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The objective and purpose of this PhD is to provide pragmatic solutions to the 
Posted Workers Directive 96/71/EC.1 This European Union legislation is designed 
to govern a unique category of worker that moves throughout the internal market 
temporarily under the provision of services. The Directive was created to protect 
workers’ rights, combat social dumping by ensuring a climate of fair competition 
and promote the transnational provision of services. In practice, it has failed to 
fulfil its objectives, as seen by the Laval Triplet.2 Therefore, following a thorough 
analysis of the issues that are intrinsic to the Directive itself and also highlight 
wider issues such as the competing interests of the internal market and national 
labour law as well as the conflicting economic and social policy interests, this 
thesis will provide legislative solutions which will constitute the requisite original 
contribution to knowledge. 
 The thesis is composed of five parts, beginning with the Introduction and 
ending with the Conclusions. The central Chapters follow the chronological order 
of the Directive’s story as follows: Chapter 1 details why and how the Directive 
was created including an analysis of the early case law; Chapter 2 analyses the 
issues associated with the Directive and it offers an original critique of the Court’s 
interpretation of the Directive; and Chapter 3 reviews the solutions that have 
already been suggested by the EU Institutions, the European Social Partners and 
the academic literature before providing my own input to the field. The form of 
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I. The Research Question and Methodology 
 
This thesis was originally inspired by the fascinating consequences stemming 
from the clash between European Union (EU) law and the national law of the 
Member States. The EU appears to be ever-expanding4 and this expansion 
highlights a growing market with increasing economic and social opportunities. 
Nevertheless, it is imperative that amongst these developments the Member 
States’ interests and differences must not be eroded. Ultimately, it is these 
differences that we embrace and are drawn to as other Member States offer 
something different from our own. The place of national law in the context of the 
primacy of Union law is a timeless issue and although it motivated the idea for 
this thesis, it was clear from the start that the complexities elicited from the clash 
of laws within a supranational entity are so vast that this thesis needed to examine 
the relevant issues through the lens of a specific case study. This case study is 
intended to give a greater focus and a tangible reference point that will confer real 
substance to the value of this PhD.  
The choice of case study was influenced, not only by its subject matter, 
but also by the fact that I started the thesis in October 2009 which was a very 
exciting and dynamic time for EU law; months away from the anticipated Lisbon 
Treaty coming into effect, which would amend the Union’s constitutional 
framework, coupled with the legally binding status of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (the Charter) that promised change in respect of 
social policies from the Union’s economic origins and finally, in 2009 academic 
debate on EU law was largely dominated by, arguably, one of the most important 
groups of EU cases of the early twenty-first century: the Laval Quartet.5 The case 
study that has been selected is the Posted Workers Directive 96/71/EC (the 
                                                 
4
 Croatia acceded to the EU on 1 July 2013, increasing Union membership to a total of 28 Member 
States.   
5
 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v 
Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-341/05 Laval un 
Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767; Case C-346/06 Dirk 
Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1989; Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg 
[2008] ECR I-4323. 
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Directive)6 because it elicits all of these most pertinent developments and thereby 
functions as the perfect tool to consider the broader issues of the European Union 
whilst also necessitating its own intrinsic review. 
The Directive governs the temporary movement of labour across the EU, 
hence the requirement that workers are “posted”. The Directive is extremely 
topical both in the current political and judicial spheres as this unique category of 
worker comes under Article 56 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) on service provision, therefore, in principal, home State rules apply which 
aggravates the potential to undercut the local workers of the host State during the 
period of posting. The issues have truly come to light during the economic 
recession as the commercial opportunity of using cheaper labour is made available 
by the Directive and is certainly one of the benefits of the internal market for 
undertakings, however, the effect of this is that at times of recession when local 
unemployment is at its highest, the threat of social dumping has been intensified. 
This was exacerbated by the fact that in 2004 the EU experienced an explosive 
enlargement with ten countries acceding to the Union, predominantly from 
Eastern Europe. In light of the battle played out in the Directive between the 
competing interests of national and Union law and also economic and social 
policies, this thesis asks: how can the issues associated with the Posted Workers 
Directive best be resolved?  
 In finding the answer to my research question the following sources have 
been used: the legislation itself; the Court’s judgments; the Advocate Generals’ 
Opinions; documents from the European social partners and the EU Institutions; 
and the academic doctrine. Accordingly, the methodology adopted is doctrinal and 
although the doctrine primarily focuses on the practical elements involved, the 
thesis also intends to contribute to the more general public policy debate 
surrounding these issues. The context in which this thesis has been written is 
principally from an EU law perspective and secondarily, a labour law perspective, 
as my starting position has always been that of an EU law researcher and the topic 
overlaps with European labour law. Finally, the law is stated as of 30 September 
2013. 
 
                                                 
6
 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, [1997] OJ L18/1. 
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II. The Format of the PhD 
 
(i) Chapter 1: The Posted Workers Directive 
 
The first Chapter is separated into two Parts: Part 1 details how and why the 
Directive was created. Prior to the Directive there was no legislation governing 
posted workers, therefore, this Part examines the early impetus for legislative 
guidance in the area followed by the issues that arose during its drafting, issues 
that would reveal themselves in practice following the Directive’s adoption. This 
Part concludes with the adoption of the Directive and an explanation of its most 
prominent provisions in order to set the scene for the rest of the thesis. 
 Part 2 discusses how the Directive was initially interpreted by the Court, 
from the case law immediately following its adoption through to the cases that 
invoked the Directive following transposition. In these early cases there was an 
evolution in the Court’s interpretation from revealing a reluctance to rely on the 
provisions of the Directive at first to then using the Directive as it was intended by 
showing a suitable balance of all of the Directive’s objectives. The final case 
discussed in this Chapter, Commission v Germany,7 draws attention to the very 
first sign that the Court was willing to interpret the Directive solely in accordance 
with its legal basis; the freedom to provide services, above all else. From this 
point to the Laval Quartet, that is discussed in the next Chapter, there was a 
perceptible shift in the Court’s interpretation. Therefore, this Chapter concludes 
with the reasons that caused this shift. 
 
(ii) Chapter 2: The Issues Relating to the Directive 
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to find solutions to the problems of the Directive, 
in order to achieve that result, it is necessary first to reveal all of the problems and 
explore them in-depth. This Chapter centres around Laval as the case exemplifies 
the predominant issues relating to the Directive. There are five main areas that are 
explored in depth: (i) competence; (ii) judicial activism; (iii) horizontal direct 
effect; (iv) EU law versus national law; and (v) local unemployment at times of 
                                                 
7
 Case C-490/04 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany 
[2007] ECR I-6095. 
 15 
recession. This Chapter provides an original critique of the Court’s interpretation 
in Laval, revealing that it was ultra vires by relying on a provision concerning the 
applicability of collective agreements that is in fact obsolete. 
 In showing that Laval was not an aberration of the Court, the Chapter then 
discusses the issues arising from Rüffert and Commission v Luxembourg. This is 
followed by a discussion of a UK case that reveals how the Directive has been 
(mis)used in order to circumvent national immigration law. The Chapter 
concludes with a final word on the failings of the Court in interpreting the 
Directive that has heightened the issues and confirmed the need for change, 
thereby paving the way for the proposed solutions in Chapter 3. 
 
(iii) Chapter 3: The Proposed Solutions to the Directive 
 
Chapter 3 collates all of the proposed solutions and then presents my own. There 
are three solutions that are considered: (i) amend the Directive, which directly 
addresses all of the issues identified in Chapter 2 and responds accordingly in 
order to shape the current Directive into the best version of itself. This proposal 
also fulfils a sub-aim of the thesis by providing a valid public policy justification 
intended to protect social values that are closely connected to national interests; 
(ii) adopt the Commission’s proposed Enforcement Directive;8 or (iii) do not 
make any changes to the Directive but simply rely on the legislative changes that 
have been made to EU law since Laval and its progeny. 
 
(iv) Conclusions  
 
This final part of the thesis confirms the legislative solution that is held as being 
the most efficient and necessary response in light of the issues that have been 
examined and the interests of all the major stakeholders. The final comments 
assess whether there is the political will to implement the solution proposed by 
this thesis. 
                                                 
8
 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
enforcement of Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services’ COM(2012) 131 final. 
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The PhD considers the wider issues demonstrated by connecting the 
influence of the issues and proposed solutions to the broader picture of the EU, 
thus coming full circle and reflecting on the primary motivation of the thesis 
































Chapter 1: The Posted Workers Directive 
 
Part 1: The Directive’s Creation 
 
I. Inspiration for the Posted Workers Directive 
 
The Directive’s inception can be dated back to the 1989 Community Charter of 
the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers (Charter of Social Rights). In the 
European Union, at this time, there was a determination, motivated by the Single 
European Act’s commitment, to establish the Single European Market by the end 
of 1992, consequently, the direction of the EU was economically driven. 
Therefore, despite its non-binding effect, the Charter of Social Rights filled a 
potential void respecting the social aspects within the Union, “in the context of the 
establishment of the single European market, the same importance must be 
attached to the social aspects as to the economic aspects”.9  
 The Charter of Social Rights established the foundations of the European 
labour law model and it granted an initial platform for social dialogue, “the 
Charter was instrumental in the launching of initiatives in employment and 
industrial relations policy, which produced a number of directives during the 
1990s.”10 This included the Directive, “The Posted Workers Directive represented 
one of the last pieces of unfinished business from the 1989 Social Charter action 
programme, and had been grinding slowly through the Community law-making 
process since 1991.”11 This Charter clearly inspired elements of the Directive,12 
however, the most direct influence on the creation of the Directive must be 
credited to Rush Portuguesa;13 a case that was determined the year after the 
Charter of Social Rights was adopted.  
                                                 
9
 Para. 2 of the Preamble, Commission of the European Communities, ‘Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights (Draft)’ COM(89) 471 final. 
10
 Eurofound, ‘Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers’: 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/communitycharter
ofthefundamentalsocialrightsofworkers.htm [accessed 20 February 2012]. 
11
 ‘European Communities: progress at September council’ (1996) European Industrial Relations 
Review, 274: 14-15, 14. 
12
 The Charter of Social Rights established the core principles on which the European labour law 
model is based, including employment and remuneration, equal treatment for men and women, 
health protection and safety at the workplace; all of which are expressly provided for under Article 
3(1) Directive.  
13
 Case C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa Lda v Office national d’immigration [1990] ECR I-1417. 
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 Rush Portuguesa was an undertaking established in Portugal. As Portugal 
had only recently acceded to the EU, on 1 January 1986, Rush Portuguesa was 
subject to the rules of the transitional period. Therefore, when it posted its 
workers to France, for the construction of a railway line, the Director of the Office 
national d’immigration in France ordered Rush Portuguesa to pay a special 
contribution due to employing foreign workers from non-Member States in breach 
of the Labour Code. That decision was annulled. However, the Office national 
d’immigration argued that the freedom to provide services does not extend to all 
employees of the service provider; as they are subject to the arrangements 
applicable to workers from non-Member States under the transitional provisions 
laid down in the Act of Accession as regards the free movement of workers. The 
Court disagreed and held that Rush Portuguesa was permitted to post its workers 
to France and the French authority could not impose any conditions on Rush 
Portuguesa’s workers in relation to the recruitment of manpower in situ or the 
obtaining of work permits. 
 The Court, in its judgment, attempted to find some equilibrium between 
the competing interests of the host State and the service provider. As a new 
Member State in an enlarging Union, it was feared that Portugal would be able to 
send their workers to the old Member States, under the free movement provisions, 
but could continue to maintain their lower wage and labour standards, thereby 
retaining a competitive advantage and undercutting the workforce of the host 
State, “The Directive, which was drafted in 1991, was partially intended to allay 
the fears of policymakers in high-wage economies that their markets would be 
flooded by increasing numbers of lower paid workers.”14 In the Rush Portuguesa 
case the French Government feared an influx of Portuguese workers; there was a 
concern that Portuguese service providers would be able to circumvent “the 
provisions of Article 216 of the Act of Accession under the cloak of a provision of 
services.”15 However, the Court held that there was no abuse of Union law and the 
additional conditions imposed on the Portuguese workers would have amounted to 
a restriction on the freedom to provide services which is prohibited by Article 56 
TFEU. Therefore, the Court upheld the freedom to provide services, in the 
                                                 
14
 Kennett and Nesbitt, ‘The consequences of employing a mobile workforce – a patchwork of 
protections’ (2000) ICCLR, 11(12): 399-406, 400. 
15
 Rush Portuguesa, op. cit., Summary to the judgment. 
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interests of the service provider, on the condition that the service provider respects 
the local legislation and collective agreements of the host State, so as to appease 
the host State’s concerns of social dumping. 
 This case is the seminal judgment on posted workers and is of paramount 
importance to the creation of the Directive; it permitted the host State to extend its 
legislation or collective labour agreements to posted workers sent to its territory: 
 
“Finally, it should be stated, in response to the concern expressed in this 
connection by the French Government, that Community law does not 
preclude Member States from extending their legislation, or collective 
labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry, to any person who 
is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no matter in which 
country the employer is established nor does Community law prohibit 
Member States from enforcing those rules by appropriate means.”16 
 
Interestingly, it has been said that the Court’s decision to extend the host State’s 
laws to the posted workers was not a material part of the judgment and therefore 
not requisite to the decision, “the Court, committing a basic error of the craft of 
judicial decision-making, answered a question which was not necessary for its 
decision”.17 The substance of the case concerned whether a Portuguese service 
provider could move its workforce for the period of posting and if the authorities 
could impose any conditions on that service provider relating to the recruitment of 
manpower or the obtaining of work permits. Therefore, in establishing that the 
host State could extend its own laws to the posted workers during their 
deployment suggests that the Court was guilty of judicial activism here. However, 
I do not believe that to be true; a more plausible explanation is that what was 
essentially obiter dictum in this case has been transplanted by the legislator and 
applied as the founding principle to the broader context of posted workers. The 
Directive codified the ruling by stating that host States could extend the terms and 
conditions set out in Article 3(1) Directive to posted workers by the means 
provided there. From a subjective point of view, this part of the judgment was 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., [18]; see also Case 62/81 Société anonyme de droit français Seco and Société anonyme de 
droit français Desquenne & Giral v Etablissement d’assurance contre la vieillesse et l’invalidité 
[1982] ECR 223, [14].  
17
 Davies, ‘The posted workers Directive and the EC Treaty’ (2002) ILJ, 31(3): 298-306, 300.  
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obiter to the final ruling, but to state that it “was not necessary” fails to appreciate 
the tensions that were building in regard to the threat of greater competition for 
jobs and the differing wage and labour standards, as highlighted by an enlarging 
Union; Spain and Portugal had just acceded to the Union in 1986. Also, in 1985 
and 1990 two Schengen Agreements were signed between all the Member States, 
excluding Ireland and the UK, consequently removing frontier checks and 
establishing a common external frontier, thereby adding to a greater sense of 
vulnerability in respect of the limits to national protection. Accordingly, the posting 
of workers highlights a politically sensitive area that was not, at the time, governed 
by specific legislation.  
 Prior to the Directive’s adoption, certain Member States had already 
established their own national legislation concerning posted workers,18 however, 
Rush Portuguesa highlighted the need for a Union-wide statutory response in 
respect of governing the cross-border temporary movement of labour. This case 
was therefore the true catalyst to the Directive’s creation. 
 
II. Drafting the Posted Workers Directive 
 
Rush Portuguesa acted as the prologue to the Directive as the year after the ruling, 
the Commission presented its first Proposal for the Directive.19 When preparing 
this Proposal, the Commission conducted a series of consultation meetings with 
employers, trade unions and individual organisations and it was concluded that, 
“The workers’ trade union organisations support the action by the Commission… 
Employers in certain sectors, such as the construction industry, which are faced 
with problems concerning the posting of workers, are in favour of Community 
action.”20 This confirms that secondary legislation to govern the posting of 
workers was required and following the 1989 Charter of Social Rights, it was 
presented at the right time and in the right environment. However, it took five 
years from the Directive’s Proposal to its final adoption in 1996, which included 
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an amended Proposal in 1993.21 The fate of the Directive was jointly in the hands 
of the Council of the EU and the European Parliament, due to the legal basis that 
stipulated under Article 53(1) TFEU the Directive was subject to the ordinary 
legislative procedure (previously the co-decision procedure). The lead up to the 
adoption of the Directive was long and eventful as it was revealed during the co-
decision procedure that this Directive elicited more politically sensitive matters 
than first imagined. There were four major points of contention that arose and 
necessitate discussion here: (i) which law applies?; (ii) lack of clarity; (iii) three 
month threshold; (iv) erga omnes effect. 
 
(i) Which Law Applies? 
 
The choice of applicable law presented a difficult predicament; due to their 
temporary nature, prior case law has established that posted workers come within 
the provision of services and therefore the service provider cannot be required to 
comply with all the obligations of an establishment.22 However, Rush Portuguesa 
highlighted the accelerating threat of social dumping in an enlarging Union, which 
the Commission gave credence to in its Proposal; at the time, in 1990, the highest 
level of hourly wages in ECU23 in collective agreements in the construction 
industry was 18.39 in Denmark and 2.52 in Greece.24 Therefore, if posted workers 
were entirely subject to the country of origin principle, this would exacerbate the 
diverging wage and labour conditions across the Member States. The solution 
offered by the Directive was essentially a compromise, whereby both the home 
and host State laws apply in part. 
The legal basis of the Directive, which has always remained the same, 
comprises Articles 53(1) and 62 TFEU which binds the Directive to the freedom 
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to provide services, confirming that home State rules apply in general. However, 
as inspired by Rush Portuguesa, the Proposal offered a list of terms and 
conditions of the host State’s employment laws under Article 3(1)(b) Proposal 
that must be extended to posted workers during the posting. This list has remained 
effectively the same in the adopted text of the Directive. The terms and conditions 
of employment reflect the mandatory hardcore terms of the contract that are 
directly relevant during the period of posting. In essence, a distinction can be 
made between short and long-term social protection; the short-term benefits that 
will be accrued during the posting, such as minimum wages and health and safety 
at work, are governed by the rules of the host State where the posting takes place 
and the long-term benefits, such as social security benefits, are governed by the 
rules of the home State where the workers will return after the posting has been 
completed. 
The Directive does not aim to harmonise substantive minimum standards 
across the Member States, quite the opposite, it requires each Member State to 
ensure that employers observe national terms and conditions of the host State, 
“Minimum wage levels, for example, will vary as much across the Community 
after the Directive as they did before.”25 Evidently, this is not a full harmonisation 
Directive, but it does intend to coordinate the conflict of law rules so that the 
service provider can abide by the terms of the host State, “In that sense, this is not 
a labour law instrument, but a proposal concerning international private law 
closely related to the freedom to provide services [emphasis added].”26 It is 
submitted that by specifying the Directive was not intended to be a labour law 
instrument, the Commission was making it abundantly clear from the start that the 
Directive should be interpreted as an internal market instrument, not a labour law 
instrument and therefore the freedom to provide services is the overriding 
objective to be fulfilled and consequently the Directive can already be read as a 
‘maximum’, as opposed to a ‘minimum’ Directive, thereby associating the rules 
more closely to commercial law as opposed to labour law, “In the labour law 
domain, minimum protections and international standards can always be improved 
in favour of workers… In the commercial law field, by contrast, the basic 
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protections are the maximum limit in order to allow compatibility with the goal of 
fostering competition; any additions would be regarded as unjustified constraints 
on the provision of services”.27 
In binding posted workers to the provision of services, they are inevitably 
at an advantage to migrant workers and national host State workers as they 
maintain their own labour standards in the main, thus, posted workers can 
potentially undercut the host State workers. Furthermore, posted workers can offer 
a cheaper service as despite working in a Member State where there may be 
higher living costs in comparison to their home State, posted workers are only 
there temporarily and therefore can survive on a lower wage during the period of 
posting as they do not incur the higher living costs on a permanent daily basis.28  
As posted workers come within the scope of service provision, they are 
not subject to the usual labour market regulations imposed on the free movement 
of workers or the freedom of establishment. Their access to the host State’s labour 
market is less burdensome due to the fact that their consequent departure from the 
host State’s labour market is guaranteed. During this time of co-decision, the 
Court declared that posted workers are distinct from migrant workers as they “do 
not in any way seek access to the labour market in that [host] State, if they return 
to their country of origin or residence after completion of their work [emphasis 
added].”29 The latter part of this sentence provides the condition that where the 
workers return to their home State qualifies them as not “in any way” accessing 
the host State’s labour market. It is as if the period of posting does not count; the 
decisive factor is that they return. However, one cannot nullify the period of 
posting from time spent in the host State on the condition that at some point the 
workers return to their home State, for the reason that the period of posting is the 
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sole cause of the workers exercising their right of free movement. At this time the 
Council and Parliament were negotiating the Directive, therefore, one might have 
argued that the freedom to provide services was not the most suitable legal basis 
for a category of worker that was not seen to technically enter the host State’s 
labour market and therefore could circumvent all of the regular conditions 
imposed on workers.  
The choice of legal basis is a reoccurring issue throughout this thesis as it 
embodies the legal, occupational and social issues associated with the Directive. 
The Parliament has referred to the Directive as “an essential feature of the social 
dimension of the single market”.30 However, it is submitted that this statement is 
not entirely accurate when considering the Directive’s foundations, “It is the first 
substantial whole-Community social Directive – that is, based on the Treaty rather 
than the social policy Agreement annexed to the Maastricht Treaty on European 
Union”.31 It sounds pleasing to call this a “social Directive” but it is submitted 
that it cannot be this if its legal basis is grounded in economic policies. The legal 
basis selected does not reflect all of the Directive’s objectives as it does not have a 
legal footing on the social policy provisions of the Treaty, suggesting an apparent 
lack of social concern. Therefore, despite being inspired by the Charter of Social 
Rights, the Directive was always primarily designed to be an economic tool, 
providing an insight into what can be expected from the Court’s interpretation of 
the Directive.  
The issue of a lack of social policy in the Directive resonated throughout 
the drafting process as the Preamble of the Proposal made reference to 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 94 concerning social 
clauses in public contracts, however, this was not included in the adopted 
Directive. By omitting this provision the Commission freed itself from certain 
obligations that might act as an obstacle to the free movement of services in future 
case law. 
 
(ii) Lack of Clarity 
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In principle, the Proposal was well-received; the Council consulted the Economic 
and Social Committee on the Proposal for the Directive32 and their Opinion was in 
favour of the Proposal as the Committee opined that there was a need for 
legislation in this area at Union level.33 However, the Committee recommended 
considerable amendments as despite recognising the need for such a Directive, it 
foresaw difficulty in its practical implementation. In particular, the Committee 
identified problems arising from a lack of clarity in identifying the fundamental 
aim of the Directive.34 This incoherence is evident in the legal basis which is 
based on the freedom to provide services but the Directive also aims to support 
fair competition and worker protection which the legal basis does not adequately 
reflect. The Committee also took issue with Article 53(1) TFEU which makes 
reference to the self-employed and is deemed unnecessary in respect of posted 
workers. 
Postings can be made either from a service provider to a recipient; or via 
intra-company transfers; or hiring out workers by a temporary employment 
agency, provided that in all these instances there is an employment relationship 
between the undertaking making the posting and the worker during the posting. 
The Committee expressed that greater clarity of what an “undertaking” constitutes 
would assist in clarifying the type of activities covered by the Directive.35 Also, in 
respect of temporary employment agencies and typical service providers, the 
Directive needs to distinguish the difference between the supply of labour and the 
supply of services to avoid potential abuse of the law.36  
The lack of precision in the mandatory terms and conditions of 
employment in the Proposal, “is likely to give considerable difficulty in 
operation.”37 Also, in accordance with Directive 91/533/EEC,38 posted workers 
are entitled to be fully informed of the terms and conditions of employment that 
will be applied to them during their posting abroad. Finally, the Committee 
                                                 
32
 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the proposal for a Council Directive 
concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services (1992) OJ 
C49/41-42.  
33
 Ibid., Section 1.1.  
34
 Ibid., Section 1.2.  
35
 Ibid., Section 2.2. 
36
 Ibid., Section 2.3.  
37
 Ibid., Section 2.4.1.1.  
38
 Directive 91/533/EEC of the Council of 14 October 1991 on an employer’s obligation to inform 
employees of the conditions applicable to the contract or employment relationship [1991] OJ 
L288/32-35.   
 26 
recognised the lack of social policy under the terms and conditions of employment 
and proposed that a social clause should be included in the contract between the 
service recipient and provider.39 
As seen in practice, which will be explored throughout the thesis, the 
Commission did not adequately heed the Committee’s forewarnings and 
consequently much of the lack of clarity identified here came to light in the case 
law.   
 
(iii) Three Month Threshold 
 
Article 3(2) Proposal provided that minimum paid holidays and the minimum rate 
of pay in accordance with the terms and conditions of employment of the host 
State shall not apply to posted workers when the duration of the posting is less 
than three months. This provision was vehemently challenged and called on for 
review by both the Council and the Parliament. The Economic and Social 
Committee opined that this threshold can lead to an abuse as posted workers could 
be rotated on a three-monthly basis in order to avoid the obligation of complying 
with all of the host State’s rules.40 
Following its first reading,41 the European Parliament approved the 
Proposal, subject to a number of amendments. The main sticking point, that in fact 
delayed the completed first reading,42 concerned the three month threshold which 
the Parliament did not support. The Parliament called on the Council to agree that 
the wages and holidays of posted workers should be governed by the principle of 
lex locis43 and even suggested a ‘zero threshold’.44 The Commission did not agree 
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with the zero threshold but a compromise was finally reached and Article 3(2) of 
the amended Proposal lowered the threshold to one month.  
The final Directive concluded that the host State rules under Article 3(1) 
Directive would apply from the first day of posting, but, added four potential 
derogations. These are listed under Article 3(2), (3), (4) and (5) Directive. Article 
3(2) details the only compulsory exemption: minimum paid annual holidays and 
minimum rates of pay will not apply to postings lasting eight days or less where 
these concern skilled workers in assembly and installation work which forms an 
integral part of a contract for the supply of goods (except where this is in the 
construction sector). The only compulsory exemption therefore is restricted to 
eight days; a significant reduction from the original threshold of three months and 
it applies to a very specific group of skilled workers who will presumably be 
receiving more than the minimum wage in any case. 
Article 3(3), (4) and (5) Directive permit Member States to decide whether 
or not they wish to apply the minimum rates of pay provision to postings lasting 
under a month or by means of collective agreements to provide exemptions to 
postings lasting under a month. It is also left to Member States to decide whether 
or not they wish to apply minimum paid annual holidays and minimum rates of 
pay provisions on the grounds that the amount of work to be done during the 
posting is “not significant”. From a subjective point of view, even though the 
threshold has been reduced by a third, the rules on applying this threshold are not 
clear-cut and they appear very arbitrary. Firstly, what does “not significant” 
mean? And who makes that decision? When it provides that the Member States 
can decide to opt-out of the mandatory hardcore terms it does not specify which 
Member State makes this decision; the host State or the home State, also with 
these exceptions it no longer seems appropriate to refer to the terms as either 
“mandatory” or “hardcore” – do these derogations in fact re-define the terms as a 
mere guideline or reference point? Further, the Member States are instructed only 
to make their decision following consultation with “employers and labour” but 
again, is this referring to the employers and labour of the home or the host State or 
both? It is this lack of definition and consequent uncertainty that not only leads to 
problems in practice but even more troubling than that; an opportunity for service 
providers to circumvent the rules, post workers unlawfully and excuse themselves 
from applying the host State’s laws. Before there was legislation in this area the 
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service providers and recipients had to instinctively rely on cooperation and 
common sense in order to form a good working relationship with the hope of 
creating contacts and opportunities in other Member States. However, when there 
is legislation the parties are not allowed to derogate from the specified rules, so 
when there are derogations but those derogations are ‘hazy’ this actually gives the 
contracting parties statutory law to rely on in support of non-compliance. The 
legislation should assist in clarifying the rules, but instead the lack of clarity in the 
wording has the effect of legislating, and therefore solidifying, the confusion. 
 
(iv) Erga Omnes Effect 
 
From July to December 1992 the Presidency of the Council was the UK and on 3 
December 1992 the Council presented a press release on the proposed Directive.45 
The Council raised the ongoing issue of the application of collective 
agreements;46 the Proposal stipulated that collective agreements only apply if they 
cover the whole of the occupation and industry concerned and have an erga 
omnes effect. The Council suggested that collective agreements which apply 
generally should suffice. This highlights the differing national labour rules of the 
Member States; certain Member States rely heavily on collective agreements to 
regulate their system of industrial relations. Take Sweden, as an example, where 
legislation on minimum wages or guidelines on rates of pay is non-existent; these 
provisions of the contract are left to be determined by collective agreements.47 
Therefore, collective agreements can be very specific to the particular contract on 
the site where it applies and will not necessarily have an erga omnes effect, so that 
the collective agreement would not be applicable to the posted workers and as 
there is no other provision for the rate of pay the home State rule would apply 
which could be considerably less than that of the host State. Consequently, the 
aim of the Directive to bolster fair competition and protect workers’ rights would 
not be feasible in practice if only collective agreements that have an erga omnes 
effect are applicable. In principle, this thesis commends the Directive’s objectives 
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to cater to all elements of the posted worker scenario, however, these elements 
cannot be evenly balanced in practice when the provisions of the Directive do not 
reflect the reality; the Directive does not intend to harmonise the labour law rules 
of 28 Member States but it also has not shown a flexibility or awareness of the 
differing labour law systems in practice. The application of collective agreements 
is one of the fundamental issues of the Directive, it was picked up on by the 
Council in 1992 and has shown itself to be a live issue ever since.48 
Following the strong opposition to the “erga omnes effect”, it was sensibly 
omitted in the amended Proposal and redefined by Article 3(4) of the amended 
Proposal which provided that collective agreements are applicable if they are 
“observed by all undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or 
industry concerned”. Or in the absence thereof, those which have been declared 
“generally applicable… provided that their application… ensures equality of 
treatment.” Article 4(3) of the amended Proposal added that generally applicable 
collective agreements need to be published as such in the implementing 
legislation, if they have not been published, the foreign undertaking will not be 
bound by the collective agreement. 
The final Directive applied the same provisions but with two alterations: 
firstly, it specified that collective agreements which are “observed by all 
undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned” 
need to have been declared “universally applicable”. The clarification of the 
collective agreements being universally applicable is arguably akin to erga omnes 
and therefore reinstates the terminology that was intended to have been deleted. 
Thus, it is submitted that “erga omnes” was deleted in nomenclature as opposed to 
in substance, after all, the Latin phrase translates to “towards all”49 and 
“universally” defines, “every instance; without any exception”.50 In 2003 the 
Commission must have forgotten the controversy surrounding the erga omnes 
terminology in this preliminary stage as in its Communication it defined 
universally applicable agreements as being “erga omnes collective agreements.”51 
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Consequently, there is clearly an overlap between the two definitions, revealing 
that the erga omnes effect has been maintained through the phrase “universally 
applicable”.  
Secondly, Article 4(3) of the amended Proposal that required generally 
applicable collective agreements to be declared as applying in the implementing 
legislation was not included in the final text of the adopted Directive. This 
provision would have made collective agreements even harder to apply in 
practice, therefore, the second alteration to the final version of the Directive is that 
where there is no system to declare collective agreements universally applicable 
they can still apply in two instances under Article 3(8) Directive. Those two 
instances include collective agreements that are generally applicable to similar 
undertakings in the geographical area and in the industry concerned, or those 
which have been concluded by the most representative employers and labour 
organisations at national level. The fact that the Directive removed the obligation 
to explicitly declare these collective agreements as applying in the implementing 
legislation implicates that they should now be easier to extend to posted workers. 
Unfortunately, the case law based on the final version of the Directive has proved 
otherwise.52  
 
III. Adoption of the Posted Workers Directive  
 
After five years since its first Proposal, a common position was finally reached53 
between the Parliament and the Council. Despite the fact that the UK Government 
voted against the Directive’s adoption54 and the Portuguese Government 
abstained, this did not prevent its adoption as the Council only needed a qualified 
majority vote, in accordance with the legal basis, and the Directive was finally 
adopted by the Council on 16 December 1996. The Member States then had 
exactly three years to transpose the Directive into their national law. 
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 The table below documents the three stages of the Directive’s life until its 
adoption: 
 
The Proposal (1991) Amended Proposal 
(1993) 
The Directive (1996) 
Article 1: Scope Article 1: Scope Article 1: Scope 
Article 2: Scope Article 2: Scope Article 2: Definition 
Article 3: Terms and 
Conditions of 
Employment 
Article 3: Terms and 
Conditions of Employment 
Article 3: Terms and 
Conditions of Employment 
Article 4: 
Implementation by 31 
December 1992 
Article 4: Cooperation on 
Information 
Article 4: Cooperation on 
Information 
Article 5: This Directive 
is Addressed to the 
Member States 
Article 5: Measures Article 5: Measures 
 Article 6: Implementation 
Two Years after its 
Adoption 
Article 6: Jurisdiction 
 Article 7: Commission 
Review 
Article 7: Implementation 
by 16 December 1999 
 Article 8: This Directive is 
Addressed to the Member 
States 
Article 8: Commission 
Review 
  Article 9: This Directive is 
addressed to the Member 
States 
 
Article 3(1) is described as the “centerpiece of the Directive”.55 It sets out the 
mandatory terms and conditions of employment to be extended to posted workers 
in the following list: 
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(a) maximum work periods and minimum rest periods; 
(b) minimum paid annual holidays; 
(c) the minimum rates of pay (defined by the national law and/or practice of 
the host State), including overtime rates;  
(d) the conditions of hiring-out of workers, in particular the supply of workers 
by temporary employment undertakings; 
(e) health, safety and hygiene at work; 
(f) protective measures with regard to the terms and conditions of 
employment of pregnant women or women who have recently given birth, of 
children and of young people; 
(g) equality of treatment between men and women and other provisions on 
non-discrimination. 
 
The terms and conditions are laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
provision and/or by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been 
declared universally applicable. As aforementioned, in the absence of a system for 
declaring universal applicability there are two additional options to extend terms 
and conditions of employment in collective agreements under Article 3(8) 
Directive. The extension of collective agreements to posted workers under Article 
3(1) Directive only applies to activities in the construction sector. This could 
reasonably be interpreted to mean that the application of collective agreements in 
other sectors may only be applied via the public policy provisions of Article 3(10) 
Directive, as it states that the Directive shall not preclude to posted workers, 
“terms and conditions of employment laid down in the collective agreements or 
arbitration awards… concerning activities other than those referred to in the 
Annex [construction sector].” However, it is only in the 2003 Commission 
Communication that specifies collective agreements outside of the construction 
sector must also be universally applicable in order to apply to posted workers.56 
As this condition is not expressly or clearly specified in the Directive, it 
demonstrates that the Directive is open to misinterpretation in respect of the 
applicable terms and conditions of employment and these unclear provisions have 
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been left to the Court to determine in practice which does not satisfy the 
requirement of legal certainty. 
One of the Directive’s objectives is to guarantee respect for the rights of 
workers,57 which is supported by Article 3(7) Directive; if a term or condition of 
employment is more favourable to the workers than those stipulated, the more 
favourable term will apply. For example, if the contractual rate of pay is higher 
than the host State’s minimum wage, the posted workers will receive the 
contractual rate of pay. Or at least, that is how it was initially interpreted by the 
Member States, yet the case law, as detailed in Chapter 2, reveals that the 
application of Article 3(7) in practice is extremely limited, bringing into question 
just how seriously the Court is willing to uphold the objective of protecting 
workers. 
Article 3(10) Directive enlarges the competence of the host State, subject 
to the requirement of equal treatment and in compliance with the Treaty, by 
permitting host States to extend the list of terms and conditions applicable to 
posted workers beyond those specified in Article 3(1), if they are within the 
category of public policy provisions and/or terms laid down in collective 
agreements outside of the construction industry. The availability of public policy 
provisions, beyond the scope of the mandatory hardcore terms can be likened to 
the imperative requirements that may be applied outside of the Treaty derogations 
and it is this possibility of derogation that reflects the reality and flexibility of 
applying one legislation to all of the Member States; there will always be 
something so central to the practice and tradition of a particular Member State that 
will not be known in advance but the possibility to consider these ‘grey areas’ if 
and when they arise is a fundamental principle to the workings of the law in 
practice.  
There are two final elements that were introduced by the Directive: (i) 
social security; and (ii) jurisdiction, that are integral to the Directive’s 
development and therefore require discussion here. 
 
(i) Social Security 
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The temporary nature of posted workers can prove problematic in some areas of 
administration, particularly in the context of social security contributions.58 To 
avoid legal uncertainty, workers moving within the EU are subject to the social 
security rules of only one Member State and this is generally the place where they 
are economically active at the time, irrespective of their place of residence – the 
lex loci laboris principle – in the interests of equal treatment and non-
discrimination. However, this would be the host State’s rules in respect of posted 
workers, which contradicts the notion that posted workers fall within the provision 
of services. Therefore, the Court determined59 that there is a derogation from the 
lex loci laboris principle for posted workers as they continue to be beholden to 
and the beneficiary of their home State’s social security scheme even during the 
period of posting. The Court’s reasoning was based on Regulation 1408/7160 
which lays down the provisions applicable to social security benefits and 
contributions and states in its Article 14(1)(a)(i) that special rules apply to posted 
workers derogating from the general lex loci laboris principle. Therefore, 





Article 6 Directive explicitly deals with jurisdiction and is the only totally new 
provision since the amended Proposal. It states that legal enforcement will take 
place in the host State. Therefore, posted workers must be guaranteed easy access 
to the courts and tribunals of the host State, including arbitration or mediation, on 
the same footing as national workers. For example, workers posted to the UK 
could bring a claim before the Employment Tribunal. Proceedings may be brought 
in another Member State, in compliance with existing international conventions 
on jurisdiction. 
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Article 5(1) Brussels Convention61 confers jurisdiction over contracts of 
employment primarily upon the courts of the place “where the employee 
habitually carries out his work”, in effect, the home State. Article 6 Directive adds 
to the Brussels Convention by allowing posted workers to bring proceedings in 
the courts of the host State, even though employment in the host State is only 
temporary. However, this can be viewed as a blatant ambiguity regarding 
jurisdiction. Kidner62 dispelled this apparent ambiguity by referencing Article 7(1) 
Rome Convention63 which permits the home State’s courts, when applying their 
own law, nevertheless to give effect to the mandatory rules of another country 
“with which the situation has a close connection… and… those rules must be 
applied whatever the law applicable to the contract.” This, after all, reflects the 
scope of the Directive: that the home State’s rules, under the freedom to provide 
services, will apply in general to posted workers, even during the posting, but the 
mandatory terms and conditions of employment of the host State must be adhered 
to and applied, as laid down by Article 3(1) Directive.  
 
IV. Interim Conclusion  
 
The Directive is a novel piece of Union legislation that goes further than any 
previous transnational law on the conflict of law rules in this context, “The 
Convention of Rome does not lay down conditions for the application of 
collective agreements containing mandatory provisions. The proposal for a 
Directive does.”64 However, this novelty does not come without controversy, from 
the perspective of service providers, the effect of requiring them to comply with 
host State rules actually contradicts the character and supposed freedom of what it 
is to provide services, “the Directive forces [service providers] to comply with 
two different sets of labour law… which is why some critics have argued that this 
Directive did not, in fact, facilitate the free movement of services (as its legal 
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basis requires), but hinders it.”65 Therefore, it could be argued that the Directive 
goes too far by interfering and artificially regulating the employment relationship, 
“Recent legislation on working time and the national minimum wage has partially 
undermined the idea of the supremacy of the individual’s freedom to contract, and 
the Directive continues this trend.”66  
However, it is submitted that the requirement of imposing the host State’s 
rules on to the service provider is necessary in order to fulfil all facets of its 
objectives, “This Directive is a key instrument, both to ensure the freedom to 
provide services and to prevent social dumping.”67 Also, the option on extending 
the host State’s laws to temporary labour was already judge-made law68 before it 
was formally defined by this Directive. Furthermore, the effect of imposing the 
host State’s minimum rate of pay to posted workers during the period of posting 
guarantees that those workers cannot be paid less than the minimum, which was 
not only a concern prior to the Directive but was actually presented as a 
commercial advantage of posting workers abroad. Seco concerned social security 
contributions and the Court followed the usual jurisprudence in this area by 
specifying that Seco did not have to pay the employer’s half towards social 
security contributions in the host State as they were already liable to pay similar 
contributions in the home State for the posted workers and further, the 
contributions paid in the host State would not entitle the posted workers to any of 
the social security benefits in that State. There is nothing too surprising about that 
ruling, but what is of upmost interest here is the second of the two referred 
questions, in which the cour de cassation of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
asked whether the requirement of the service provider to pay the employer’s share 
of contributions may be off-set by the economic advantages of not complying 
with the legislation on minimum wages in the host State.69 The Court did not 
agree with this argument but what is interesting is that the question referred by the 
Luxembourg court could not form a legitimate referred question anymore as 
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Article 3(1)(c) Directive has confirmed that posted workers cannot be paid less 
than the host State’s national minimum wage. Therefore revealing one of the 
benefits of this legislation; prior to the Directive the opportunity to pay posted 
workers less than the minimum wage in the host State was argued as a legitimate 
economic advantage, whereas now, thanks to the Directive, it would be seen as a 
blatant disregard of basic workers’ rights, a serious threat to the labour system of 
the host State and an abuse of the internal market. As the Directive has regulated 
the minimum threshold of pay for posted workers, those previous problems are 
now, technically, obsolete. 
 Posted workers represent a unique category of worker and accordingly 
their governance must be unique. There are clearly competing interests and 
conflicting policy choices at stake but it appears that the overwhelming dilemma 
from the Directive’s history and creation is that – twenty years on – the Directive 
has never pin-pointed exactly what it is. Both the Council and the Parliament 
urged the Commission from the first Proposal to state more clearly what the 
Directive’s aims are and how it can achieve those aims in practice; without clear 
definitions, incorrect interpretations may be reached. The thesis now turns to the 
case law thereby revealing which of the forewarnings detailed in this Part have 
come to light in practice. 
 
Part 2: The Court’s Initial Interpretation 
 
I. The Directive’s Objectives: Guidance for the Court 
 
Part 1 detailed the lead up to the adoption of the Directive, including the relevant 
case law that helped shape its creation. In the interests of continuity and 
coherence, Part 2 begins with the case law immediately following the Directive’s 
adoption so that each section of this thesis builds on from the last and adds 
something new; ensuring that each issue is dealt with in context, independently 
and exhaustively. It is submitted that the issues are best illustrated through the 
case law where the Directive has been used in practice. The cases are presented in 
chronological order in order to illustrate the Court’s changing interpretation of the 
Directive.  
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The intentions of the Directive are commendable and it is submitted that 
its aims follow the same constitutional principles of improving both the economic 
well-being and social standards of its citizens.70 However, the practical realisation 
of the Directive’s objectives concurrently is problematic. This is because the 
objectives stem from differing policy choices: protecting workers’ rights;71 
ensuring fair competition;72 and securing the fundamental freedom to provide 
services.73 Accordingly, this will not guarantee complete harmony in the Court’s 
decisions, “the Court seems to accept that economic and non-market objectives 
that are simultaneously present in a piece of internal market law do not 
necessarily have to be consistent with one another and that there may be an 
internal tension between those objectives that requires a balanced 
interpretation.”74 This internal tension can be seen in the Court’s interpretation of 
the Directive which comprises competing interests and also, as seen in Part 1, a 
lack of clarity in the text regarding the priority of its objectives.  
This uncertainty in the legislation is inevitably reflected in the Court with 
inconsistent judgments; not knowing which objective should be granted greater 
weight, particularly when the objectives at stake stem from differing policy 
interests and, further, where there is a lack of Union competence in respect of pay, 
the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs,75 the 
protection of those rights becomes somewhat ancillary to the principal aim of 
upholding the fundamental economic freedom. However, it is suggested that these 
ancillary aims will always be present in internal market legislation in achieving 
other public policy objectives, “Internal market legislation is always also ‘about 
something else’, and that something else may, in fact, be the main reason why the 
internal market measure was adopted.”76 As aforementioned, Rush Portuguesa 
was the impetus for the creation of the Directive. The case intended to placate the 
concerns of the French Government regarding an influx of Portuguese workers 
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and thereby signalled the general atmosphere of the old Member States fearing 
social dumping and the associated threat of greater competition from the new 
Member States, as highlighted by an enlarging Union. Accordingly, the creation 
of the Directive was not just about ensuring the freedom to provide services in the 
context of posted workers, but it also intended to respect the rights of workers and 
a climate of fair competition. Clearly, these elements are intended to be 
complementary of each other, however, their policy objectives do not necessarily 
equate in equal measure in the Court-room, as will be seen below. 
 
II. The First Case Law Following the Directive’s Adoption 
 
(i) Has the Directive Made a Difference? 
 
It is important to note that the Directive was adopted on 16 December 1996 and it 
came into force three years later; the deadline for transposition was set at 16 
December 1999.77 Therefore, in cases such as Arblade and Leloup,78 the Directive 
had not been adopted at the time of the facts in the main proceedings, thus there 
was no obligation to take the Directive into account. Nevertheless, in the case it 
was considered whether the judgment “should be interpreted in the light of 
Directive 96/71/EC… inasmuch as that directive gives concrete expression to, and 
codifies, the current state of Community law relating to mandatory rules for the 
provision of minimum protection.”79 However, as the deadline for transposition 
had not yet expired, this proposal was not adopted, as corroborated by Advocate 
General (AG) Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, “no direct reliance can be placed on the 
interpretation of [the Directive’s] provisions”.80 In spite of this, the judgment in 
Arblade and Leloup makes express reference to the Directive in paragraphs 61 
and 79 and it therefore was used for guidance. Arguably however, the same 
conclusions would have been reached in Arblade and Leloup without the 
Directive’s guidance.  
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The judgment stipulated five rules in respect of posted workers: (i) the 
minimum rate of pay applicable to posted workers is that of the host State (it was 
stated in Rush Portuguesa, prior to the Directive, that Union law does not 
preclude Member States from extending their own legislation or collective labour 
agreements to posted workers); (ii) the host State cannot impose an obligation on 
the home State to make payments towards social security contributions where the 
service provider is already subject to comparable obligations in the home State 
(the same conclusion was reached in Seco81 and Guiot,82 which both preceded the 
Directive, in accordance with the mutual recognition principle); (iii) the host State 
cannot request the service provider to draw up social or labour documents where 
the protection of the posted workers is already provided for by documents already 
kept by the service provider (this follows the mutual recognition principle and 
avoidance of a double burden – a classic internal market principle); (iv) the host 
State can request that the service provider keep social and labour documents 
available throughout the period of posting in the host State in order to effectively 
monitor compliance with the host State’s legislation, justified by safeguarding the 
social protection of workers (as previously stated, compliance with the host 
State’s laws was also determined in Rush Portuguesa prior to the Directive); and 
finally (v) the host State cannot impose an obligation on the service provider to 
retain, for a period of 5 years following the completion of the period of posting, 
social documents such as a staff register and individual accounts (no reference to 
such an obligation is provided for in the Directive and therefore the legislation has 
not provided any guidance on this point). Therefore, despite the Court having to 
make its judgment in Arblade and Leloup without the Directive, it is suggested 
that the same conclusions would have been drawn with or without it in any case; 
implicating that at this stage, the Directive appeared to add very little in practice. 
 
(ii) Going Further: Contradicting the Provisions of the Directive? 
 
The Court’s reluctance to rely on the Directive for guidance was seen again four 
months later in Mazzoleni.83 However, in this case the Court went even further 
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and contradicted the provisions of the Directive by stating that the minimum rate 
of pay of the host State does not have to apply to posted workers, providing that, 
“there may be circumstances in which the application of such rules would be 
neither necessary nor proportionate to the objective pursued, namely the 
protection of the workers concerned [emphasis added].”84 In the case, security 
officers were posted from France to Belgium and they were paid less than the rate 
stipulated by the collective agreement which was intended to apply to all private 
security undertakings carrying out any activity in Belgium. It is clear that in 
accordance with Article 3(1)(c) Directive the minimum rate of pay is to comply 
with that of the host State. However, the Court made a distinction here and 
determined that in the circumstances of this case whereby the posted workers are 
established in a frontier region and due to the nature of their work, as security 
officers, the staff needed to be rotated in order to avoid customers identifying 
them too easily. Also, they carried out their work on a part-time basis and for brief 
periods and part of their work was undertaken in the territory of one or even 
several Member States, in such circumstances therefore it is for the competent 
authority of the host State to establish whether imposing the minimum wage of 
the host State on the service provider would be necessary and proportionate in 
order to ensure the protection of the workers concerned. The Court was not 
necessarily contradicting the provisions of the Directive per se, perhaps the nature 
of the work was too ‘temporary’ to come within the scope of the Directive, or 
another interpretation is that the Court revealed the early stages of a tendency to 
unduly favour the freedom to provide services, “The fact that, in the name of 
proportionality, the Court is ready to set aside the sacrosanct principle of the host 
State’s regulations securing the protection (and equal treatment) of workers, is 
indicative of the weight the Court is putting on home State control as a means for 
the liberalization of services within the EU.”85 
The Court substantiated its ruling by arguing that the application of the 
host State’s rules on minimum wages to service providers may not only result in 
an additional and disproportionate administrative burden, but also the reality of 
paying certain employees from the service provider differing wages could 
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potentially “result in tension between employees and even threaten the cohesion 
of the collective labour agreements that are applicable in the Member State of 
establishment.”86 However, this argument fails to appreciate both sides of service 
provision; so that when posted workers are paid differing wages in the host State 
(the minimum wage) compared to the national host State workers (the going rate) 
that could equally result in tensions in the host State due to a lack of regard for the 
cohesion of the collective labour agreements of the host State, “I do not think that 
Directive 96/71 is of great use in terms of comparing the work conditions of 
posted and national workers; neither does it avoid the ‘social dumping’ of 
businesses which use the former to achieve work contracts and services in 
countries of superior labour standards.”87 
 
(iii) Protecting the Domestic Labour Market 
 
The case of Portugaia88 similarly revealed a reluctance on the part of the Court to 
rely on the Directive, however the case documents an extremely interesting 
discussion of what constitutes a justifiable restriction of the freedom to provide 
services, which is of paramount importance in finding a suitable equilibrium to 
the issues presented by the Directive.  
In Portugaia a Portuguese undertaking posted its workers from Portugal to 
carry out construction work in Germany. Portugaia was paying its workers a wage 
lower than the minimum wage payable under the collective agreement that was 
deemed generally applicable in the construction sector in Germany. The 
legislation at issue provided the following, “under German law governing 
collective agreements, the social partners may conclude collective agreements at 
various levels, at the federal level as well as at the level of an undertaking. In this 
regard, collective agreements specific to an undertaking in principle take 
precedence over general collective agreements.”89 Therefore, the German 
employers had the opportunity to conclude more specific collective agreements 
with a German trade union in order to avoid the application of the general 
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collective agreement; an opportunity that was not available to employers from 
other Member States. It was considered whether this was an infringement of 
Article 56 TFEU, but in its defense of the national law, “It points out that, 
according to the stated grounds of the AEntG [Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz 
(Law on the Posting of Employees)], its objective is to protect the national labour 
market – in particular against social dumping resulting from an influx of low-
wage labour -, to reduce national unemployment and to enable German 
undertakings to adapt to the internal market.”90 This is a public interest objective 
that reveals the reality of the internal market – and an issue that is so pertinent to 
the case of posted workers – social dumping. If the domestic employers were able 
to protect their prerogatives by negotiating their own specific agreements with the 
trade unions it would ease the transition and adaptation to a rapidly enlarging 
market, confirm that the national labour market has maintained its significance 
and extinguish the threat of social dumping. However, equally, it could disguise 
national protectionism and is ultimately “liable to prohibit, impede or render less 
attractive the activities of a provider of services”91 thereby restricting trade and 
not supporting the objectives of the European Union that the Member State has 
agreed to uphold. 
Imperative requirements that have been accepted by the Court to 
justifiably restrict the freedom to provide services include the protection of 
workers.92 However, this is still subject to the proportionality test.93 Thus, the 
protection of workers is not an absolute right and it must be balanced against the 
fundamental freedoms, “This clearly opens up a gap in the protection of workers, 
since it has to be weighted against the economic freedom of their employers.”94 
Therefore, arguably it is an even more onerous task to protect the “domestic 
construction industry and to reduce unemployment in order to avoid social 
tensions”,95 although a valid and prolific concern, it is prima facie discriminatory 
and could too easily, if used incorrectly, be utilised to meet protectionist ends. 
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Moreover, it has been established by the case law96 that economic grounds, such 
as considerations linked to the employment market, cannot be relied upon to 
justify a restriction of the freedom to provide services. Further, as it would be a 
distinctly applicable measure only the Treaty derogations would be available for 
potential justification and the Court would most likely take a very stringent 
approach to proportionality in terms of this public policy requirement. When a 
public policy requirement is held as being “the very negation of the fundamental 
freedom to provide services, to be accepted, it must be shown that it constitutes a 
condition indispensable for attaining the objective pursued.”97 
The Court determined in Portugaia that the intention of the legislature is 
“not conclusive”;98 that is not to say that the aim of the national law does not exist 
in the broader context of the Union, but rather that it must be balanced with the 
other interests at stake, in effect, the freedom to provide services. As the 
proportionality test is not ‘black and white’ but must be malleable in practice in 
order to fulfil its purpose effectively, the overriding reasons relating to the public 
interest could potentially always be disproportionate, even if justified. In this case, 
the Court dismissed the objective of protecting the domestic construction industry 
and thereby reducing unemployment to avoid social tensions as an economic aim. 
It is submitted that the objective could come within the heading of “public policy” 
under the Treaty derogations, if argued carefully. Public policy is clearly the most 
suitable Treaty derogation available in the context of the freedom to provide 
services, ahead of public security and public health, and further, any possible 
justification that can be drafted in this area must come under the Treaty 
derogations so that it is always available for a potential justification, whether the 
measure is distinctly or indistinctly applicable. The argument would have to be 
constructed selectively, focussing on the impact of the rhetoric to the Member 
State’s advantage, for example, it could be argued that the intention of the 
German national law allowing domestic employers to negotiate specific collective 
agreements with trade unions was not discriminatory as it did not prohibit other 
non-German undertakings that are established in Germany from concluding such 
collective agreements. However, clearly it cannot be argued by any stretch of the 
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imagination that there is not a restriction on the freedom to provide services here; 
only undertakings established in Germany can conclude such collective 
agreements, but equally, just as the intention of the legislature is “not conclusive”, 
neither is Article 56 TFEU – it is open to exceptions. 
In presenting a potential justification, it is necessary to steer clear from 
arguing the protection of the domestic market and its level of employment as that 
is too obviously compatible with protectionism, even though it is the disruption to 
the host State’s labour market that evidently needs protecting. It follows that the 
potential justification of enabling the German undertakings to adapt to the internal 
market also does not hold weight; this is not to take away from the fact that 
German undertakings, just like all undertakings in the internal market, require 
time to settle into the new dynamic and adjust to the changing environment of the 
internal market, however, that justification, by its very nature, will only ever be 
temporary as the market develops and all undertakings are required to adapt. 
These issues are representative of the Directive’s dominant concern; the 
legislation provides for temporary, cheap labour, yet its legal basis directs its 
prominent objective to be in line with the economic freedoms. Therefore, this sets 
a very difficult standard in presenting a justified and proportionate public interest 
objective.  
It is imperative to successfully argue a strong justification on the grounds 
of Article 52 TFEU, in conjunction with Article 62 TFEU, under public policy in 
order to bolster the social values that are connected to national interests. This 
thesis aims to provide a successful argument in this context and at present, the 
most viable justification is likely to be on the basis of avoiding social tensions that 
are caused by the market. It would be wrong for the Court to argue that social 
tensions fall under an “economic aim” and it could be argued that the predicament 
presented by posted workers introduces a very real perturbation of the social 
order,99 but the Commission has submitted in the case law that the “concept of 
public policy must be interpreted restrictively… and… recourse to that concept 
presupposes the existence… of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat affecting 
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one of the fundamental interests of society.”100 It is submitted that the provision of 
labour – particularly when it is temporary – presents a markedly sensitive issue 
from the labour and social point of view and therefore the issues that arise from 
the Directive do present a sufficiently serious threat to the public interest. 
Therefore, aside from specifically providing solutions to the Directive, a sub-aim 
of this thesis is to provide an intellectual, valid and robust justification to 
protecting national interests in this context.   
In Portugaia the Court stated that the declared intention of the legislature 
cannot be conclusive and it did not accept protection of the domestic market as a 
justification, however, it did accept the protection of workers as a legitimate 
justification and left the proportionality test to the national court. Therefore, it 
would appear that the Court was much more deferential to the national rules 
where there is a ‘human’ element involved and by leaving proportionality to the 
national court, the Court revealed that there is not an automatic dismissal of such 
restrictions to trade. 
 
(iv) Interim Conclusion 
 
As can be seen from the initial case law on posted workers, following the 
Directive’s adoption, the Court showed a reserve to utilise and voice the 
Directive’s full effect. However, as aforementioned, this is most likely 
accountable to the fact that the events in the main proceedings took place prior to 
the expiry of the deadline for transposition. Nevertheless, Arblade and Leloup 
demonstrated that the Court’s judgment would not have differed if the Directive 
had been invoked, and further, in Mazzoleni the category of workers was not 
deemed to come within the scope of the Directive. Finally, in Portugaia the Court 
held that protecting the domestic labour market is not a valid justification for 
restricting the provision of services. From an economic perspective, the accession 
of new Member States from Eastern Europe opens up new markets for the goods 
and services already being offered in the old Member States and allows the 
potential for public contracts to be performed more cheaply by lower paid workers 
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from Eastern Europe.101 Yet, from a social perspective, the effect this will have on 
the national workers of the host State is potentially damaging and is a reoccurring 
issue in the case law on posted workers; from Rush Portuguesa prior to the 
Directive, to Portugaia following its adoption, it does not appear that the 
Directive has satisfactorily eased the concerns of the old Member States in respect 
of their labour markets. 
Article 8 Directive states that the Commission shall “review the operation 
of this Directive with a view to proposing the necessary amendments to the 
Council”. In 2003, following the initial case law after the Directive’s adoption, the 
Commission presented its first Communication on the implementation of the 
Directive.102 The Communication highlighted the current problems raised by the 
case law and suggested solutions, the Commission identified Article 4 Directive 
‘Cooperation on information’ as being the lynchpin to effective implementation of 
the Directive, this includes making the information on the terms and conditions of 
employment under Article 3 Directive generally available. As far as revision of 
the Directive was concerned, the Commission concluded that, “it is not necessary 
to amend the Directive. The difficulties encountered in implementing it have so 
far tended to be more of a practical nature than a legal nature.”103  
 
III. The Early Case Law Invoking the Directive 
 
In this section, it is argued that the Court’s interpretation of the Directive at this 
stage evenly balanced the three elements of the posted worker scenario: 
promoting service provision; maintaining fair competition by upholding the 
legislation of the host State; and guaranteeing the protection of workers. 
The first case in this line of case law that expressly relied on the Directive 
is Wolff & Müller.104 The national court that made the reference for a preliminary 
ruling did not refer to the Directive but, as the facts in the case took place 
following the transposition deadline of the Directive, the Austrian Government 
and the Commission in their written observations expressed that, “the facts in the 
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main proceedings… must be regarded as coming within the scope of Directive 
96/71 [emphasis added].”105 Mr Pereira Félix was posted from Portugal to 
Germany where he was employed on a building site for Wolff & Müller. He 
sought payment jointly and severally from his employer and from Wolff & Müller 
for unpaid remuneration, claiming that Wolff & Müller, as guarantor, was liable 
for sums in respect of wages not received by him. Wolff & Müller opposed those 
claims on the grounds that Paragraph 1(a) AEntG (German Law on the Posting of 
Workers which provides that the service recipient is liable as guarantor) 
constituted an unlawful infringement of the constitutional right to carry on an 
occupation under Article 12 Grundgesetz (Basic Law) and Article 56 TFEU.  
Article 5 Directive provides that Member States are to ensure compliance 
with the Directive and shall take measures in the event of failure. Therefore, it is 
the responsibility of the Member States to ensure that the obligations provided for 
in the Directive can successfully be enforced by the workers. It has been argued 
that liability as guarantor does provide greater protection for workers as it presents 
another party from whom posted workers can claim their wages.106 However, the 
referring court had doubts as to the genuine benefit to posted workers of liability 
as guarantor,107 for the reason that in practice it has its limitations as the posted 
workers may not be familiar with the language or legal position in the host State, 
therefore, enforcement may prove more arduous for the posted workers which 
highlights the importance of the Member States upholding their obligations under 
the Directive in order to protect those workers, including Article 3(1)(c) Directive 
which ensures that posted workers receive the minimum rate of pay, “In fact, if 
entitlement to minimum rates of pay constitutes a feature of worker protection, 
procedural arrangements ensuring observance of that right, such as the liability of 
the guarantor in the main proceedings, must likewise be regarded as being such as 
to ensure that protection.”108 Therefore, the Court held that Article 5 Directive, 
interpreted in the light of Article 56 TFEU, administers that when a national 
system subcontracts the conduct of building work to another undertaking, the 
building contractor becomes liable to pay the minimum wage to a worker or to 
pay contributions to a joint scheme for parties to a collective agreement.  
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The case observes all three elements of the posted worker scenario by (i) 
promoting service provision (if the option is available in the Member State, 
liability as guarantor presents another party, aside from the service provider, from 
whom posted workers can claim their wages); (ii) maintaining fair competition by 
upholding the legislation of the host State (the host State’s minimum rate of pay is 
a ‘hardcore’ mandatory rule of the Directive); and (iii) guaranteeing the protection 
of workers (the minimum rate of pay guaranteed to posted workers constitutes a 
feature of worker protection, thus, procedural arrangements must ensure the 
observance of that right). 
 
(i) Joint and Several Liability 
 
Wolff & Müller is significant for permitting a State to impose joint and several 
liability. Yet, it was a permission rather than an endorsement at this stage, as joint 
and several liability is not provided for in the original Directive; its implication 
can be found in Article 5 Directive in accordance with the measures for its 
enforcement and was thus provided de facto in Wolff & Müller. However, in the 
proposed Enforcement Directive109 it has been expressly provided, for the first 
time. 
Article 12 Enforcement Directive, entitled “Subcontracting – Joint and 
several liability”, provides that the main contractor (service recipient) can be held 
liable, in addition to or in place of the employer (service provider), for any 
outstanding net remuneration corresponding to the minimum rates of pay and/or 
contributions due to common funds and also for any back-payments or refund of 
taxes or social security contributions unduly withheld from the worker’s salary. 
Despite the intention of this Article providing greater protection for posted 
workers, it is arguably one of the most controversial provisions of the 
Enforcement Directive, in part, because joint and several liability does not exist in 
every Member State110 and therefore there may be additional administrative costs 
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in implementing these measures, which could have the effect of restricting the 
freedom to provide services. 
The objectives of implementing liability as guarantor were highlighted by 
the referring court in Wolff & Müller, “the explanatory memorandum to the 
legislation states that the objective of liability as guarantor is to make it more 
difficult to award contracts to subcontractors from so-called cheap-wage countries 
so as thereby to revive the German labour market in the construction sector, 
protect the economic existence of small and medium-sized establishments in 
Germany and combat unemployment in Germany.”111 The concern of protecting 
the domestic market in respect of posted workers has established itself in the case 
law as a valid and persistent issue. The possibility of imposing liability on the 
service recipient will have the effect of making subcontracting to lesser-known 
undertakings, from other Member States, less attractive as the service recipient 
will have an additional responsibility to the posted workers and the Court 
recognised that the service recipient is “generally more solvent”112 than the 
service provider. Thus, the idea is to retain subcontracting within Germany so that 
the national workers and entities will be the primary beneficiaries. It is interesting 
that the objective of the national law was stated as combating unemployment in 
Germany and thereby protecting the German labour market and the Court did not 
preclude this measure in light of the Directive and Article 56 TFEU. The 
protection of workers, both national and posted, was clearly prioritised in this case 
by advocating the implementation of liability as guarantor.  
The Austrian Government pointed out in its observations, “there is not 
necessarily any contradiction between the objective of upholding fair competition 
on the one hand and ensuring worker protection, on the other. The fifth recital in 
the preamble to Directive 96/71 demonstrates that those two objectives can be 
pursued concomitantly.”113 This observation was satisfactorily demonstrated by 
the Court in Wolff & Müller. As aforementioned in Portugaia, the protection of 
workers is a well-established public interest objective but the protection of the 
domestic labour market is not. In Wolff & Müller, the Court did not state that the 
protection of the domestic labour market is now recognised as a valid justification 
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for restricting the provision of services, but if liability as guarantor robustly 
protects workers (as the Directive aims to do), and an ancillary objective of 
liability as guarantor is to protect the domestic market, the Court will seemingly 
be more lenient to the spill-over effect of the national measure and accordingly, 
the sought-after balance of the competing interests in this predicament becomes 
more attainable.  
 
(ii) Infringement Actions 
 
The following two infringement actions demonstrate the Court continuing its 
balanced approach in upholding all the objectives of the Directive. Commission v 
Germany114 concerned the calculation of the minimum rate of pay; the German 
legislation did not recognise all allowances and supplements as being integral 
components of the minimum wage. Therefore, the service provider would most 
likely have to pay their posted workers a higher wage than the national workers in 
Germany. The result of which can be concluded in two ways: either, it is another 
example of national protectionism of the German labour market; or, it is in 
compliance with the German method in an area that is not subject to 
harmonisation, to the extent that the Directive requires the host State to determine 
and have absolute autonomy over what constitutes the minimum wage, as per the 
second subparagraph of Article 3(1) Directive, “the concept of minimum rates of 
pay… is defined by the national law and/or practice of the Member State to whose 
territory the worker is posted.”  
The Court held that in failing to recognise the constituent elements of the 
minimum wage, Germany failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3 Directive. 
It would be too hasty a conclusion to claim that the Court dismissed the autonomy 
of the host State in determining the minimum wage. As the Directive does not 
take account of social security or taxation, it is the gross amount of wages that 
must be taken into account in order to provide a more transparent comparison of 
wages between the Member States. Therefore, as provided for by the Directive, 
the host State can extend their own rules as defined by their laws, however, it does 
not follow that when comparing the minimum rate of the host State and the wages 
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paid by the service provider the host State can impose their own payment 
structure. 
Commission v Germany does not negate the fact that host States are 
granted a “pretty free hand”115 to extend their labour laws to posted workers on 
their territory. However, the application of Article 3(1) Directive transcends any 
deviation from the mandatory terms and conditions of employment to be applied 
to all posted workers. In this case, it is submitted that the Court evenly balanced 
the objectives of (i) promoting service provision (cannot implement a method that 
has the effect of obliging the service provider to pay unjustifiably higher wages); 
(ii) maintaining fair competition by upholding the legislation of the host State (the 
case reiterated that the minimum rate of pay must be in accordance with the host 
State’s law and/or practice); and (iii) the protection of workers (the host State 
cannot impose their own payment structure as it is necessary to ensure 
transparency in respect of the minimum wage). 
Commission v Austria116 concerned third country nationals as posted 
workers. The Austrian legislation at issue required all third country posted 
workers to obtain an ‘EU Posting Confirmation’. Issuing the confirmation 
required: (i) the workers concerned to have been employed for at least one year by 
the posting undertaking or to have concluded an employment contract of 
indefinite duration; and (ii) evidence that the Austrian national employment and 
wage conditions were complied with.  
The Austrian Government conceded that the national legislation at issue 
restricted the freedom to provide services, but that it was justified in order to, inter 
alia, “prevent the national labour market from being disrupted by a flood of 
workers who are nationals of non-Member States.”117 The Austrian Government 
stated that the restriction was also justified by overriding requirements relating to 
the general interest, such as the protection of workers and the safeguarding of 
public policy and public security; arguably ‘safer’ and more well-established 
justifications. However, the ‘EU Posting Confirmation’ was held to be an 
authorisation procedure and not merely a declaratory procedure, therefore, the 
application process could take up to six weeks, which constitutes a 
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disproportionate restriction and cannot be justified by protecting the workers 
concerned as such a requirement would make the recruitment of workers from 
non-Member States much more arduous for the service provider and therefore 
would hinder their recruitment as a result.  
The very nature of services is that they are intended to be sporadic and in 
accordance with the mutual recognition principle, if the third country workers are 
lawfully employed in the home State, the host State cannot impose further 
obligations. The case of Vander Elst118 placed the locus of regulation on the home 
State in this respect; it was held that if the service provider ‘lawfully and 
habitually’ employs third country nationals, the service recipient may not impose 
additional obligations therein. In Commission v Austria the Court suggested that a 
more proportionate measure to monitor compliance with the host State’s social 
welfare and wages legislation would be to require the service provider, prior to the 
posting, to report the workers to be posted, the duration of the posting and the 
service that is being provided by that posting.  
The ground for automatic refusal laid down in the Austrian national law 
was held as being disproportionate in respect of public policy and public security, 
since posted workers do not seek to access the labour market of the host State as, 
by the very definition of a posting, they return to their country of origin or 
residence on completion of their work in the host State. As aforementioned, it is 
submitted that the Court’s argument of the posted workers not seeking access to 
the labour market is unsatisfactory and unconvincing; it implies that the national 
labour market is not disrupted during the posting and that clearly does not reflect 
the reality – the work is temporary but it still takes place. The reoccurring theme 
in much of this case law is the protection of national labour markets from being 
disrupted by a flood of workers, who are either third country workers or nationals 
from other Member States, therefore for the Court to rigidly maintain that there is 
no disruption to the labour market as the posted workers will leave at some point 
ignores the fact that when the workers are present in the host State that causes 
some disruption to the labour market; albeit not a permanent disruption, but a 
disruption nonetheless. 
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The infringement actions did not support the protection of workers as 
emphatically as in Wolff & Müller, but it is important to remember that the 
protection of workers is not the only objective and the early case law invoking the 
Directive does reflect a consideration of all of the legislation’s objectives. In 
Commission v Austria the Court balanced the objectives of (i) promoting service 
provision (cannot impose unjustified and disproportionate additional requirements 
on the service provider); (ii) maintaining fair competition by upholding the 
legislation of the host State (the Court suggested a more proportionate method to 
monitor compliance with the Austrian employment and wage conditions); and (iii) 
the protection of workers (the ‘EU Posting Confirmation’ would have the effect of 
hindering recruitment of employees from non-Member States and therefore could 
not be justified). 
 
IV. A Conceptual Shift in the Court’s Interpretation of the Directive 
 
The final case on posted workers that the Court determined prior to the Laval 
Quartet119 was Commission v Germany.120 This case was determined on 18 July 
2007; five months to the day before Laval was decided. Commission v Germany 
exemplifies the very first shift in the Court’s approach; and if there was to be a 
“Laval Quintet”, it is submitted that Commission v Germany would be the fifth 
case. As we have seen, from this ‘timeline’ of the case law on posted workers, the 
early case law showed the Court’s reluctance in using and implementing the 
Directive and then as the Court’s familiarity with the Directive improved so did 
its judgments and there was clearly an evenly balanced weighting granted to the 
three determinative elements of the posted worker scenario. At this stage, the 
Court ensured that all of the Directive’s objectives were given fair consideration 
so that the Directive itself was interpreted as intended and applied uniformly 
across the Member States. However, the significance of Commission v Germany 
is that it revealed the Court changing tack, and this was not a temporary change; it 
was the forerunner of the Laval Quartet in which the Court firmly placed the 
economic freedoms above any other considerations. 
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In Commission v Germany the Commission claimed that in light of three 
separate issues, Germany failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 56 TFEU. 
The Commission’s first issue was the obligation on the service provider to 
contribute to the German paid-leave fund. However, the Commission was 
unsuccessful on this point as it did not provide the necessary evidence to establish 
that foreign undertakings actually were obliged to contribute to the fund. The 
second complaint of the Commission was the obligation on the service provider to 
translate into German all of the documents required under national law that are to 
be kept at the building site in the host State during the period of posting. It was 
held that the Commission was unsuccessful again in proving this point to be 
inconsistent with Article 56 TFEU. The obligation to retain specific documents in 
German at the building site is justified as Article 4 Directive on the ‘Cooperation 
on information’ does not render this a superfluous obligation. Also, the four 
documents stipulated (the employment contract, pay slips, time sheets and proof 
of payment of wages) were relatively short and therefore did not impose a heavy 
financial or administrative burden for the undertaking posting their workers and 
therefore, this requirement did not go beyond what was necessary to achieve the 
objective of the social protection of workers and the monitoring of that protection. 
Understandably, if the documents were not translated into German the task of on-
site supervision would become more arduous in practice for the German civil 
servants. The requirement to translate documents into the host State’s language 
reveals two things: firstly, translating the four documents was deemed 
proportionate in this context and secondly, on a broader scale, it emphasises that 
posted workers are a unique category of worker; whereas in other cases of service 
provision the rules would be in line with the home State and accordingly the 
country of ‘production/origin’ as opposed to ‘sale/provision’, however, in this 
case the fundamental principle of mutual recognition was outweighed by the 
obligation to monitor compliance with the host State’s rules under Article 4 
Directive in line with worker protection, revealing that the applicable law to 
posted workers is a true combination of both home and host State rules. 
The first two points of complaint from the Commission in this case reveal 
the Court’s readiness to rule in favour of the host State and worker protection. 
However, it is the third complaint from the Commission in which the Court 
appears to unreasonably and controversially favour the freedom to provide 
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services. The third complaint concerns the obligation on foreign temporary 
employment agencies to declare the place of posting and to declare if there is any 
change relating to that place of posting (Paragraph 3(2) AEntG). The German 
Government claimed that the obligation is proportionate and justified in the 
interests of more effective monitoring and consequently improved worker 
protection. The temporary employment agencies established in other Member 
States were required, in accordance with the German legislation, to make a 
declaration in writing to the undertaking in Germany detailing in German the 
surname, first name and date of birth of the posted workers, the start and finish 
dates of the placement and the place of work to which the workers will be posted. 
However, undertakings established in Germany were not required to do the same; 
accordingly, it was a discriminatory restriction that could only be justified by the 
Treaty derogations. The Court’s reasoning, which is relatively short in comparison 
to the first two complaints, stated that, “the German Government has not pleaded 
anything that could be covered by one of those reasons [public policy, public 
security or public health].”121 Therefore, the Court held that the obligation to 
make such a declaration imposed by the German legislation is an unjustified 
restriction on the freedom to provide services and in the interests of this 
fundamental freedom, it is prohibited. However, it is submitted that the Court’s 
reasoning on this third and final point is problematic. This is because, in 
accordance with the 2006 Communication from the Commission,122 which 
provides express clarification of certain technical elements of the Directive, the 
Commission stipulated that Member States are permitted to use declarations to the 
effect provided for under Paragraph 3(2) AEntG: 
 
“the Commission considers that the host Member State, in order to be able 
to monitor compliance with the conditions of employment laid down in the 
Directive, should be able to demand, in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality, that the service provider submit a declaration, by the time 
the work starts, at the latest, which contains information on the workers who 
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have been posted, the type of service they will provide, where, and how long 
the work will take.”123  
 
The Communication from the Commission on this point also declared that, 
“Almost half the Member States require service providers which post workers to 
their territory to submit a prior declaration to their authorities.”124 In fact, the 2007 
Communication from the Commission found there to be sixteen Member States 
that require a prior declaration from the service provider and one Member State 
(Czech Republic) imposes such an obligation on the service recipient.125 The 
requirement is intended to assist with monitoring compliance of the host State 
rules and thereby supporting the enforcement of the full protection guaranteed to 
workers, as intended by the Directive. The Commission also recognised that the 
use of such a declaration is “just as effective as and less restrictive than a prior 
authorisation”126 and therefore meets the test of proportionality. Clearly, a prior 
authorisation or formal system of registration of the posted workers would be 
unduly cumbersome on the service provider, however, the system of 
implementing a declaration appears to support a more transparent and open 
method of monitoring the number of posted workers in the host State at any one 
time in order to ensure that those posted workers return to their home State on 
completion of the work and accordingly do not circumvent the free provision of 
services and enter the host State’s labour market on a permanent basis. 
The ambiguity of the Commission advocating such a declaration in 2006 
and at the same time bringing an infringement action against Germany for 
implementing such a declaration and consequently so easily contradicting its own 
guidance, is not settled by the case which makes no reference to the 
Commission’s Communication. The reasoning provided by the Court was that the 
supplementary obligation imposed by use of the declaration for the purposes of 
monitoring posted workers in the host State is not imposed upon the employment 
agencies established in the host State, the result of its use would therefore make 
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the transnational provision of services more cumbersome than the internal 
provision of services. The Commission’s Communication was issued prior to this 
decision at a time when the Court had not delivered any judgments relating to 
such a request from the national law. A potential caveat is that Commission v 
Germany refers to “foreign temporary employment agencies” whereas the 
Commission’s Communication refers to the “service provider” submitting a 
declaration. Clearly these two types of undertakings differ more than just in 
semantics, however, the essence and objective of both undertakings is to post 
workers to a host State in accordance with the Directive and therefore to apply the 
Directive differently to the undertakings would lead to legal uncertainty and 
would ultimately be rendered futile. Of course the Commission’s Communication 
is a non-binding measure and therefore the Court does not have to uphold its 
advice word-for-word but to disregard it without acknowledgment removes any 
impact that it may have, which is highlighted by the Commission bringing this 
infringement action in respect of a measure that it opined to support the previous 
year. This contradiction reveals a flaw in the Commission’s understanding of the 
Directive and accordingly the Court’s ambiguous interpretation of its use in 
practice; highlighting the lack of clarity surrounding the Directive’s purpose, 
leading to the manipulation of its objectives.  
AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer wrote the Opinion for this case, as he did in 
several of the other cases in this line of case law.127 In his Opinion, AG Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer also did not make reference to the Commission’s Communication 
and accordingly reached the same conclusion as the Court; that the requirement 
under Paragraph 3(2) AEntG is incompatible with Article 56 TFEU. The 
reasoning was very similar to that of the Court’s; there has been an infringement 
and as it is a discriminatory measure and it cannot be justified by one of the 
Treaty derogations, there is no possible justification for such a restriction. 
Interestingly, AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer added that, “the obligation to notify each 
posting is not in issue but rather the identity of the person responsible for that 
task.”128 This reason provided by the AG to prohibit the restriction does appear to 
be a more plausible and deeply considered reason than those provided for by the 
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Court as the protection of personal data is recognised by Article 8 Charter. If the 
Court had relied on this reasoning to prohibit Paragraph 3(2) AEntG it implies 
that removing the requirement to provide the identity of the worker and simply 
stating the number of workers that will be posted would be a more proportionate, 
and therefore potentially justifiable, method of effectively monitoring compliance. 
However, this alternative form of declaration – of stating the number of posted 
workers and not their identity – would have presented an additional obligation on 
the service provider and accordingly was not suggested by either the AG or the 
Court. 
The Commission v Germany evokes the “turning point” in the Court’s 
interpretation of the Directive whereby the first two complaints, particularly the 
second, avidly support worker protection and the host State as it is not considered 
a superfluous task when posting workers to Germany to translate specific relevant 
documents into German. However, the third complaint which favours the freedom 
to provide services over the national law of the host State is interesting as it is 
unclear why the host State was unsuccessful on this point; earlier Communication 
from the Commission expressed that declarations are permitted, but in this case, 
the Court held that requiring foreign temporary employment agencies to make a 
declaration in respect of the posted workers was not permitted. The Court’s 
reasoning as to why the host State was not entirely successful against the 
Commission’s complaints is unsatisfactory, but what this case does show is a 
subtle change in the Court’s priorities in the context of posted workers. From 
initially maintaining the Directive’s objectives “promotion of the transnational 
provision of services requires a climate of fair competition and measures 
guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers”129 by balancing support of the 
three elements; the service provider, the host State and workers’ rights, it appears 
that the latter elements have become less influential. This theory is by no means a 
passing concern, as the case law that followed; the ‘Laval Triplet’, showed an 
overwhelming push towards fulfilling Article 56 TFEU on the freedom to provide 
services over any other considerations that may be deemed as restrictions to trade.  
The Court’s voice is imperative in shaping the general principles of Union 
law130 and it cannot be underestimated; as exemplified here, Commission v 
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Germany clearly set the tone for the posting cases that followed. In accordance 
with Article 6(3) Treaty on European Union (TEU), the general principles of 
Union law are inspired by the fundamental rights under the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. Also, international 
legislation such as the ILO Convention all contribute to the goal of social policy 
in the Union and therefore all of these elements are intended to create the sui 
generis structure of Union law. Accordingly, when the Court adopts a particularly 
one-sided approach which has the effect of rendering its social policy objectives 
void, this does not blend with its role as the Union’s constitutional adjudicator.131 
Supporting the freedom to provide services is an integral element to the posted 
worker scenario and therefore must be maintained, however, when this element is 
prioritised without good reason, as seen in Commission v Germany, this is 
concerning. It shows that the Court has reached its decision on a tenuous and 
inadequate basis. 
 
(i) What Caused this Conceptual Shift? Lead up to the Laval Quartet 
 
So on what basis was the Court making its decision? Were there external 
pressures at play that influenced the judgement and the invisible, yet perceptible, 
thread that pulled the Court firmly towards Article 56 TFEU? It is hereby 
submitted that the Court’s interpretation of the Directive at this point, from 
Commission v Germany,132 shifted from initially maintaining all of the Directive’s 
objectives to gradually narrowing its interpretation exclusively in line with the 
legal basis. It is argued that the shift reflects an uncertainty in the Directive’s text 
itself leading to, and allowing for, differing interpretations,133 and also, the Court 
changed its priorities as the Union expanded and therefore its interpretation of the 
same legislation has naturally evolved and adapted. This thesis will now set the 
scene in the run up to the Laval Quartet (early to mid-2000s) revealing significant 
changes that took place in the EU causing a systemic re-thinking of the geography 
and scope of the Union that inevitably echoed throughout all of the Institutions, 
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including the Court. 
In 1999 the euro was introduced in eleven Member States by the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) showing the progression to harness an 
ever-closer Union, now also bound by a single-currency. In 2000 the Charter was 
adopted by the Convention which made fundamental rights more visible, 
therefore, this inferred that the Union became the central locus for issues 
regarding fundamental rights, whereas previously this was left to the competence 
of the Member States, which could ultimately raise questions of competence 
creep, as the Union became able to assert its position over fundamental rights and 
gain further control over socially and politically sensitive areas that used to be 
within the sole jurisprudence of the Member States.134 The area of EU citizenship 
also witnessed significant changes in the early to mid-2000s, for example, it was 
determined that children have an independent right of residence, regardless of the 
fact that their parents are not Union citizens.135 In 2001 the first idea of a 
Constitutional Treaty was considered in Laeken, Belgium, that would require 
wide-ranging institutional reform and democratic regeneration. Member States 
signed the Constitutional Treaty in 2004 that would create a European Union-
wide Constitution as well as provisions for an EU flag, anthem, motto and holiday 
and in essence, a strong push towards a dominant and centralised European 
identity. This was clearly a step too far for certain Member States and not a 
natural progression of unity, therefore, following the negative outcome of the 
French and Dutch referenda, the Treaty was ultimately abandoned. Also in 2004 the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Cyprus, 
Malta and Slovakia joined the Union. In accordance with the transitional 
arrangements, for the first two years following accession the national law of the 
Member States that were already Members determined the new Member States’ 
access to the labour market, so for example, the workers from the new Member 
States may have still required a work permit. The next period of transition was a 
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further three years in which the old Member States could still impose additional 
requirements, on the condition that the old Member States gave prior notification of 
such a restriction to the Commission. In the final two year period (bringing the total 
time period of transitional arrangements to seven years in 2011) the old Member 
States could continue to apply restrictions but only if they informed the Commission 
of serious disturbances in the labour market. Therefore, the initial two year probation 
period in which the old Member States could freely impose restrictions on the 
workers from the ten new Member States came to an end prior to the Laval Quartet, 
meaning that there would have been less automatic protection for the labour markets 
of the old Member States at that time. EU enlargement continued in 2007 when 
Bulgaria and Romania joined the Union. On 13 December 2007 (two days after the 
ruling in Viking and five days before Laval) the Treaty of Lisbon was signed, which 
made substantive and procedural changes to the constitutional and institutional 
framework of the EU, its external relations and EU policies.136  
These developments have changed the shape and policies of the Union and 
it is submitted that this must have also influenced the policy decisions of the EU 
Institutions, including the Court, bringing into question whether the original 
Directive from 1996 was still viewed as being coherent in the evolving economic 
and social climate of the Union.  
Further to these changes that were taking place in the Union at large, the 
area of services and posted workers was also changing prior to the Laval Quartet. 
On 4 April 2006 the Commission published three documents: (i) an amended 
Proposal for a Directive on services in the internal market (the original 2004 
Proposal had to be substantially amended and this amended Proposal was finally 
adopted as the ‘Services Directive 2006/123/EC’);137 (ii) the Commission’s 
guidance on the use of the Posted Workers Directive (which was dismissed in 
Commission v Germany,138 as previously discussed in detail);139 and as an 
accompaniment to the Commission’s Communication (iii) a staff working 
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document on the implementation of the Posted Workers Directive.140 It is 
submitted that the amended Proposal of the Directive on services in the internal 
market being published by the Commission on the same day as the further 
guidance on the Posted Workers Directive is telling of the direction that the 
Commission intended the Directive to take. 
Following these documents, the Commission published two more on the 
Posted Workers Directive prior to the Laval Quartet. A further Communication141 
and a staff working document142 on 13 June 2007 in light of information provided 
by the Member States and the EU social partners in response to questionnaires 
from the Commission submitted in October 2006, intended to gain a deeper 
insight into the Member States’ experience of the Directive to date, and the 
Commission’s Communication also took account of the European Parliament’s 
Resolution of 26 October 2006 on the application of the Directive. The 
Communication from the Commission is entitled, “Posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services: maximising its benefits and potential 
while guaranteeing the protection of workers [emphasis added]”. Whereas, the 
2006 Communication from the Commission does not include the protection of 
workers in the title, “Guidance on the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services”. The explicit reference to protection of workers in the 2007 
Communication reveals the necessity to draw attention to all of the Directive’s 
objectives at this time. 
The results of the Commission’s questionnaire from the Member States 
and the EU social partners are detailed in the staff working document and 
highlight the extent of the varying degrees to which the Directive has been 
implemented. In some respects this is positive as it has allowed the Member States 
to maintain their diversity and therefore organise their social models and labour 
law systems and collective bargaining arrangements in a manner that suits the 
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national method, whilst fulfilling their obligations under the Treaty. However, the 
associated advantages with the implementation of directives in general, in leaving 
the choice of form and method of transposition to the national authorities, also 
indicates that where there is no general and uniform application or direct 
applicability, as is the case with regulations, this could lead to legal uncertainty 
and a lack of proper implementation of the Directive. As an example of this, the 
UK did not adopt an entirely new Act to implement the Directive but extended 
and elaborated pre-existing texts to cover the provisions of the Directive,143 
however, this may lead to confusion over where to look for the appropriate 
legislation, given that the applicable UK legislation can be found on a page of the 
Department for Trade and Industry’s website,144 but all of the relevant information 
is not on this page as it refers the reader to other pages of the website and other 
legislation that is relevant to the Directive. The varied application in the Member 
States of the Directive gives the Court a greater opportunity to rule that the 
national measures are unjustified in accordance with Article 56 TFEU, “The 
proper functioning of administrative cooperation among Member States is an 
essential instrument for compliance control; its virtual absence may explain why 
Member States revert to control measures, which appear unnecessary and/or 
disproportionate in the light of the interpretation by the ECJ of Article [56 
TFEU].”145  
Therefore, it would appear at this stage that despite the Commission’s 
efforts to provide greater clarity of the Directive (with two Commission 
Communications and accompanying staff working documents on the same 
legislation in the space of fourteen months), the Member States’ differing 
implementation (as seen by the results from the questionnaire in the 2007 staff 
working document) and the events in the EU at large that took place between 
1999 – 2007, followed by the start of the Global Recession in December 2007, all 
culminated to produce change and uncertainty. This was the atmosphere prior to, 
what is arguably, one of the most infamous groups of cases experienced in the EU 
legal order: the Laval Quartet.  
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Chapter 1 concluded by detailing the first step in the Court’s changing 
interpretation of the Directive. Chapter 2 confirms that this changing 
interpretation became an axiomatic shift in the Laval Triplet146 which reduced 
every judgment to the Directive’s legal basis in upholding the freedom to provide 
services. 
This Chapter centres on the Laval Triplet in which the issues relating to 
the Directive reached their summit. Each case is sub-categorised into the 
predominant issues that it illustrates. The objective of this Chapter is to decipher 
the extent and severity of the relevant issues so that the need for a solution and the 
most appropriate means of achieving that solution will become clear. Further, this 
Chapter aims to verify whether the issues presented are intrinsic to the Directive 
itself, or whether they can be attributed to external factors, such as the Court’s 
interpretation, the results will therefore provide a definite indicator as to which 
direction Chapter 3 must take. 
 
II. Laval Quartet 
 
The Laval Quartet consists of Viking147 and the Laval Triplet. Each case will be 
discussed below, including facts and analysis, however, only a brief description of 
Viking has been provided as the case is not based on the interpretation of Article 
56 TFEU or the Directive and therefore does not substantially contribute to the 
arguments of this thesis. However, I have decided to mention the case as the 
issues that it presents are so closely linked to the Laval Triplet that these four 
cases have become synonymous with each other and further, Viking and Laval are 
very often coupled together in the literature.148 Therefore, in order to fully 
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appreciate the significance of the following line of case law a brief description and 
analysis of Viking has been included. 
Viking was decided on 11 December 2007 in the Grand Chamber with 
Judge Schintgen as the Rapporteur and Maduro as the AG. The facts of the case 
are as follows: Viking, a ferry operator established under Finnish law and its 
passenger ferry (the Rosella), ran the route between Helsinki, Finland and Tallinn, 
Estonia. The Rosella was running at a loss as it was in direct competition with the 
Estonian ferries which operated at lower wage costs. Consequently, Viking sought 
to reflag the Rosella to Estonia. The crew of the Rosella were members of the 
Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU) (affiliated to the International Transport Workers’ 
Federation (ITF)) and they opposed Viking’s plans of reflagging, in the interest of 
protecting Finnish jobs and gave notice of intended strike action and the ITF sent 
a circular to its affiliates asking them to refrain from entering into negotiations 
with Viking. In response, Viking brought an action before the High Court of 
Justice of England and Wales (EWHC) in order to restrain the planned strike 
action requesting the court to declare that the action was contrary to Article 49 
TFEU. The court granted the order sought by Viking, which the ITF and FSU 
appealed on the grounds that the right of trade unions to take collective action to 
preserve jobs is a fundamental right recognised by Title X TFEU on Social Policy, 
particularly Article 151 TFEU which gives expression to the European Social 
Charter and the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 
which provide that trade unions have the right to take collective action against an 
employer established in a Member State to seek to persuade him not to move part 
or all of his undertaking to another Member State.149 The Court of Appeal of 
England and Wales decided to stay proceedings and refer ten questions to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling. 
AG Maduro opined that, “Sometimes, when the questions are complicated, 
the answers are simple.” And then swiftly followed this satisfying statement with 
the following, “This is not one of those occasions.”150 When asked whether 
collective action by a trade union or association of trade unions is a directly 
discriminatory restriction of Article 49 TFEU or Regulation 4055/86 and if so, 
whether it can be justified by the fact that collective action is a fundamental right 
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as protected by Union law and/or the protection of workers, AG Maduro stated, 
“The right to associate and the right to collective action are essential instruments 
for workers to express their voice and to make governments and employers live 
up to their part of the social contract.”151 Also, it must be borne in mind that the 
right to take collective action is protected by various international instruments that 
the Member States have ratified, such as the European Social Charter, given 
express reference in Article 151 TFEU which protects “proper social protection, 
dialogue between management and labour…[and] measures which take account of 
the diverse forms of national practices”, and ILO Convention No. 87 on the 
Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to Organise. Further, the 
Court also makes reference to the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social 
Rights of Workers (also given expression in Article 151 TFEU) and the Charter 
which expressly supports the right of collective bargaining and action under 
Article 28. The international instruments aforementioned and the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States all contribute to the fundamental rights 
of the EU, forming an integral part of the general principles of Union law and the 
Court must ensure the observance of those rights. 
The Court never denied the importance of both economic and social 
protection in Viking, therefore, to conclude that economic values automatically 
took precedence over the social interests at stake in this case would be a 
trivialisation of the facts and an incomplete analysis of the issues. The Court 
explicitly supported the importance of the social provisions, the real issue, 
however, is how genuine that support really was, “it may be asked whether the 
ECJ is engaging with – as opposed to just citing – any of this material.”152 The 
Court slightly ‘ducked-out’ of fully supporting the social interests by leaving the 
proportionality test in this case to the national court. However, despite leaving it 
in the hands of the national court, it is submitted that the Court left the national 
court in no doubt as to how the case should be concluded, stating that even if it is 
ultimately for the national court, as they have sole jurisdiction to interpret the 
national legislation, the Court “may provide guidance… in order to enable the 
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national court to give judgment”.153 The Court provided that even if the collective 
action could be justified by the objective of protecting workers, it could only stand 
if the jobs at risk were jeopardised or under serious threat and, if that is 
established, the collective action cannot go beyond what is necessary to attain that 
objective. Therefore, the Court advised the national court to determine whether 
the FSU had no other means at their disposal which were less restrictive and 
whether they had exhausted those means prior to initiating collective action. In 
effect, the guidance offered by the Court provided a very narrow interpretation of 
the restriction of the freedom of establishment.  
 In its ruling, the Court determined three points: firstly, the collective 
action at issue comes within the scope of Article 49 TFEU, therefore those rights 
are capable of restricting the fundamental freedoms and must be justified and 
proportionate. The second point in the ruling reveals another major development 
initiated by the case; Article 49 TFEU confers rights on private undertakings 
which may be invoked against a trade union or an association of trade unions. The 
horizontal direct effect of this Article being applied in private law entails that, 
“The concept of private barrier has been widened – the question is, of course, to 
what extent.”154 The third point is that the collective action at issue, which 
encouraged ‘Viking Line’ established in Finland to enter into a collective work 
agreement with a trade union in that State and to apply those terms to the 
employees of the subsidiary ‘Viking Line Eesti’ established in Estonia, does 
constitute a restriction of Article 49 TFEU. In principle, such a restriction can be 
justified by an overriding reason of public interest, provided that it is 
proportionate. 
Ultimately, the trade union was asking Viking to pay the employees of its 
Estonian subsidiary in accordance with Finnish wages; it is submitted that if this 
was upheld it would defeat the very purpose of the internal market that both 
Finland and Estonia have agreed to promote when acceding to the Union. 
Therefore, in this respect, the judgment seems to be correct. However, the 
difficulty lies in the fact that an area that was intended to be left to the competence 
of the Member States and consequently outside the scope of the fundamental 
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freedoms has now been swept-up within their remit and therefore subjected to the 
judicial scrutiny of justifications and proportionality. And finally, not only has the 
national labour law been drawn under the microscope of the internal market, but it 
has been subjugated by the fundamental freedoms.  
 
III. Laval Triplet 
 
As aforementioned, Viking focuses on the freedom of establishment and is not 
concerned with posted workers, but it does set the scene for the Laval Triplet, 
which consists of Laval, Rüffert and Commission v Luxembourg. These three 
cases elicit the most fundamental issues in respect of posted workers, to which the 
attention of this Chapter now turns. The cases are dealt with chronologically, 
starting with Laval; initially the facts are presented, followed by an in-depth and 




One week after Viking, the Court determined Laval on 18 December 2007 in the 
Grand Chamber with Judge Lõhmus as the Rapporteur and Mengozzi as the AG. 
The reference from the Arbetsdomstolen (Swedish Labour Court) was on the 
interpretation of Articles 18 (non-discrimination on grounds of nationality) and 56 
(freedom to provide services) TFEU and the Directive. 
Laval, a company established in Latvia, posted around 35 workers to 
refurbish Söderfjärd School in Vaxholm, Sweden. The site was operated by L & P 
Baltic Bygg AB (Baltic), an undertaking established in Sweden. Sweden does not 
have a national minimum rate of pay and therefore relies on trade unions to reach 
an agreement with their employer, “the coverage of collective agreements in the 
Swedish private sector is very extensive.”155 Laval had signed a collective 
agreement with the Latvian building sector’s trade union, of which around 65% of 
the Latvian workers concerned were members, but at this stage it had not signed 
anything with Byggnads (Swedish building and public works trade union), 
Byggettan (a local branch of Byggnads) or Elektrikerna (Swedish electricians’ 
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trade union). Byggettan required that Laval sign the collective agreement for the 
building sector and guarantee that the workers on site receive an hourly wage of 
SEK 145 (approximately €16). If Laval signed the tie-in to the collective 
agreement it would have been able to negotiate the €16 wage and if an amount 
was not agreed upon there was a fall-back clause of €12. The agreement contained 
additional conditions such as Laval having to pay contributions for insurance 
premiums, surcharges to various Swedish bodies and a commission to Byggnads 
for the monitoring of wages by local branches of that union. Further, Byggettan 
threatened collective action if Laval did not agree to these requirements, however, 
the hourly wage proposed did not constitute a minimum wage and was not laid 
down in accordance with Article 3(1) Directive. Therefore, Laval did not sign the 
collective agreement and consequently collective action was undertaken by 
Byggettan and Byggnads, consisting of blockading the Vaxholm site, which 
involved preventing the delivery of goods onto the site, placing pickets and 
prohibiting Latvian workers and vehicles from entering the site. It is submitted 
that the collective action in the case was not a protest against the freedom to 
provide services, but it highlighted the trade unions’ discontent regarding the 
disparity of wages and the collective action intended to put a stop to unequal 
conditions. Laval asked the police to intervene, but the police could not do 
anything as this collective action was regarded as lawful under Swedish national 
law. One month later, the collective action intensified as Elektrikerna initiated 
sympathy action, consisting of boycotting all of Laval’s sites in Sweden. Finally, 
the workers posted by Laval went back to Latvia and did not return. The town of 
Vaxholm requested that the contract with Baltic be terminated, and the following 
month, Baltic was declared bankrupt.  
 Laval brought an action before the Swedish Labour Court against 
Byggnads, Byggettan and Elektrikerna seeking a declaration and two orders: (i) a 
declaration that the collective action and sympathy action is illegal; (ii) an order 
that the action must stop; and (iii) an order that the trade unions must pay 
compensation for the damage caused. The Swedish Labour Court dismissed 
Laval’s application for an interim order that the action must stop and instead, 
decided to stay proceedings and refer two questions to the Court for a preliminary 
ruling. 
 71 
 The first question asked whether Articles 18 and 56 TFEU and the 
Directive preclude trade unions from attempting, by means of collective action, to 
force a service provider to sign a collective agreement in the host State (Sweden), 
specifically, where the collective agreement at issue has not been declared 
universally applicable.  
The second question refers to the Swedish Law on workers’ participation 
in decisions (Medbestämmandelagen, ‘the MBL’) which “lays down rules 
applicable to the right of association and of negotiation, collective agreements, 
mediation of collective labour disputes and the obligation of social peace, and 
contains provisions restricting the right of trade unions to take collective 
action.”156 In accordance with Article 41 MBL there is a ‘social truce’ between 
workers and employers bound by a collective agreement, therefore, it is prohibited 
to take collective action to seek to amend or have set aside collective agreements 
between other parties and Article 42 MBL prohibits the organisation or support of 
illegal collective action. Following the Britannia judgment (1989, No. 120) in 
which the Swedish Labour Court considered the right of Swedish trade unions to 
take collective action against a flag of convenience (FOC) vessel whereby the 
crew were already subject to a valid foreign collective agreement, the Swedish 
Labour Court held that the prohibitions set out in the MBL do extend to the 
collective action in this case, provided that such collective action is prohibited by 
the foreign legislation to the signatories to that collective agreement. In other 
words, the prohibition on taking collective action can only be activated whereby 
the MBL directly applies, therefore, the prohibition on collective action is not 
activated whereby the collective action is aimed at service providers from other 
Member States posting their workers to Sweden. This became the law and entered 
into force on 1 July 1991 known as the ‘Lex Britannia’. In light of this, the second 
question from the Swedish Labour Court asked whether Articles 18 and 56 TFEU 
and the Directive are incompatible with the Lex Britannia. 
 Initially, Byggnads, Byggettan and Elektrikerna challenged the 
admissibility of the reference from the Swedish Labour Court for the reason that 
despite Laval being established in Latvia and Baltic being established in Sweden, 
as Baltic is in fact a subsidiary of Laval and the share capital of both undertakings 
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are held by the same people, they should in fact be regarded as one entity. 
Therefore, “[Laval] is seeking to escape all the obligations under Swedish 
legislation and rules relating to collective agreements and, by relying on the 
provisions of the Treaty on services and on Directive 96/71, is making an 
improper attempt to take advantage of the possibilities offered by Community 
law.”157 This is a very serious allegation on the part of the Defendant trade unions; 
it implies that Laval abused the law as it circumvented the Swedish national 
conditions of employment to take advantage of the lower Latvian conditions and 
therefore used their subsidiary as a letter-box company as they wrongfully took 
advantage of the internal market. Consequently, the Defendant trade unions 
claimed that this is a domestic issue for the national court to determine. However, 
AG Mengozzi opined, “there is nothing in the file to prove or even indicate that 
Laval’s activities were wholly or mainly directed towards Swedish territory with a 
view to evading the rules that would have been applicable to it if it had been 
established in Sweden.”158 Further, the fact that the Latvian workers returned to 
Latvia corroborates that there is no evidence to support the allegations that Laval 
intended to enable Latvian workers to gain access to the Swedish employment 
market. The Court held that the reference for a preliminary ruling is in fact 
admissible for the reason that the national court sought an interpretation of Union 
law in the context of a case that concerned Latvian workers being posted to 
Sweden and the consequence of the collective action in Sweden led to the 
suspension of the work and the Latvian workers returning to their home State. 
In response to the first question the Court examined the collective action in 
light of potential justifications and the proportionality test which exemplifies the 
manner in which this fundamental social right was treated when up against an 
economic freedom, “the very fact that the unions are having to justify their 
collective action at all shows that the unions are already on the defensive.”159 It 
would seem that prior to the Lisbon Treaty, which granted the Charter legally 
binding status, and therefore placed social rights in the primary law, the legislative 
balance of economic versus social rights weighed in favour of the former. 
Therefore, at this time a stricter test of scrutiny was applied to any social 
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protection measure that restricted an economic fundamental freedom and therefore 
required a proportionate justification from the Defendants. The Swedish 
Government and the Defendant trade unions submitted that the restrictions at 
issue were justified as the justification for their actions constituted an overriding 
reason of public interest in the form of worker protection which, in principle, is 
capable of justifying a restriction of one of the fundamental freedoms, as 
evidenced by the case law.160 The Court accepted that the blockading action in 
this case, which aimed at ensuring the terms and conditions applicable to the 
posted workers was fixed at a certain level, does fall within the objective of 
protecting workers.161 However, it was held that the “specific obligations, linked 
to signature of the collective agreement for the building sector, which the trade 
unions seek to impose on undertakings established in other Member States by way 
of collective action… the obstacle which that collective action forms cannot be 
justified with regard to such an objective.”162 The Court therefore held, in 
response to the first question, that Article 56 TFEU and the Directive preclude the 
trade union action in this case. Interestingly, the AG reached a different 
conclusion in his Opinion:  
 
“Where a Member State has no system for declaring collective agreements 
to be of universal application, Directive 96/71/EC… and Article [56 TFEU] 
must be interpreted as not preventing trade unions from attempting, by 
means of collective action in the form of a blockade and solidarity action, to 
compel a service provider of another Member State to subscribe to the rate 
of pay determined in accordance with a collective agreement which is 
applicable in practice to domestic undertakings in the same sector that are in 
a similar situation and was concluded in the first Member State, to whose 
territory workers of the other Member State are temporarily posted, provided 
that the collective action is motivated by public interest objectives, such as 
the protection of workers and the fight against social dumping, and is not 
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carried out in a manner that is disproportionate to the attainment of those 
objectives [emphasis added].”163 
 
Unlike the Court, the AG opined that Union law does not preclude the collective 
action in this case. In respect of these differing conclusions, there are two caveats 
to that Opinion, the first being that the action is only allowed whereby the 
Member State has no system for declaring collective agreements to be of universal 
application, which implies that in Member States that do have such a system the 
trade union action would be precluded. The second caveat to this Opinion is that 
the collective action must be motivated by public interest objectives, such as the 
protection of workers and the fight against social dumping, and is proportionate in 
attaining those objectives. However, it would appear from the very detailed 
Opinion that AG Mengozzi did not believe the collective action in this case to be 
proportionate, “it seems to me that the fact of making the very possibility of 
applying a given rate of pay conditional upon prior signing up to all the conditions 
of a collective agreement that apply in practice to undertakings established in 
Sweden in the same sector and in a similar situation goes beyond what is 
necessary to ensure the protection of workers and to prevent social dumping.”164 
Further, in the discussion of the additional conditions contained in the collective 
agreement that go beyond the rate of pay, the AG stated, “It seems to me that 
some of the payments claimed from Laval… in particular those subsidising the 
SBUF and vocational training in the building sector, display no connection with 
the protection of workers or any real advantage significantly contributing to the 
social protection of posted workers.”165 It is therefore submitted that despite the 
AG reaching a different conclusion to the Court in respect of the collective action, 
the proportionality test that he leaves to the national court would lead them to the 
same conclusion as the Court: that Article 56 TFEU and the Directive preclude 
the trade union action in Laval. 
The second question went one step further and rather than looking at the 
way the national law had implemented Union law in the context of the collective 
action it asked directly if the national law, in its own right, is compatible with the 
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Union law; placing national versus Union law head-to-head. The Swedish law 
‘MBL’ and specifically the ‘Lex Britannia’ grants that “Swedish collective 
agreements become applicable and take precedence over foreign collective 
agreements already concluded”.166 In practice it clearly is a discriminatory 
measure and one that can only be justified by the Treaty derogations. The very 
essence of the freedom to provide services implies the prohibition of 
discriminating against a service provider on account of its nationality; it is self-
evident that the service provider will be established in a different Member State to 
the service recipient therefore discriminating against the provider on account of 
being based in a Member State other than the host State would clearly create an 
obstacle to the provision of services. Since discriminatory rules can only be 
justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health and it was 
determined that the discrimination at issue cannot be justified under any of those 
headings, the Court consequently held that the Lex Britannia which prohibits 
Swedish trade unions from taking collective action against other Swedish 
undertakings, but not against service providers from other Member States, is 
precluded by Articles 56 and 57 TFEU. The effect of the Lex Britannia is that the 
domestic labour markets would have been protected from industrial action in this 
context, whereas the service providers from other Member States would not. 
However, it also reveals, in the same way as in Viking, an area of national law that 
was initially considered to be safe from the scrutiny of the Union legal order was 
actually held to come within its scope; even if not within its competence, and 
furthermore, it was subjugated by EU law.  
It is submitted that the impact of these rulings was made even greater by 
their proximity: two very bold statements from the Court made just one week 
apart. If there was only Viking or Laval there would have been great and 
interesting discussions in respect of their content and implied consequences, but 
as there were two it validates that the Grand Chamber of the Court was happy 
with its legal reasoning in the first case and so answered the second case much 
along the same lines, solidifying a very definite attitude and opinion of the Court. 
The following analysis therefore maintains the focus on Laval as that is the most 
pertinent case in respect of posted workers and therefore is the most useful case to 
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this thesis, however, at times Viking will also be mentioned as some of the issues 
are so inter-linked that it would be artificial to discuss one in isolation of the 
other. 
The most significant issues stemming from Laval can be summarised as 
follows: (i) collective action comes within the scope of Article 56 TFEU (when 
previously it was considered that this Article does not apply to collective action, 
in light of Article 153(5) TFEU); (ii) by ruling that collective agreements that are 
not universally applicable must have been published in the implementing 
legislation in accordance with Article 3(8) Directive shows that the Court was 
ultra vires; (iii) Article 56 TFEU confers rights on private undertakings which 
may be invoked against a trade union or an association of trade unions 
(confirming that these fundamental freedoms have horizontal direct effect capable 
of being used against social partners); (iv) the collective action at issue, 
constitutes a restriction of Article 56 TFEU and the Swedish legislation that 
permitted the collective action against the service provider was held to be 
precluded by Articles 56 and 57 TFEU, highlighting the tension between national 
and Union law; and (v) the judgment was made at the start of the Global 
Recession and accordingly, subjugating workers’ rights in favour of the free 
movement of cheaper labour from other Member States corroborated the existing 
concerns in respect of protecting the domestic labour market. 
Accordingly, the five specified issues are presented under the following 
headings below: (A) Competence; (B) Judicial Activism; (C) Horizontal Direct 
Effect; (D) EU Law versus National Law; and (E) Local Unemployment at Times 
of Recession.  
 
A. Competence  
 
One of the most contentious issues of Laval is the place of social rights within the 
jurisdiction of EU law. The Defendant trade unions, along with the Swedish and 
Danish Governments, observed that the right to take collective action does not 
come within the scope of Article 56 TFEU in accordance with Article 153(5) 
TFEU. This provision, which specifies the limit to the Union’s competence in the 
field of social policy, became primary law as amended by the Treaty of Nice and 
following the Lisbon Treaty, where the legislators had the opportunity to amend 
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the Treaties once more, this provision continued to remain as primary law. 
However, it is to be noted that, even where the Union does not have competence, 
these rights must be consistent with Union law; the prohibition on restricting the 
fundamental freedoms still applies, if there were certain areas in which national 
law was able to restrict the rights of the internal market the concept of the Union 
legal order would ultimately be rendered ineffectual. Therefore, the social rights 
of the workers continue to be the Member States’ prerogative but this is strictly 
within the constant presence of the Union context. AG Mengozzi observed that, 
“the social laws of the Member States do not enjoy any general exemption from 
the application of the Treaty rules”167 this is especially realised where those social 
rights come within the context of the fundamental freedoms; the collective action 
in Laval is only being undertaken because of the provision of services, therefore 
to warrant that an effect of the cause falls outside of the fundamental principle of 
that cause would inadvertently result in the destruction of a principle because of 
its impact. Clearly, the impact is a negative one; for trade unions to have to resort 
to collective action indicates something systemically wrong and this has been seen 
in nearly every case preceding Laval; the threat of cheaper labour becoming more 
accessible across the Union, as supported by the Union’s freedom of movement 
provided for by the Treaty and the Directive. Therefore, the problem is a very real 
one and the collective action in this context was clearly called for, not only 
specifically to Laval, but in light of the enlarging Union in general. Thus, the 
threat to jobs and the threat to the national labour system protecting those jobs 
now facing the judicial scrutiny of the Union was a step too far for the Defendant 
trade unions and Swedish and Danish Governments who observed that this does 
not come within the jurisdiction of the Union. It is submitted that there has to be 
some truth to this observation, after all, it does state in the Treaty that the Union 
has no place to regulate this area of social law, however, it can be argued that the 
Union is in no way legislating this area but it is upholding the Treaties via the 
ever-present concept of negative integration. 
This section on the competence of the Union will initially detail the law in 
this area, as prescribed by the Treaty, followed by an assessment of whether the 
issues at stake in these cases, primarily the use of collective action and bargaining, 
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can legitimately come within the competence of the Union legal order and 
therefore whether they can be limited by that legal order. 
 
(i) The Law on Collective Action and Collective Bargaining 
 
In accordance with Article 4(2)(b) TFEU, social policy is a shared competence of 
the Union and the Member States. However, it is important to note that this 
competence is limited to “the aspects defined in this Treaty”.168 Title X of the 
TFEU is the social policy chapter and defines the areas of social policy that come 
within the shared competence of the Union as well as the limits of that 
competence. Article 153(1) TFEU provides the areas of social policy that are 
covered by the Union’s competence, “the Union shall support and complement the 
activities of the Member States in the following fields: …(c) social security and 
social protection of workers; …(f) representation and collective defence of the 
interests of workers and employers, including co-determination, subject to 
paragraph 5”. Therefore, the social protection of workers, which is a legitimate 
justification for the restriction of the fundamental freedoms in the case law, does 
come within the competence of the Union along with the representation and 
collective defence of the interests of workers and employers. It is argued that 
“representation and collective defence” are synonymous with collective action, 
however, clearly as this is suffixed by it being subject to paragraph 5, the type and 
extent of collective action is not necessarily within the competence of, and 
therefore protected by, Union law.  
Paragraph 5 of Article 153 TFEU specifies the limitations of Union 
competence in the area of social policy as the following, “The provisions of this 
Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the 
right to impose lock-outs.” Thus, despite it being a shared competence, it does not 
cover all aspects of social policy and the four aspects that are excluded from 
Union competence essentially boil down to provisions on pay, collective action 
from the employees (right of association and right to strike) and collective action 
from the employers (imposing lock-outs); arguably, the very substance of the 
rights at issue in Laval. It can therefore be summarised that the representation and 
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collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, which arguably 
includes collective action, is a shared competence of the Union and Member 
States in principle, however, there are certain forms of collective action that are 
outside the scope of the Union’s competence.  
As for collective bargaining, it would appear that it is subject to fewer 
conditions and can be viewed as falling within the shared competence of the 
Union and the Member States in its entirety, in accordance with Article 152 
TFEU, “The Union recognises and promotes the role of the social partners at its 
level, taking into account the diversity of national systems. It shall facilitate 
dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy.” The notion that 
collective action is in principle a shared competence, yet subject to limitations, 
appears to show a lack of insight into the industrial relations context as collective 
action and collective bargaining are inextricably linked, “The ECJ’s approach in 
Laval can also be criticized for its poor understanding of the industrial relations 
context… [the judgment] ignores the inherent links between collective bargaining 
and the ability to take collective action.”169 Collective action can be used to 
implement collective bargaining from employers and employees alike, to ensure 
that both sides uphold their part of the bargain. However, it would appear that 
activities such as strike action; a central theme to the case law, does not come 
within the competence of the Union. The collective action specifically undertaken 
in Laval included blockading the site, picketing and sympathy action in the form 
of boycotting Laval’s sites in Sweden. These actions are not expressly mentioned 
in Article 153(5) TFEU, which details the activities that do not come within 
Union competence in an exhaustive list, therefore, it could be argued that they do 
come within the Union competence. Alternatively however, it could equally be 
argued that these activities only arise where there is some form of strike action 
already taking place, by exercising the right of association which, as 
aforementioned, is excluded from the Union’s competence.  
In summary, the law in this area is not clear-cut as there are different 
forms of collective action and the Treaty does not detail where there is an overlap 
which form falls within its competence. This is a key issue and determinative 
factor as this is an area so close to the heart of national law, therefore in 
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establishing it within the competence of the Union confirms that the Union has 
more of a strong-hold on the way this area is to be regulated, which can be an 
advantage in the sense of added protection, but ultimately leads to more regulation 
and therefore a lack of sensitivity and appreciation of the peculiarities of the 
national labour law systems and essentially de-sensitises the unique approach each 
Member State has previously adopted in regulating this area that suits their own 
cultural and political climate, “The Laval decision in particular has potentially 
farreaching implications for what is sometimes referred to as the ‘Nordic social 
model’. This is characterized by high levels of collective bargaining coverage to 
protect terms and conditions of employment.”170 However, it is not just the 
‘Nordic social model’ that will be affected by Laval and that is perhaps one of the 
greatest indicators of why this case has had such an impact, “The Court’s 
conclusion affects not just the Swedish system, but all national industrial relations 
systems which allow workers to strike to gain ‘recognition’.”171  
 
(ii) The Law on Pay 
 
Article 153(5) TFEU also specifies “pay” as being excluded from the competence 
of the Union in the area of social policy. Article 157(1) TFEU expands on this by 
stating, “Each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male 
and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied.” Despite 
there being no Union competence in respect of pay, the Court conferred horizontal 
direct effect on Article 157(1) TFEU in Defrenne172 thereby establishing the far-
reaching effect of social rights within the internal market. The Court emphasised 
that the EU, “is not merely an economic union, but is at the same time intended, 
by common action, to ensure social progress and seek the constant improvement 
of the living and working conditions of their peoples”.173 Thus, it was held that 
Article 157 TFEU has a double aim: (i) to uphold both the economic and social 
aims of the Union; and (ii) to avoid certain Member States, whose social 
legislation is more developed and therefore have already implemented the 
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principle of equal pay, from suffering a competitive disadvantage.174 The 
staggered stages of development of social legislation across the Member States 
was a key instigator to conferring individual rights through the direct effect of 
Article 157 TFEU. However, somewhat cynically, it could be argued that the 
development of social progress through equal pay for men and women in the 
Union was motivated by an economic, as opposed to a social, objective, “As with 
the prohibition of nationality discrimination, this was grounded in an economic 
rationale, namely, the concern that certain Member States could gain a 
competitive advantage through cheap female labour.”175 Nevertheless, the result 
was that this Treaty provision was the catalyst for a new body of law on equal 
treatment in employment and social security between men and women. 
Defrenne acknowledged that the work of an air stewardess is identical to 
that of a cabin steward and accordingly equal pay for equal work must apply in 
light of the EU general principle of equality. Clearly this case and the application 
of Article 157 TFEU relates to equal pay between men and women and the reader 
may therefore be curious as to how this relates to posted workers, but it is 
submitted that the implication of this jurisprudence extends to equal pay between 
all men and all women and in turn all workers for equal work or work of equal 
value. It is well-established that workers from other Member States cannot be 
discriminated against,176 as there is intended to be no distinction between one 
Member State and another, only between EU and non-EU countries, therefore, it 
is submitted that this principle of non-discrimination works both ways: posted 
workers have an opportunity to undertake work in the host State, just as host State 
workers must have the same opportunity to the same work, in effect, posted 
workers should not be prioritised over the national host State workers in 
accordance with the Union’s aim to establish, “a highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress [emphasis added].”177 
The Union is concerned with the employment of all of its citizens and it is 
submitted that through the jurisprudence of the Court and the application of 
Article 157 TFEU the Union must be concerned with the employment and welfare 
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of both the host State workers and the posted workers. Therefore, the interests of 
the posted workers, and therefore the service provider, should not be so readily 
prioritised over the host State workers and national labour interests, in light of the 
EU general principle of equality.  
 
(iii) Article 28 Charter 
 
This section on ‘Competence’ will now move on from the provisions on 
competence in the Treaty and will turn its attention to the Charter. Article 28 
Charter states, “Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in 
accordance with Community law and national laws and practices, the right to 
negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in 
cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, 
including strike action.” Therefore, strike action, which is held to be out of the 
remit of Union competence, is in fact protected by the Union’s Charter. However, 
Article 28 Charter does appear to include a reservation on this protection of the 
right of collective bargaining and action as it must be “in accordance with 
Community law and national laws and practices”. Therefore, as stated in Viking 
and Laval, in principle the right is protected and recognised by Union law, and 
mention is given to the national laws and practices too, however, in light of the 
primacy of Union law178 it has to be “in accordance with Community law” 
implying that where the right restricts the fundamental freedoms, the justification 
and proportionality of the restriction will be subject to a very strict level of 
scrutiny. Moreover, Article 51(1) Charter provides that the Charter can only apply 
when Union law is already being implemented. Therefore, the reality is that 
Article 28 is only activated in the context of Union law and can only be relied 
upon if it complies with Union law, bringing into question the practical scope of 
this right. It has its limitations and reveals that even though consideration of the 
national laws and practices are accounted for in the Charter, they must still be 
consistent with the market freedoms. Equally, however, the requirement of the 
collective bargaining and action being “in accordance with Community law and 
national laws and practices [emphasis added]” implies that the right is only 
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recognised at the Union level to the extent that it is also recognised by national 
law, “The EU has no competence to regulate the exercise of this right, nor can it 
act in a way that would deprive the right, as recognised in national law, of its 
essence.”179 In my opinion, this summary offered by Hinarejos describes the level 
of Union competence perfectly; it has no place to regulate the right, and further, it 
cannot function so as to diminish the right as prescribed by national law. 
However, the prefix that it must also be “in accordance with Community law” 
expressly ensures the primacy of Union law, even where there is no express 
competence. 
 The provision “in accordance with… national laws and practices” of 
Article 28 Charter can be found in six of the twelve Articles in Chapter IV on 
Solidarity.180 The reference to rights being in accordance with national laws 
governing the exercise of those rights can be seen in four other Articles of the 
Charter; all contained within Chapter II on Freedoms.181 It is submitted that the 
rights identified are unified by the fact that they are all culturally, economically, 
politically and socially sensitive to the Member States and therefore deference to 
the Member States’ interests must be accounted for and accordingly the Union has 
not been granted exclusive competence in these areas, for instance health care, 
education, social security, right to found a family, freedom of religion and 
collective action, as examples. It is the Solidarity Chapter that this thesis is most 
concerned with and it is interesting to note that half of the provisions in that 
Chapter are required to be in accordance with national laws and practices. It 
would appear that the Solidarity Chapter is different from the other Chapters in 
the Charter and this is highlighted in N.S. and M.E.182 The AG’s Opinion in the 
case recognised that, “That title, entitled ‘Solidarity’, is regarded as one of the 
most controversial areas in the evolution of the Charter.”183 Accordingly, that 
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Chapter is treated differently, “Title IV of the Charter of Fundamental Rights does 
not create justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom”.184 This 
lack of justiciability entails that private individuals cannot rely on the Solidarity 
Chapter against the UK or Poland except for where the UK or Poland have 
provided for such rights in their national law. One of the central issues of N.S. and 
M.E. was the practical application of Protocol No. 30.185 The existence of this 
qualifying Protocol highlights a fundamental issue of European labour law, “This 
is another illustration of the political difficulties associated with the scope of 
labour law rights.”186 The degree of competence in this area clearly has moving 
boundaries and Protocol No. 30 reflects how solidarity within the Union is 
adopted differently between the Member States, which is an advantage in the 
sense of maintaining flexibility on the part of the Member States in a politically 
sensitive area, but it does inevitably lead to a lack of legal certainty. It is 
important to be aware of these differences in order to acknowledge that the 
Solidarity Chapter in the Charter, which contains the provision on the right of 
collective bargaining and action, maintains the requirement that it be in 
accordance with national laws and practices, hence why it was necessary for the 
Court to establish the lawfulness of the collective action in accordance with the 
national law in Viking and Laval.187 However, the specific application of Protocol 
No. 30 was not actually at issue in Viking or Laval as the facts of those cases 
concerned the employment terms and conditions of Estonia, Finland, Sweden and 
Latvia only, not the UK or Poland.  
Article 28 Charter was mentioned by the Court in both Viking and Laval as 
a reminder that the right to take collective action is to be protected in accordance 
with Union law and national law and practices.188 However, it was not relied on 
emphatically in order to bolster the right to take collective action, instead, the 
Court mentioned the significance of the Charter as a whole, along with the 
European Social Charter, ILO Convention No. 87 and the Community Charter of 
the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, in order to validate the importance of 
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fundamental rights. This is most likely due to the fact that the Charter only gained 
legally binding status when the Lisbon Treaty became effective, on 1 December 
2009, two years after these cases were decided. Accordingly, the Charter and its 
future potential was more symbolic at this stage and so the Court primarily relied 
on the right to take collective action as a fundamental right that had been given 
expression by the aforementioned Charters and international instruments. It is 
therefore hoped that now the Charter has been granted legally binding status, 
Article 28 Charter and the right to collective bargaining and action will hold 




The final issue to be discussed in respect of the competence of the Union is 
whether the social rights at issue came within the scope of the fundamental 
freedoms. In both Viking and Laval the Danish and Swedish Governments 
attempted to show that the right to strike, as a fundamental right, fell outside the 
scope of the free movement provisions, and in doing so drew an analogy with the 
case of Albany.189 In Albany the Court considered whether the social goals, in 
respect of the promotion of collective bargaining, determined that they must fall 
outside the scope of the Treaty. The Court determined, “It is beyond question that 
certain restrictions of competition are inherent in collective agreements between 
organisations representing employers and workers. However, the social policy 
objectives pursued by such agreements would be seriously undermined if 
management and labour were subject to Article [105(1) TFEU] when seeking 
jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions of work and employment.”190 
Accordingly, the Court held in Albany that agreements concluded in the context of 
collective negotiations between management and labour in pursuit of such social 
policy objectives must fall outside the scope of Article 105(1) TFEU. The Court’s 
statement that the social policy objectives “would be seriously undermined” if 
they came within the scope of Article 105(1) TFEU boldly supports those 
objectives and clearly distinguishes their special place in the Union legal order. 
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However, the Court in Viking and Laval did not follow the same reasoning. In 
relation to Viking, AG Maduro opined, “the fact that an agreement or activity is 
excluded from the scope of the competition rules does not necessarily mean that it 
is also excluded from the scope of the rules on freedom of movement.”191 As 
exemplified here, the Court does not always treat the free movement provisions as 
analogous to the competition provisions in the Treaty, “the clash in Albany was 
total and would have resulted in the collective agreements being automatically 
void, without possible reconciliation – a reconciliation that is, however, possible 
in principle when a clash occurs between a fundamental right and one of the 
fundamental freedoms.”192 In principle, the fundamental right to take collective 
action can be justified where it restricts a fundamental freedom and in Viking and 
Laval the Court chose not to follow the same rationale as it did with the 
competition provisions in Albany, but instead, “it followed the Schmidberger line 
of cases in which a proportionality test had been used to resolve conflicts between 
fundamental rights and the free movement provisions.”193 Thereby presenting the 
collective action with a negative starting point, “the ECJ is prevented from 
treating the right to strike as a positive goal of Community law… the Court’s 
‘defensive’ recognition of the right to strike colours the way in which the right can 
be used”.194 
Davies argued that even if the Albany approach had been adopted by the 
Court the result may well have been the same, for the reason that “it is not clear 
that the Albany approach would have applied automatically to any collective 
action. The unions might still have had to show that the action was pursuing a 
legitimate worker-protective purpose, like the pension fund in Albany itself.”195 
However, I do not believe that the Court were ever truly tempted to apply the 
Albany reasoning; in both Viking and Laval the Court made it clear that the 
collective action naturally comes within the scope of the fundamental freedoms as 
the very essence of the functioning of the internal market in removing obstacles to 
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the fundamental freedoms “would be compromised”196 if obstacles not governed 
by public law, such as the collective action at issue, did not come within the scope 
of the free movement provisions. It is submitted that the fundamental freedoms 
are the centrepiece of the internal market and accordingly they are not always 
treated as comparable to the competition provisions in the Treaty. Therefore, once 
the Court had established that the social rights at issue did come within the 
fundamental freedoms, the Court followed the normal formula for internal market 
cases: fundamental freedom; restriction; justification; proportionality. The 
rationale in Albany was rejected as the legal framework of Viking and Laval 
clearly falls within the free movement provisions, therefore it is submitted that the 
formula adopted by the Court in deciding these cases was neither surprising nor 
wrong. 
 
(v) Interim Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, Laval is an internal market case in line with the freedom to provide 
services. The difficulty is that the restriction of the freedom is collective action; a 
social right that was previously assumed to be outside the scope of the Union’s 
competence, and further, a right that is representative of the differing national 
labour law systems. Social policy is a shared competence and under Article 
153(1) TFEU this includes the representation and collective defence of the 
interests of workers and employers. However, Article 153(5) TFEU specifies 
certain areas that are outside of the scope, including pay and the right to strike, yet 
provisions on pay must be in accordance with the Court’s jurisprudence and the 
EU general principle of equality. Therefore, the concept of competence in this 
area does appear to warrant some degree of flexibility in light of the general 
principles and fundamental rights and it is this latter point that has changed 
exponentially in EU law since the Laval Quartet and therefore proves most 
interesting for future cases. Since Laval, Article 28 Charter has gained legally 
binding status and accordingly the right of collective bargaining and action would 
now appear to be of greater legal significance to the Court and arguably these 
social rights, which are considered to be the second generation of rights, should be 
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granted a balanced level of importance as the economic rights, which are seen as 
the first generation of rights. The concept of balancing the social and economic 
rights was advocated in Laval, “the rights under the provisions of the Treaty on 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital must be balanced 
against the objectives pursued by social policy”197 but now, with the Charter, the 
Union has the legal impetus to realise its intention. Perhaps Article 28 Charter 
does provide scope for greater protection of individual rights now that it has 
legally binding status, however, significantly the Charter does not create 
justiciable rights as between private individuals and therefore cannot be invoked 
horizontally. The issue of horizontal direct effect is dealt with below. 
 
B. Judicial Activism 
 
The issue of competence arises once more, this time in the context of judicial 
activism. Bercusson submitted that by applying Articles 49 and 56 TFEU 
horizontally to trade unions and collective action, it will have the effect of 
outlawing collective action and consequently circumventing the exclusion of 
Union competence in this area, as prescribed by Article 153(5) TFEU.198 The 
effect of bringing the right to strike within the scope of the Treaties inadvertently 
brings it within the Union’s competence, suggesting an act of judicial activism. 
Whether circumventing the exclusion of Union competence in this area in order to 
uphold the fundamental freedoms was intended by the Court is undecided; the 
effect clearly pertains to that possibility, yet one would hope that instead it was an 
indirect knock-on effect of the balancing act that the Court had to undertake in 
applying Articles 49 and 56 TFEU in line with the justifications and 
proportionality test. 
The second potential act of judicial activism is represented by the Court 
behaving in a manner that encroached onto the legislator’s prerogatives. 
Following the adoption of the Directive, the Labour and Social Affairs Council 
specified that, in respect of the mandatory terms and conditions of employment 
under Article 3(1) Directive, “Member states are free, within limits, to add further 
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items to this list.”199 Therefore, Article 3(1) Directive was always intended to be a 
non-exhaustive list, yet the Court, on its own accord, altered the political will of 
the legislators. This pertains to judicial activism on the part of the Court, “the 
legislature should be legislating and the Court should be judging – without 
interfering with one another.”200  
It is submitted that the Court interpreting the Directive so stringently and 
potentially acting beyond its competence, as seen above, could infer judicial 
activism. However, in such a socially sensitive area controversial decisions are 
inevitable, also, the Directive itself may be the main offender in this context, “An 
approximate test of the quality of any given piece of secondary legislation may be 
offered by the number of occasions in which the Court had to interpret the terms 
of such text”.201 This indicates that the Court is not entirely to blame for its 
interpretation of a Directive that is open to misinterpretation. The issues do appear 
to have been exacerbated by an external factor (the Court) due to the internal 
issues of the Directive itself. This conclusion provides direction for Chapter 3 in 
identifying the most suitable solution. 
There is however one final issue to be discussed under this section that 
proves the Court is guilty of judicial activism in Laval. The Court determined that 
Article 56 TFEU and Article 3 Directive preclude the trade union action at issue 
because the action intended to force Laval to enter into negotiations with the 
Swedish trade unions regarding the rates of pay applicable to the posted workers 
and to sign a collective agreement which contained more favourable conditions 
than those in the relevant legislative provisions. As well as containing more 
favourable conditions, the Court held that the collective agreement at issue was 
not applicable as it did not conform to the provisions set out under Article 3(1) or 
(8) Directive.202 It is hereby submitted that in stating that the collective agreement 
at issue did not conform to Article 3(8) Directive, the Court is guilty of judicial 
activism. 
 
(i) The Collective Agreement 
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Article 3(1) Directive specifies that the terms and conditions of employment of 
the host State to be extended to the posted workers must be laid down “by law, 
regulation or administrative provision, and/or by collective agreements or 
arbitration awards which have been declared universally applicable within the 
meaning of paragraph 8”. Article 3(8) Directive provides that in the absence of a 
system for declaring collective agreements to be universally applicable, which is 
the case in Sweden, there is a second option: 
 
“Member States may, if they so decide, base themselves on: - collective 
agreements or arbitration awards which are generally applicable to all 
similar undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or 
industry concerned, and/or collective agreements which have been 
concluded by the most representative employers’ and labour organizations at 
national level and which are applied throughout national territory”.  
 
The Directive does not specify that the applicability of these collective agreements 
must be explicitly declared in the implementing legislation and the wording, cited 
above, indicating that the Member States “may, if they so decide” seems to leave 
it as an option. It therefore can reasonably be understood that the Member States 
interpreted this to mean that de facto collective agreements will be applicable. 
However, in the questions referred for a preliminary ruling it was asked whether 
the trade unions can force a service provider, by collective action, to sign a 
collective agreement in the host country “if the situation in the host country is 
such that the legislation to implement Directive 96/71 has no express provisions 
concerning the application of terms and conditions of employment in collective 
agreements?”203 The need to expressly provide that the collective agreement 
applies in the implementing legislation is a new invention: it is not provided for in 
the Directive. Yet it has apparently been assumed to apply; the Court did not 
specify otherwise. There is a danger that these new principles can be created and 
then accepted as being self-evident, but where there is no legislative support for 
such a crucial issue in the case it is imperative that these errors are not followed. 
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Unfortunately in Laval, the Grand Chamber of the Court took for granted that the 
provision to publish the application of the collective agreement in the 
implementing legislation does not exist and yet the Court based its reasoning on 
Sweden not complying with the opportunity offered by Article 3(8) Directive. 
 This thesis submits that the collective agreement at issue did comply with 
the opportunity offered by the second limb of Article 3(8) Directive, which 
stipulates three conditions: (i) the collective agreement is concluded by the most 
representative employers’ organisation at national level; (ii) the most 
representative labour organisation at national level; and (iii) is applied throughout 
national territory. The collective agreement was concluded by Sveriges 
Byggindustrier which is the central organisation for employers in the construction 
sector204 and Byggnads which is the Swedish building and public works trade 
union and is one of the most representative trade unions in Sweden, representing 
over 87% of workers in the Swedish building sector.205 Finally, the collective 
agreement is the collective agreement for the building sector.206 
Unfortunately, the requirement created by the Court to publish the 
collective agreement as applying in the implementing legislation has also been 
accepted in the literature, “It is obvious from Laval and Rüffert that the boxes of 
Art.3(8) of the Directive must be very fully ticked to have a ‘qualifying’ collective 
agreement”;207 and, “the Court of Justice requires Member States positively to opt 
into either of these possibilities [provided by Article 3(8) Directive]”;208 and, 
“Sweden… deprived itself of the option to allow other broadly applicable 
collective agreements to set standards by failing explicitly to make use of that 
option.”;209 and, “Wage fixing in Sweden is essentially a (collective) bargaining 
matter. The Swedish Act on implementation of the PWD210 is based on this, but 
contains no provision to that effect nor any explicit stipulation that existing 
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collective agreements may be applicable.”211 However, this thesis loudly 
proclaims that this was not just yet another example of the Court’s overly 
restrictive interpretation of the Directive; the Court made a blatant mistake, 
Article 3(8) Directive should never have been interpreted in this way as that 
interpretation was never available: the Court relied upon it erroneously.  
AG Mengozzi argued that the option provided for by Article 3(8) 
Directive is “merely a possibility offered to Member States”,212 which was 
corroborated in the ‘Country Report’ on Sweden’s transposition of the 
Directive.213 However, the Court did not deliberate this point raised by AG 
Mengozzi at all, which is so critical to the clarity of the way in which the Member 
States have transposed the Directive, and instead ignored AG Mengozzi’s advice 
and firmly stated without further definition that the “Member State has not made 
use of the possibility provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 3(8) of 
that directive.”214 
 So where did the Court gather inspiration to establish this principle? There 
are two possibilities: firstly, the Commission’s Communication of 2003 specified 
that collective agreements that are generally applicable, in accordance with Article 
3(8) Directive, must make explicit mention thereof in the legislation implementing 
the Directive, “If their implementing legislation makes no reference to this effect, 
Member States may not oblige [service providers posting their workers] to 
observe the collective agreements [emphasis added]”.215 This is very bold and 
definite language from a non-binding instrument that does not reflect the text of 
the applicable legislation, “Member States may, if they so decide…[emphasis 
added]”. If the Court based its judgment on this provision it reveals that it has 
based its judgment on a non-binding instrument that was published four years 
after the deadline for transposition.216 The second possibility is that there is one 
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other place in which this requirement has been expressed: the 1993 amended 
Proposal for the Directive. Article 4(3) of the amended Proposal stated that, in the 
interests of legal certainty, “Member States shall ensure that official information 
on the collective agreements which are generally applicable within the meaning of 
Article 3(4) is published by a competent authority and readily available to the 
undertaking referred to in Article 2 [service provider]. Failing such information 
the undertaking in question shall not be bound by the abovementioned collective 
agreements.”217 Therefore, the amended Proposal stated that collective agreements 
which are deemed to be generally applicable, and not universally applicable, have 
to be published; if they are not published, the undertaking will not be bound by 
the collective agreement. The effect of this provision is that it would have made 
collective agreements even harder to apply in practice, therefore, during the 
Council and the Parliament’s co-decision on the Directive, the provision was 
removed and thus never appeared in the final Directive. It is submitted that the 
provision’s removal nullified the requirement. This indicates that the Court either 
relied on a non-binding instrument or a nullified requirement in an out-dated 
Proposal over the legislation and accordingly was ultra vires.  
 
(ii) Interim Conclusion 
 
It is very disappointing, and somewhat surprising given the amount of attention 
and doctrinal criticism this case has received, that this technical point has been 
accepted in the academic literature without further investigation, “The Court’s – 
however cursory – observation (offered three times over) is that Sweden ‘has not 
made use of the possibility provided for in the second subparagraph’ of Article 
3(8).218 The requirement implicit in this reasoning evidently is that if a State 
wishes to ‘so decide’ pursuant to Article 3(8), some form of explicit mention of 
this must be made in the legislation implementing the PWD.”219 To date, I have 
not read anything in the literature that expressly raises the fact that Article 4(3) 
amended Proposal was deleted so that the final Directive does not instruct 
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Member States to declare the applicability of collective agreements in the 
implementing legislation and in spite of this the Court relied on that provision as 
the basis of its reasoning. 
In respect of judicial activism in the posted workers’ cases the usual issues 
have been presented in the literature, such as the scope of Article 3 Directive 
being “drastically circumscribed”.220 However, the original critique of the Court’s 
judgment in Laval offered in this thesis does not guarantee that the outcome 
would have been in favour of the trade unions; after all, the Court also specified 
that the collective agreement contained more favourable conditions than those in 
the relevant legislative provisions. Nevertheless, the issue at least needed to be 
considered by the Court and should have been raised by the trade unions’ legal 
team.  
What this finding does confirm is that the Directive clearly needs to be 
amended in order to clarify these apparent ambiguities. The issue also reveals the 
Court’s meagre significance bestowed on collective agreements, given that this 
collective agreement was so easily and readily dismissed. Finally, the Court’s 
error elicits a deeper issue of accepting the Court’s assumptions of the law as 
being self-evident when in fact there should be an awareness that there may be 
other factors inciting a decision from the Court, including an ever-expanding 
caseload221 and inevitable time pressure, “in a difficult case, speed may come at 
the expense of quality.”222 
 
C. Horizontal Direct Effect 
 
In Laval the two parties at dispute were private parties and therefore the 
application of EU law in this private law case had to be invoked horizontally. The 
horizontal direct effect of Article 56 TFEU, and potentially the Directive as well, 
was one of the most contentious issues of the case and, along with Viking, 
changed the scope of the law in this area. This section will therefore discuss the 
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horizontal application of the Treaty and then the horizontal application of the 
Directive, followed by a discussion on what the outcome may have been if the 
cases had in fact come under the scope of public law, concluding with an analysis 
of how the Court applied the proportionality test. 
 
(i) Horizontal Direct Effect of the Treaties  
 
A provision is capable of direct effect when the substance of the provision is 
sufficiently precise and unconditional.223 In principle, Treaty provisions, 
regulations and international agreements are capable of both vertical and 
horizontal direct effect, whereas directives and decisions are only capable of 
vertical direct effect. However, prior to Viking and Laval, the horizontal 
application of the Treaties against trade unions initiating industrial action 
remained undetermined and was not confirmed or thought to be entirely 
appropriate. Therefore, it is arguable that one of the most striking conclusions that 
came from these cases was the confirmation from the Court, “without much 
explanation”,224 that trade unions, as private parties, can be bound directly by 
Articles 49 and 56 TFEU when initiating industrial action. In this respect, these 
cases are the seminal judgments on the issue. 
Prior to the judgments, the Commission took the view that Article 49 
TFEU could not be applied horizontally by a private undertaking against a trade 
union in respect of the union’s collective action and accordingly, Articles 49 and 
56 TFEU only applied to regulatory measures adopted by quasi-public bodies.225 
However, that was not the case here as there was no delegation of state authority 
and the Court has made it clear that trade unions are not public bodies.226 
Furthermore, in his Opinion in Laval, AG Mengozzi stated that trade unions 
cannot be considered as being a quasi-public body so as to legitimise vertical 
direct effect, “I do not believe that that obstacle can be overcome by the attempt, 
appearing in Laval’s written observations, to widen the concept of a State in such 
a way that, in the present case, trade unions are regarded as a subdivision of the 
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Swedish State, against which Laval could then directly invoke Directive 
96/71”.227 On this latter point, Bercusson drew a parallel between the horizontal 
application of the Treaties and the fact that directives do not have horizontal direct 
effect but can only be invoked vertically against the State and ‘emanations of the 
State’228 accordingly, “If the same criteria were to apply to horizontal direct effect 
of Articles [49 and 56 TFEU], trade unions are not such bodies.”229 Trade unions 
are not public bodies and neither are they emanations of the State, therefore, there 
is an uneasiness about applying Articles 49 and 56 TFEU horizontally against a 
trade union. However, it is apparent that the Treaties, as primary law, differ 
greatly from the secondary law of directives and as such the parallel drawn 
between the two is not that convincing as the Treaties automatically have greater 
leverage in their application. 
In Laval the Court justified the horizontal application of Article 56 TFEU 
against the Defendant trade unions as follows: 
 
“compliance with Article [56 TFEU] is also required in the case of rules 
which are not public in nature but which are designed to regulate, 
collectively, the provision of services. The abolition, as between Member 
States, of obstacles to the freedom to provide services would be 
compromised if the abolition of State barriers could be neutralised by 
obstacles resulting from the exercise of their legal autonomy by associations 
or organisations not governed by public law.”230  
 
The Court corroborated this justification with evidence of its previous case law.231 
However, despite following the logic of its previous case law, this leaves us with 
two problems, as identified by Barnard,232 firstly, the ruling bestows the same 
responsibilities on trade unions as it does the State, but it does not provide trade 
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unions with the same ‘get out clause’ such as the public policy derogation in 
Article 3(10) Directive, and further, if we are to consider the Treaty derogations, 
they were all made with the public body in mind, not private actors, “public 
policy, public security or public health.”233 Secondly, Laval’s reasoning above 
specifies that Article 56 TFEU applies to rules which are not public in nature but 
which “collectively” regulate the provision of services which introduces the 
dilemma of whether individual strikers can be included within this scope. 
Presumably, the action of an individual striker would be considered as being too 
remote as the Court has only identified action undertaken by “associations or 
organisations not governed by public law.”  
To summarise the Court’s conclusion on this matter and in spite of prior 
uncertainties in this area, it has now been determined that trade unions, as private 
parties that act collectively, are required to comply with Articles 49 and 56 TFEU. 
The effect of this decision by the Court is that trade unions must be on the 
defensive and be prepared to justify their actions, “by imposing a direct obligation 
on the trade unions rather than on the State, the trade unions must now shoulder 
the burden of justifying their activities in every instance, something that may be 
considered undesirable.”234 It is undesirable because collective action is 
recognised as a fundamental right and the Court’s decision has clearly prioritised 
the fundamental freedoms above fundamental rights, which introduces scepticism 
as to how seriously social rights are truly valued in the EU against economic 
values. The Union originated as an economic vehicle with an emphasis on trade 
and as much as the Treaties have been amended, it is submitted that it is the 
decisions of the Court that reveal how Union law is actually interpreted and used 
in practice and therefore where its values are expressed. The difficulty with Viking 
and Laval is that they have received so much attention, described as being “Two 
of the most remarkable human rights cases decided by the European Court of 
Justice”,235 that it is difficult to ignore these two particular rulings and the priority 
that was granted to the fundamental freedoms over the fundamental rights. 
The apparent scepticism of trade unions shown by the Court by placing 
them on the defensive could be due to the fact that, “National unions’ attempts at 
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worker protection may also be regarded as examples of protectionism.”236 The 
purpose of trade unions is to protect the workers that they represent, but this 
worker protection overlaps with protecting national jobs, which is important in the 
domestic sphere but viewed as a threat to market integration in the Union sphere. 
It is submitted that, in achieving any sort of congenial balance here, the Court 
must recognise that collective industrial action is not a form of protectionism. 
Viking and Laval demonstrate that unfortunately for trade unions they do 
not have the freedom like other private actors to pursue their private interests 
without the constraint of direct effect, “The German Government argued that trade 
unions represent the interests of workers and direct effect would affect their 
freedom of association.”237 
  
(ii) Horizontal Direct Effect of the Directive 
 
As aforementioned, in principle, directives are only capable of vertical direct 
effect, therefore, the main bone of contention in this respect is that the Court 
placed such a heavy reliance on a Directive in private law. The Directive was 
discussed at length in Laval and the preliminary reference was made on the 
interpretation of the Directive and Articles 18 and 56 TFEU and the final 
judgment expressly refers to Article 3 Directive and Articles 56 and 57 TFEU. 
Clearly, the application of the Directive to this extent was made by the Court and 
the doctrine of direct effect provides for EU law to be invoked in the national 
courts, but the reference for its interpretation was made by the Swedish Labour 
Court. Thus, the reliance on the Directive and its influence on this private law 
case cannot be denied. 
It was previously held that there can be no direct effect of provisions 
containing obligations for private parties.238 However, despite the fact that directives 
do not ‘officially’ have horizontal direct effect, as per the previous jurisprudence 
of the Court, directives are intended to be binding as to the result to be achieved: 
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“in applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted 
before or after the directive, the national court called upon to interpret it is 
required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the 
purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter 
and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article [288 TFEU] of the 
Treaty.”239  
 
Therefore, even if it can be argued that there was no explicit direct effect of the 
Directive in Laval, its provisions were thoroughly evaluated in light of the facts 
and were relied on as far as possible in order to attain the result pursued by the 
Directive, in the interests of achieving harmonious interpretation through indirect 
effect. In my opinion, it is somewhat artificial to suggest that there was absolutely 
no horizontal direct effect of the Directive in the case when there has to be such a 
delicate manipulation of the nuances between horizontal direct effect, indirect 
effect and incidental effect in order to defend that in principle there is no 
horizontal direct effect of directives when, in reality, no matter how careful and 
precise the rhetoric, it has exactly the same result as if the Directive was 
comfortably and openly expressed as being capable of being relied on in private 
law. Clearly, the purpose of stating that there is no horizontal direct effect of 
directives ensures that the discretion given to Member States in implementing 
directives means that private parties may only derive rights from the acts of 
national authorities and further, it maintains the distinction between regulations 
which are directly applicable compared to directives which are not. However, the 
distinction has become more blurred in recent years, revealing that the judge-
made law tirelessly expressing that, technically, there is no horizontal direct effect 
of directives is a forced and somewhat unfeasible principle, as exemplified by the 
case law below.  
The recent ruling of Prigge240 revealed how fundamental rights can be 
applied in private law. In this case three pilots had their employment contracts 
automatically terminated when they reached the age of 60. The applicants brought 
an action on the grounds that they were victims of age discrimination and 
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therefore their employment contracts should continue as the difference in 
treatment, on the grounds of age, is contrary to the general principles of EU law 
and/or Directive 2000/78/EC (the Framework Directive)241 which regulates non-
discrimination of, inter alia, age in the workplace. The Court agreed and in 
reaching this decision, the Court was required to apply the Framework Directive 
in a private law case thereby by-passing the prohibition of horizontal direct effect 
of directives. This case is now part of a line of case law that has taken such an 
approach and it would appear that the Court has now confirmed the strong-hold of 
directives in national private law, amid the previous legal uncertainty and lack of 
legitimate expectation in this area.  
First, there was Mangold242 which is “one of the most controversial 
judgments to be delivered by the Court of Justice (ECJ) in recent years”.243 In the 
same way as it did in Prigge, the Court found the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of age to be a general principle of EU law that had been given expression 
by the Framework Directive. However, at the time of the facts in the case, the 
Directive’s time limit for implementation had not yet expired, nevertheless, the 
Directive – even if the Court was unwilling to expressly admit it – was granted 
horizontal direct effect. Five years later in Kücükdeveci244 the Court once again 
gave horizontal direct effect to the Framework Directive, again invoking the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. Finally, Prigge has confirmed 
the Court’s application of directives in national private law, specifically German 
national private law; all three cases were referred from the German courts. 
Presumably, the Court could not simply invoke Article 21 Charter; the non-
discrimination provision, as these cases were of a domestic nature and the Charter 
is only activated in the context of Union law, therefore a remedy from the national 
court was required. “It has been argued that the Court’s understanding of when a 
dispute will fall within the scope of the Treaties, for the purposes of triggering the 
general principles of Union law, has been stretched to (or even beyond) its 
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tolerable constitutional limits by rulings such as Kücükdeveci.”245 And it is hereby 
submitted, also by Mangold and now Prigge as well. 
In light of these cases, if the legislator were to deny the horizontal direct 
effect of directives at this stage it would implicate that the judiciary were either 
ultra vires or that they arrived at their previous decisions accidentally per 
incuriam. Consequently, one must ask where Laval and the application of the 
Posted Workers Directive fits into this jurisprudence? In the three cases 
mentioned above the Framework Directive was invoked as the applicants relied 
on the EU law general principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age, 
however, in Laval the Applicants’ main argument was that their freedom to 
provide services had been restricted, accordingly, with or without the Directive, 
Laval was able to invoke Article 56 TFEU, which, as discussed above, is less 
controversial to apply horizontally than the Directive. Whereas the three age 
discrimination cases required the medium of the Framework Directive to give 
expression to the general principle. As such, the Court was not forced to rely on 
the Directive in Laval; as the Treaty provision was available. In the interests of 
maintaining the distinguishing features of directives, it can be argued that there 
was not an absolute applicability of the Directive in Laval. However, that does not 
negate the fact that the Court relied heavily on the Directive to determine the 
acceptable level of collective action. 
This is a highly sensitive area and in principle it does seem sensible to 
hold on to the premise that directives do not have horizontal direct effect for the 
reason that the effect of individuals being able to invoke directives in private 
national law, as well as creating more rights for its citizens, also imposes more 
duties on private parties and as the EU is not intended to have competence in 
national private law, this could be seen as competence creep masked by the 
carefully selected and precise rhetoric of the Court. Having said that, in my 
opinion, it cannot be denied that the Laval judgment does rely on both Article 56 
TFEU and Article 3 Directive as precluding the collective action at issue in the 
case, logically, it would infer that the Court relied on the secondary legislation, as 
well as the Treaty, horizontally against the social partners. 
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(iii) Whether Sweden Transposed the Directive Incorrectly 
 
A possible way around the prohibition of the horizontal direct effect of directives 
is the application of Member State liability. As opposed to invoking the Directive 
horizontally against the Defendant trade unions, which clearly remains to be an 
undetermined and uncertain route, Laval could have instead brought proceedings 
for damages against the State, “Incidentally, [the rulings of Viking and Laval] may 
also pave the way in the future for a Francovich-type of damage claims against 
private actors for breach of the market freedoms.”246 Member State liability can 
arise whereby a State has failed to apply or implement EU law correctly. 
One of the major concerns in Laval was how the Swedish State transposed 
the Directive.247 The choice of form and method of implementing a Directive is to 
be left to the Member States.248 In Laval, the Court recognised that “the purpose 
of Directive 96/71 is not to harmonise systems for establishing terms and 
conditions of employment in the Member States, the latter are free to choose a 
system at the national level which is not expressly mentioned among those 
provided for in that directive”.249 Therefore, provided that it does not hinder the 
provision of services, the Court expressly accepted that Member States are free to 
adopt an implementation mechanism of their own in respect of the Directive. 
Sweden does not have a statutory minimum rate of pay and therefore relies 
heavily on collective bargaining and agreements. In Laval the minimum wage was 
not specified in the collective agreement but left to be negotiated on a case-by-
case basis between the service provider and the relevant trade union. As 
highlighted by Davies, “the Court took exception to the requirement for what it 
referred to as ‘case-by-case’ negotiations… This process was presented as too 
onerous and uncertain for firms.”250 It is stated in the primary law and accepted by 
the judiciary that Member States may implement the Directive exactly as they 
wish; it is their prerogative. Sweden had their own system of implementing 
collective agreements and this is supported by the means of collective action. 
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Consequently, for the Court to conclude that the method and form of Sweden’s 
national labour law system constitutes a restriction to the freedom to provide 
services reveals how far the Court are willing to go to protect the Union legal 
order. The potential impact of this cannot be underplayed; as demonstrated by the 
atmosphere prior to the judgment in Laval, “The fact that the legitimacy of the 
Swedish model is to be tried by the ECJ has caused consternation and Swedish 
trade unions have warned that a negative outcome might imply an end to Swedish 
EU membership.”251 
Laval and the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish and Czech 
Governments opined that Sweden transposed the Directive incorrectly and 
therefore as there is no system for declaring collective agreements to be of 
universal application in Swedish law and they did not make use of Article 3(8) 
Directive, Laval and the aforementioned Governments stated that Sweden waived 
the right to apply the terms and conditions of employment laid down in collective 
agreements to posted workers.252 AG Mengozzi did not agree with this as he 
argued that the option provided for by Article 3(8) Directive is “merely a 
possibility offered to Member States”.253 Therefore, the fact that Sweden opted 
not to use that possibility, but left it to both sides of industry to determine the 
employment conditions by means of a collective agreement, does not constitute an 
inadequate implementation of the Directive. As aforementioned, this thesis is in 
agreement with the Opinion of AG Mengozzi on this point; the wording of Article 
3(8) Directive indicates that de facto collective agreements which are generally 
applicable and/or collective agreements which have been concluded by the most 
representative employers’ and labour organisations at national level can be 
extended to posted workers.  
Sweden transposed the Directive prior to the deadline for transposition, 
“Sweden implemented the [Directive] through a new Act: the Posting of Workers 
Act that entered into force in December 1999.”254 Thereby complying with the 
implementation provision as set out under Article 7 Directive and then expressed 
the applicable terms and conditions of employment in line with their own labour 
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system. The rules for setting out how a collective agreement can be relied upon 
are the same for all Member States as prescribed by the Directive, however, it is 
left up to the Member States as to how they choose to implement those rules into 
their national law. Therefore, the method of implementation does not pertain to an 
incorrect transposition of the Directive by Sweden, but rather the problem lies 
with the lack of clarity in the legislation itself which has led to ambiguous 
interpretations of the law. 
 
(iv) Public Law or Private Law? 
 
Laval gave authority to the freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU 
conferring rights on private undertakings which may be invoked against a trade 
union or an association of trade unions. However, the question that will be 
addressed here is whether the case could have been brought against the State and 
if so, whether the result would have been the same. 
 In accordance with the free movement of goods, the Court has chosen not 
to extend the reach of Articles 34 and 35 TFEU to the activities of private parties. 
This is exemplified in Schmidberger255 which dealt with protesters restricting the 
free movement of goods and accordingly was brought vertically against the State. 
Environmental protesters in Austria undertook a demonstration on the Brenner 
motorway, which is the main transit route between Germany and Italy. 
Schmidberger, a German haulage company, could not transport timber and steel 
between Germany and Italy during the demonstration and therefore brought an 
action against Austria for granting permission to the demonstration. The Court 
held that the restriction of the free movement of goods was permitted as the action 
was justified by the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly, 
guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 ECHR. The activity was proportionate as it was 
a one-off 30 hour demonstration on a single route that abided by national law and 
provided alternative routes to those that would be affected by the demonstration 
so as to minimise the restriction as far as possible and the measure was 
indistinctly applicable. 
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Therefore, provided the restriction has a valid justification and the action 
is proportionate to the objective pursued, the Court’s position on fundamental 
rights is that they are a legitimate interest that are capable of justifying a 
restriction of the internal market.256 However, the case did raise concerns about 
the extent of the obligation on the State to interfere with the exercise of 
fundamental rights.257 This is one of the main differences between Schmidberger 
and Viking and Laval; in Viking and Laval the spotlight turned on the private 
parties and their right to take collective action as opposed to the State’s action and 
therefore brings into question how suitable Schmidberger was as an authority for 
these cases. In Viking AG Maduro believed that even if the case was constructed 
in accordance with public law, the result would have been the same, “the present 
case could theoretically have come to the Court in the framework of proceedings 
against the Finnish authorities for failing to curtail collective action against 
Viking Line. It would not have affected the substance of the problem: how to 
reconcile Viking Line’s rights to freedom of movement with the rights to 
associate and to strike of the FSU and the ITF?”258 Personally, I am not entirely 
convinced by this; Viking and Laval could theoretically have been brought 
vertically against the State, indeed, in Laval the police were asked to intervene, 
but were unable to do anything as collective action is lawful under Swedish law, 
however, if the onus of restricting the fundamental freedom was on Finland and 
Sweden and not the private parties, the ramifications of such a public law decision 
would have been less far-reaching. If we are to accept that the right to strike 
comes within the scope of the internal market then we have accepted that it is 
subject to its judicial scrutiny, but the crux of the matter is that this was used 
directly against the private parties, revealing how far the Union’s jurisdiction may 
reach. The obligation on the Member States is to take adequate steps to ensure the 
fundamental freedoms remain free from restrictions, which is pertinently revealed 
in Schmidberger whereby the goods were merely passing through Austria en route 
for Italy and Germany,259 yet the Commission argued that it was Austria’s 
obligation to ensure the free movement of the goods. It would now transpire from 
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Viking and Laval that the obligation to ensure the fundamental freedoms remain 
free from restrictions has stretched to the private parties as well, even where they 
are exercising their fundamental right to strike. 
It has been argued that “the balancing approach adopted in Schmidberger 
shares greater similarities with a test of unreasonableness than that of 
proportionality”,260 therefore, the precise application of the proportionality test in 
Schmidberger as an authority carries its own set of uncertainties. It can therefore 
be concluded that the cases did rely on Schmidberger as an authority, but not 
stringently; if Schmidberger had been followed more rigorously then it may have 
been determined that the fundamental right at issue was in fact justified and 
proportionate and capable of restricting a fundamental freedom as the collective 
action was in accordance with national law, the trade unions were exercising their 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly as guaranteed by Articles 10 and 
11 ECHR and arguably, the collective action was not targeted specifically at the 
posted workers simply because they were established in another Member State – 
the issue was that they were not subject to equal terms and conditions of 
employment. 
 
(v) The Proportionality Test  
 
The principle of proportionality is provided for in accordance with Article 5(4) 
TEU, “Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union 
action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties.” This necessity test is malleable in order to fulfil its purpose as a judicial 
tool applied by the judges so that it is flexible enough to take into account the 
facts on a case-by-case basis. However, in the interests of applying the test with 
an appropriate level of precision and legal certainty, its parameters have been 
honed to formulate a tripartite test: 
 
(1) Is the measure suitable to achieve a legitimate aim? 
(2) Is the measure necessary to achieve that aim? 
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(3) Does the measure have an excessive effect on the applicant’s interests?261  
 
It is to be remembered that some discretion was left to the national court in Viking 
in respect of proportionality, however, the Court provided guidance by stating that 
the restriction could be justified by an overriding reason of public interest 
provided that it is proportionate which should be determined as follows, “the 
restriction is suitable for ensuring the attainment of the legitimate objective 
pursued and does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.”262 
Whereas in Laval, the Court applied the proportionality test, however, it is 
submitted that the potential for a justification in this case was so remote in the 
context of making the collective action conditional on signing the collective 
agreement and the Swedish law which was held as being discriminatory, thereby 
having access to fewer potential justifications,263 accordingly, as the Court 
decided fairly readily that there were no potential justifications, the 
proportionality test arguably became a secondary consideration. 
The horizontal application of the Treaties in Viking and Laval reveals the 
intricate issues of applying the proportionality test to trade union action, “the 
extension of the direct effect of Treaty provisions relating to free movement so as 
to catch the actions of trade unions is problematic, especially in the light of the 
tests for justification and proportionality employed by the Court.”264 The use of 
the proportionality test in private law has shifted the perception of how the test is 
expected to be used; in the context of the right to strike, the proportionality test 
was not used in terms of the State’s permission or restriction of the right but 
focussed on the strike action itself as a restriction to the fundamental freedoms. 
This perspective entails that as the Court has applied the Treaty provisions to the 
private action directly rather than indirectly, the onus is placed on the trade unions 
to ensure that they act proportionately in every instance.265 The effect of this 
highlights the most contentious issue surrounding the application of the 
proportionality test in Viking and Laval; its use in the industrial relations context. 
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Davies’ greatest concern with Viking and Laval was arguably the Court’s 
use of the proportionality test in this context, “The rulings in Viking and Laval 
have the potential to involve the courts in a much more politically sensitive set of 
questions as they seek to apply the proportionality test to unions’ strike action.”266 
It has been argued that the use of the judicial tool in this way requires a very 
sensitive and practical application of the test, which the Court has failed to 
demonstrate:  
 
“In practical terms, the limited recognition afforded to the right to strike by 
the ECJ is manifested in the use of the proportionality test to regulate it… 
Proportionality requires a detailed understanding of the legal and factual 
background. The ECJ is not a labour court and in Viking and Laval it did not 
show much sensitivity to the industrial relations context... the Viking and 
Laval decisions show that there is a deep uncertainty within the EU about 
the role of the trade union movement.”267 
 
One of the re-occurring issues of the Court is its lack of expertise on all of the 
numerous areas that it is asked to adjudicate, which is inevitable given the breadth 
of its jurisdiction and the expanding docket.  
The lack of sensitivity demonstrated by the Court in the industrial relations 
context was magnified in its use of the proportionality test, as it would appear 
that, “the more the strike restricts the employer’s free movement rights – and thus 
the more effective it is from the union’s perspective – the harder it will be to 
justify.”268 Under the scope of the proportionality test, it is required that the action 
undertaken is the least restrictive possible in order to pursue the legitimate aim. 
Alternatives to strike action have been suggested, for example, the union could 
have protested outside of working hours, undertaken a march, leafleting or 
exercised action short of a strike such as an overtime ban.269 However, these 
alternatives, which clearly would be less restrictive on the employer’s free 
movement rights, are not comparable to the effectiveness of collective action 
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which constitutes a strike supported by sympathy action. These less restrictive 
options should not be viewed as genuine alternatives by the Court, “there is a real 
danger here that the courts will identify alternatives without considering their 
effectiveness in the bargaining process. Again, this could prove highly restrictive 
of the right to strike.”270 This resonates with the re-occurring issue that has 
threaded its way through the issues revealed by Viking and Laval: the Court’s 
innate preference towards the fundamental freedoms over the fundamental rights. 
Which is apparent given the fact that it is the Court’s duty to uphold the 
Treaties271 and even though the Court has satisfactorily voiced the importance of 
fundamental rights, the actual act of balancing the fundamental rights against the 
fundamental freedoms was executed through the application of the proportionality 
test and the Court’s approach to that task in Viking and Laval was geared towards 
placing the employer’s free movement rights as the primary interest and the 
secondary consideration was how far the collective action restricted the 
employer’s rights. As opposed to placing the collective action as the primary 
interest and considering how far the employer’s free movement rights would 
restrict that action. The latter approach is not compatible with the case law of the 
Court at issue, which has shown that the fundamental freedoms have a natural 
advantage in light of the proportionality test.  
 
(vi) Interim Conclusion  
 
Laval confirmed that Article 56 TFEU is capable of being applied horizontally by 
a private undertaking against a trade union or an association of trade unions. As 
the Treaty provision was relied upon, the horizontal direct effect of the Directive 
was not confirmed either way, therefore, as much as the Court relied on Article 3 
Directive in its reasoning, ultimately, the Court can argue that in the end it was the 
primary, not the secondary, legislation that was applied. In respect of Sweden’s 
transposition of the Directive, it is submitted that the collective agreement in 
Laval was in compliance with the second limb of Article 3(8) Directive and as 
Sweden transposed the Directive on time and it was left up to the Member States 
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as to how they chose to implement those rules into their national law, Sweden 
transposed the Directive correctly.  
This section examined the private/public law context and it has been 
concluded that the fundamental issue was initially placing the collective action 
within the scope of the Treaties, once that had been established it is submitted that 
if the case had been brought against the Swedish State, instead of the trade unions, 
it would not have made a substantial difference to the Court’s reasoning. This is 
because if the case was brought against the State the Court would have still 
focussed on the action of the trade unions in light of potential justifications and 
the proportionality test. The application of the proportionality test in both Viking 
and Laval was criticised in light of the Court’s application of this test in the 
industrial relations context and its apparent lack of sensitivity therein. It is 
understandable that this will be a sensitive issue as the Court does not have the 
equivalent expertise or familiarity of a labour court, however, it cannot be 
expected to as its role is so all-inclusive.  
 
D. EU Law versus National Law 
 
This section will detail the importance of collective action to the Swedish labour 
system, with a review of the appropriate labour standards applied in Laval, 
emphasising the more favourable terms provision under Article 3(7) Directive. 
Finally, this section will consider the broader impact the judgment has had; on a 
wider scale, beyond the labour law context, one of the main issues with Laval was 
the apparent subjugation of national law, even in an area that was intended, by the 
Treaty, to be left to the Member States’ competence. Therefore, this thesis will 
look to the future and conclude with an analysis of the place of social rights in an 
economically-geared market.  
 
(i) Collective Action in the Swedish Labour System 
 
The importance of national labour law was lost in the Court’s treatment of the 
right to strike. Collective action is emblematic of the differences between the 
national labour law models, “For Continental labour lawyers, often from systems 
with a constitutionally enshrined right to strike, the Court’s approach comes as 
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something of a shock. It changes the presumption that striking is lawful subject to 
limitations which are narrowly construed, into a presumption that striking, at least 
in the context of transnational disputes, is unlawful subject to justifications which 
are narrowly construed.”272 
Swedish law relies heavily on trade unions to negotiate with their 
employer on site to come to an agreement in respect of payment, “In Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden, normally at least seven of every ten employees are members 
of trade unions. In countries on the European continent – except for Belgium – the 
corresponding number varies between one and four.”273 This “autonomous 
collective bargaining model”274 is typical of the Nordic regulatory model and the 
infamy of Laval is that this well-established Nordic model was held as being a 
restriction to the provision of services. In breaking the consensus of the 
significance of the Swedish labour model, the Court has also done itself a 
disservice, “Ironically, the bargaining system established in Sweden and other 
Nordic countries is often described as the model for ‘flexicurity’ currently being 
promoted by the European Commission. By requiring ‘universally applicable’ 
legislation the Court’s judicial activism may be seen as threatening not only 
autonomous collective bargaining structures in the Member States, but also the 
flexibility inherent in the European Social Model and, in particular, the Open 
Method of Coordination.”275 
Therefore, in Laval, the Court not only subjugated the autonomous 
collective bargaining model but also the right to undertake collective action, 
which is lawful under Swedish law. Added to this is the fact that the judgment 
was made in December 2007 which coincided with the start of the Global 
Recession and the automatic transitional measures on the ten new EU Member 
States, predominantly from lower wage countries, had ended. These factors 
contributed to a fear of social dumping and uncertainty in respect of employment 
in the EU, therefore making the Swedish unions’ reaction more relatable and 
understandable, and perhaps even necessary. Not only do trade unions have a 
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particular strong-hold in the workings of the Swedish labour system but in any 
legitimate labour law system the pursuit of collective action and the right to voice 
your own interests must be supported; it is an expression of democracy.  
The right to take collective action in Sweden is protected as a 
constitutional right in accordance with Article 17 of Chapter 2 Regeringsformen 
(Swedish Basic Law), which provides the following, “Any trade union or 
employer or association of employers shall be entitled to take strike or lock-out 
action or any similar measure unless otherwise provided by law or arising out of 
an agreement.”276 It is submitted that the importance of collective action in the 
Swedish labour system, and the ‘Nordic social model’ generally, was not granted 
as much importance by the Court as a constitutional right should.277 The 
importance of the right to strike was recognised as a fundamental right in 
accordance with various European Charters and international instruments that 
were cited by the Court, but there was a distinct lack of due importance bestowed 
upon the Swedish constitutional law itself. One possible explanation for this could 
be that, “the Court… prefers to avoid citing national constitutions for reason of 
the considerable differences between them.”278 Alternatively, one might suggest, 
somewhat cynically, that the outcome of the case was always clear to the Court 
and therefore it was reluctant to stress the importance of the national 
constitutional right specifically, aware of the fact that it would ultimately be 
quashed by the over-riding importance of the freedom to provide services and 
therefore not wanting to pit the Union law against the national law too starkly. 
 In Laval AG Mengozzi recognised the importance of collective bargaining 
to the Swedish labour law system, “the Swedish model of collective employment 
relations grants considerable autonomy to both sides of industry, guided by the 
principle that such parties are responsible for and regulate their own conduct.”279 
The freedom to engage in trade union activities constitutes a general principle of 
labour law, yet the bargaining power of unions clearly will vary from case-to-
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case, therefore it is an ever-present consideration in the context of the Union that 
the trade unions must ensure their collective action does not disproportionately 
restrict the free movement rights. It is apparent that “In both Viking and Laval, the 
unions’ collective action was highly – perhaps even unusually – effective. The 
shipowners were deterred from re-flagging the Rosella in Viking, and Laval’s 
Swedish subsidiary ultimately became insolvent.”280 The collective action 
demonstrated in these cases was highly successful and consequently highly 
restrictive to the free movement rights.  
Collective action is an area that is generally thought to be outside the 
competence of the Union, in light of Article 153(5) TFEU, and therefore it would 
typically be considered an area in which the Court would defer to the Member 
States’ interests more readily, particularly an area that represents a constitutional 
right to the Member State concerned. Also, paragraph 22 of the Preamble to the 
Directive vows to respect the Member States’ laws on collective action, “Whereas 
this Directive is without prejudice to the law of the Member States concerning 
collective action to defend the interests of trades and professions”. This adds 
another layer to the ‘shock factor’ that inevitably ensued from the Court’s 
jurisprudence. 
 
(ii) Labour Standards 
 
This section provides an analysis of the labour standards that were applied, in 
accordance with the collective agreements at issue. In respect of the applicable 
standards as provided for by the legislation, Laval states the following, “with 
regard to workers posted in the framework of a transnational provision of 
services, their employer is required, as a result of the coordination achieved by 
Directive 96/71, to observe a nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection 
in the host Member State [emphasis added].”281 The employer is required to 
observe the “minimum protection” guaranteed to posted workers, as prescribed by 
the Directive, and seemingly, no more than that. It is a floor of protection but the 
Court’s emphasis on abiding by the minimum would seem to turn this into a 
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ceiling of rights. The Swedish collective agreement at stake consisted of higher 
terms and conditions of employment than the Latvian collective agreement and it 
also contained terms which went beyond the minimum protection guaranteed by 
the Directive282 which was held as not being justified by the objective of 
protecting workers, since the Directive already serves this purpose. However, it is 
submitted that the Court construed Article 3(1) Directive very narrowly, yet the 
legislation does not provide anything to warrant such a narrow interpretation; 
especially when considering the purpose of Article 3(7) Directive which 
advocates the application of terms and conditions of employment that are more 
favourable to workers. 
It is prima facie illogical that the Court did not rule in favour of applying 
the Swedish collective agreement when it contained more favourable terms than 
those in the Latvian collective agreement and Article 3(7) Directive provides that 
the more favourable terms should apply. However, “In the case at hand, the 
builders’ union was unduly forcing Laval to accept better conditions than those 
foreseen in the Directive; only if Laval accepted these conditions was the union 
willing to reach an agreement to pay.”283 As Laval did not accept the higher 
conditions the trade unions undertook collective action that proved to be a 
disproportionate restriction on the service provider’s freedom and although 
Article 3(7) Directive needs to be taken into account; it must be in conformity 
with Article 56 TFEU. 
The Swedish collective agreement required the workers to be paid €16 per 
hour and in accordance with the agreement this would have been open to 
negotiation, however, if a different wage could not have been agreed upon, there 
was a fall-back rate of €12 per hour. Laval paid its workers in accordance with the 
Latvian collective agreement which equated to a monthly rate of €1,500. 
Unfortunately, no rate per hour is provided by the AG’s Opinion or the Court’s 
judgment, however, if the average week is 40 hours284 and there are 4 weeks per 
month, there would be 160 hours per month (40 × 4 = 160), therefore, the hourly 
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wage for the Latvian collective agreement would be just over €9 (1,500 ÷ 160 = 
9.375). Please bear in mind as well that this figure is the lowest possible hourly 
wage that would have been paid by Laval, considering the maximum working 
time in Sweden is 40 hours (as an example, if the working week was 35 hours 
then on the same basis the hourly wage would have been €10.71). Also, this wage 
was supplemented by various benefits in kind, therefore, when comparing the 
gross wages paid by Laval and those stipulated by the fall-back clause of the 
Swedish collective agreement, the wages may have been very similar. However, it 
is submitted that there are ‘hidden costs’ involved with posting workers and it 
should clearly be determined whether the benefits in kind paid by Laval 
constituted part of the wage or not, as prescribed by Article 3(7) Directive, 
allowances specific to the posting are to be considered as part of the minimum 
wage, however the reimbursement of travel, board or lodging expenditure which 
is incurred because of the posting does not constitute part of the wage. Again, the 
case does not specify what those benefits in kind constitute. Therefore, supposing 
that the benefits in kind did constitute part of the wage, a comparison between the 
fall-back clause and the €9 plus benefits in kind would be a comparable wage, 
however, if the benefits in kind did not constitute part of the wage, and if we are 
to take the €16 per hour as the starting point, this would mean that the Latvian 
workers were being paid nearly half of what the Swedish workers were being paid 
on the same site which would inevitably lead to growing feelings of hostility on 
the site and a greater likelihood of collective action as a result. It is submitted that 
even if the former approach was adopted in calculating the wage, so that the 
wages were more comparable, the fact remains that in applying two different 
collective agreements the host State workers would still have benefitted from a 
more favourable wage. 
Due to a lack of factual information it is difficult to determine precisely 
how favourable the wages were in the Swedish collective agreement, compared to 
the Latvian collective agreement, however in spite of these apparent uncertainties, 
these aspects of the case have to be considered so that the necessity and 
proportionality of the collective action may be realised. Accordingly, it would 
appear that, “Emphasis is placed on the clarity of obligations to be imposed on 
service providers, at the expense of the improvement of terms and conditions for 
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posted workers.”285 Consequently, this also compromises achieving a harmonious 
work environment as the posted and host State workers are subject to differing 
conditions on the same site.  
 
(iii) Social Rights as an Obstacle to Economic Free Movement 
 
As detailed above, in Schmidberger, the freedom of expression and the freedom of 
assembly were justifiably held to restrict the free movement of goods, therefore, 
to assume that economic freedoms automatically trump social rights is simply not 
true. In Omega286 it was also held that the fundamental right at issue was capable 
of restricting the fundamental freedom. The facts of the case are as follows: 
Omega, a German undertaking, had been operating a “laserdrome” in Bonn, 
Germany. The equipment used by Omega, including the laser guns and sensory 
tags fixed to the players’ jackets, was supplied by the British company Pulsar 
International Ltd. There had already been public opposition to the opening of the 
game and eventually the Bonn police authority issued an order against Omega 
forbidding it from “playing at killing”287 and a fine would be imposed for each 
game played in breach of the order. 
The contested order prohibited Omega from operating the laserdrome in 
accordance with the form of the game developed by Pulsar and under the 
franchising system, therefore restricting the freedom to provide services. It was 
determined that the reason for the restriction was that the laserdrome condoned 
acts of simulated homicide and the trivialisation of violence, contrary to 
fundamental values in the public opinion.288 Furthermore, the concept of human 
dignity is a German constitutional right, as set out in the first sentence of 
Paragraph 1(1) of the German Basic Law. Therefore, as fundamental rights form 
an integral part of the general principles of Union law, the protection of those 
rights is a legitimate interest which, in principle, may justify a restriction of a 
fundamental freedom, provided that the restriction may be justified on public 
policy grounds and is proportionate. The Court held that the commercial 
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exploitation of a “killing game” in Omega’s laserdrome constituted an affront to 
human dignity and in the interests of protecting public policy the national measure 
was able to restrict the economic activity.  
Omega highlights that, “the concept of public policy may vary from one 
country to another and from one era to another.”289 From my perspective, hearing 
a game played in a laserdrome described as “simulated homicide” and the 
“trivialisation of violence” seems far removed from the reality and objective of 
the game, in short, it is absurd. However, it would be a mistake to judge this 
subjectively and that is the very essence of the EU; to appreciate and accept the 
differences which we may not all be able to relate to but nevertheless they are 
present and accordingly must be respected. The moral standards of society are 
fluid and are required to change and adapt to the evolving society that it 
represents. The Basic Law of Germany, which expressly states the concept of 
human dignity, came into effect in 1949, subsequent to the devastation of World 
War II and the Holocaust. Understandably, therefore, the concept of “human 
dignity” as expressed in the German constitutional law has a special meaning and 
significance and is of paramount importance to the German public not because of 
some “lasertag” game but because of a much wider political and historical 
background. Nevertheless, the concept of what constitutes public policy in Union 
law, particularly as a justification for a derogation from a fundamental freedom, 
must be interpreted strictly, “so that its scope cannot be determined unilaterally by 
each Member State… Thus, public policy may be relied on only if there is a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society.”290 To 
conclude: constitutional rights of the Member States must be respected in light of 
the public interests of that society, but equally, they also have to fit in to the 
overall concept of the Union as a whole. 
Schmidberger and Omega both represent that where there is a conflict 
between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms the Court is capable of 
recognising the ability of fundamental rights to justifiably restrict economic 
freedoms, on the basis that the Union is also obliged to protect fundamental rights 
and it was predicted in both the AGs’ Opinions to these case that this may 
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represent a new line of case law.291 The aim of the action that restricts the 
fundamental freedom is relevant to the discretion granted to its justification, “The 
stated aim is an important element to estimate the effect.”292 The fundamental 
rights exercised in Schmidberger and Omega; the freedom of expression and the 
freedom of assembly and the right to human dignity respectively, were clearly 
deemed to proportionately reflect their stated aims that could be justified in light 
of protecting the interests of public policy, “Clearly, if demonstrators had decided 
to use the Brenner motorway as a space for performing drama or for promulgating 
neo-Nazi opinions, the authorities would, it is submitted, have been under an 
obligation, as a matter of both Community and Convention law, to weigh that 
purpose in the balance.”293 The circumstances by which the fundamental right has 
been invoked must be taken into account by the Court, but in principle, this 
‘balancing’ of the purpose of the fundamental right against the freedom that it 
restricts conceptually undermines the exercise of the fundamental right, “The need 
‘to reconcile’ the requirements of the protection of fundamental rights cannot 
therefore mean weighing up fundamental freedoms against fundamental rights per 
se, which would imply that the protection of fundamental rights is negotiable.”294 
It is submitted that fundamental rights are negotiable for the reason that 
they are not absolute, as exemplified in Viking and Laval, but equally, neither are 
the fundamental freedoms, as exemplified in Schmidberger and Omega. 
Interestingly, all four cases were decided prior to the Charter attaining legally 
binding status and it has been predicted that the impact of the Charter may effect 
the balance of fundamental rights against fundamental freedoms, “when assessing 
the facts of Schmidberger in light of the specific wording of the Charter the 
fundamental rights invocation by the Austrian state will no longer be a derogation 
from Union law but rather an act inherent in its implementation.”295 This 
sentiment bestows a great deal of significance on the impact of the Charter and 
predicts a change to the well-established jurisprudence of the internal market; 
restrictions on the economic freedoms within the Union shall be prohibited. 
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“Using the language of prima facie breach or restriction of economic 
rights suggests that, even if the restriction is ultimately justified, it remains 
something which is at its heart “wrong”, but tolerated. This sits rather uneasily 
with the State’s usually paramount constitutional obligation to protect human 
rights.”296 The pre-conception that any restriction, including fundamental rights, 
to the fundamental freedoms are to be prohibited already places fundamental 
rights in internal market case law on the back-foot. However, it is important to 
bear in mind that the protection of human rights is not only the State’s obligation, 
but also the Union’s; fundamental rights that create a direct link between Union 
policies and Union citizens, such as the freedom of expression and the right of 
collective bargaining and action, entail that they are part of the implementation of 
Union law.297 Accordingly, fundamental rights are capable of complementing the 
fundamental freedoms and the two can be viewed as inextricably linked, “The 
rationale for free movement is market integration. Market integration is premised 
on market efficiency. Market efficiency requires collective action by workers and 
trade unions to ensure their voice is heard and their interests are taken account 
of.”298 
The stated aim of the collective action was to protect workers and worker 
protection is a legitimate justification, as revealed by the Court’s case law, 
however, in Laval the Court deployed an unduly scrupulous justification process 
and proportionality test to the collective action that was deemed restrictive to the 
freedom to provide services. In light of the fact that the right to take collective 
action in Sweden is protected as a constitutional right, just as human dignity is 
protected as a German constitutional right in Omega, this suggests that the Court 
did not grant the right to take collective action equal weight in the balancing 
process. It is submitted that there was nothing to warrant such a narrow approach 
taken by the Court. Furthermore, the Court granted the service provider undue 
leniency, “the Court’s findings seem to indicate considerable sympathy for an 
employer that is placed under pressure to enter into exclusive negotiations with a 
trade union without knowing what the precise outcomes may be [emphasis 
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added].”299 The social rights at issue in both Viking and Laval were voiced and 
explicitly stated to be of great importance to the Union legal order, however, it is 
submitted that in the end, the economic considerations were favoured and 
therefore prioritised over the social rights, “the choices which the Court has made 
in the Viking and Laval cases represent a tipping of the delicate balance between 
economic and social rights in favour of the former.”300 Accordingly, the collective 
action was an obstacle to the free movement rights and the close scrutiny applied 
to the action was seemingly at the expense of the host State workers and the 
posted workers, thereby negating the stated aim of the fundamental right, 
evidencing that both Viking and Laval signify the apparent threat to social 
standards in the Union legal order. 
This apparent threat has generated concerns for the future, “the criticisms 
concerning the fact that the more effective a strike is, the more difficult it will be 
to justify it, or the fact that the ECJ seems only concerned with the welfare of the 
workers currently employed by Viking, rather than also thinking of those that will 
follow in the future, are, in my opinion, warranted.”301 The impact of these cases 
is undeniably far-reaching, yet the Court took a very precise and stringent view of 
a snap-shot of industrial action, “the focus of the ECJ on justification of strike 
action with reference to the ‘protection of workers’, which is defined very much 
in terms of workers’ immediate economic interests.”302 This short-term view of 
industrial action could be reflective of the temporary nature of posted workers, 
indicating that this context does not warrant permanent concern. However, the 
fact is that the repercussions of these judgments do not merely reflect a 
momentary view of Union law but represent the way in which social rights and 
economic freedoms are balanced by the Court and evidently the Court’s approach 
taken in these judgments verifies the position of social rights as being a legitimate 
hindrance to economic free movement. 
 
(iv) Interim Conclusion  
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Laval represents the clash between EU law and national law and also the clash 
between economic and social rights, as has been detailed in this section. The first 
point raised assessed the Court’s disappointing treatment of autonomous 
collective bargaining and its lack of recognition of the success of this model, 
“Self-regulation means that conflicts of interests are often solved efficiently at 
local or sectoral level.”303 The importance of collective action to the Swedish 
labour model was also discarded; corroborated by the lack of due importance 
granted to this constitutional right, as highlighted by the comparison with the 
treatment of the constitutional right in Omega. 
It has been argued that this apparent lack of acknowledgement of the 
national labour law system will result in the Member State having to adapt its 
legislation to avoid another Laval-type ruling, “It now seems it [Sweden] will 
have to adapt to the judgment by regulating minimum pay centrally.”304 However, 
following the Laval judgment, in April 2008 the Swedish Government pursued an 
alternative route and ran an inquiry which culminated in a revised Act, known as 
the “Lex Laval”, in April 2010. The Lex Laval is based on three essential 
components:305 (i) Section 5a of the Act lays down four conditions whereby trade 
unions may undertake industrial action, the fourth of which specifies that 
industrial action cannot be taken if the service provider shows that the posted 
workers’ conditions of employment are essentially at least as favourable as the 
conditions in the Swedish collective agreement. However, it has been argued that 
trade unions should be able to require the service provider to confirm the 
conditions by signing a collective agreement, “Then they would have a 
contractual right to control what the employer has actually paid to its workers and 
a collective agreement that it can invoke before a court.”;306 (ii) Trade unions have 
to ‘filter’307 their collective agreements to determine the hardcore conditions 
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under Article 3(1) Directive which could be somewhat artificial; and (iii) to 
ensure transparency, trade unions have to submit these collective agreements to 
the Work Environment Authority. Thus, regulating wages and terms of 
employment continues to be the responsibility of the social partners, however, the 
revised Act has curbed the freedom to undertake industrial action, “unions argue 
that Lex Laval is an over-implementation of the judgments, with too far-reaching 
restrictions on the right to strike”.308 Notably, the Swedish Government’s inquiry 
in the lead up to the Lex Laval ran parallel to the implementation of the Services 
Directive and the Swedish Labour Court’s judgment309 on damages in Laval, 
which was just as unyielding in its treatment of trade union action as the ECJ. 
 This section then discussed the applicable labour standards in Laval, 
including a calculation and comparison of the presumed wage rates in both the 
Latvian and Swedish collective agreements. The difficulty presented here is that 
the Swedish collective agreement clearly offered more favourable wages and yet, 
in spite of Article 3(7) Directive, the more favourable terms could not apply as in 
the circumstances of the case they breached Article 56 TFEU and as the Directive 
stipulates a “minimum protection” the Court was able to take that at face value 
and read it as the only protection prescribed. It is submitted that if the posted 
workers had undertaken collective action to demand the more favourable terms 
apply to them, then the result may have been different as that would have been a 
more outward representation of worker protection, but as it came from the host 
State workers it could be read as national protectionism. 
 Finally, this section assessed the role of social rights as an obstacle to 
economic free movement with a detailed analysis of Schmidberger and Omega; 
two cases in which the Court permitted fundamental rights to restrict fundamental 
freedoms, “Schmidberger was a straightforward case for the Court to decide. On 
the facts, the result cannot have come as much of a surprise. There will however 
be other, more difficult, cases on the horizon which will test the Court’s stance on 
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the ‘human v. economic’ rights interface”.310 Three years later Viking and Laval 
were those more difficult cases on the horizon.  
 
E. Local Unemployment at Times of Recession 
 
The Laval ruling came at the very start of the Global Recession and at times of 
recession, when local unemployment is at its highest, the concern to protect the 
domestic labour market and the issue of social dumping will be magnified. Added 
to this is the fact that the Directive makes provision for cheaper labour in the 
Union by setting a minimum standard, which in reality, may be lower than the 
going rate. Therefore, this section will consider whether local hiring clauses are 
compatible with Union law. 
 
(i) “British Jobs for British Workers” 
 
This issue was discussed by Barnard311 in the context of the Lindsey oil refinery 
dispute. In 2009 Total UK, owner of the Lindsey oil refinery, decided to invest in 
a new de-sulphurisation unit. It was decided that a sub-contractor was required in 
order to complete specific aspects of the project and following a competitive 
tendering procedure, consisting of seven European companies with five being 
from the UK, the contract was awarded to IREM, an Italian company. IREM 
declared that it would use 300 of its own Italian and Portuguese workforce, which 
is possible when relying upon Article 56 TFEU and the Directive, and therefore 
did not need any additional local British labour. Italian and Portuguese workers 
were posted to the Lindsey oil refinery in Lincolnshire, UK and consequently 
British workers protested that at a time of deep recession in the UK and increasing 
unemployment, a contractor with a public commitment to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) was refusing to hire local workers. The protests included 
wildcat strikes and unofficial industrial action which was supported by sympathy 
action at other sites. Despite being unofficial, the collective action was well-
organised and it spread across the UK. It is important to appreciate the atmosphere 
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in which the Lindsey dispute arose; it was in the wake of the Laval Quartet and 
therefore the first well-publicised UK case in which the posting of workers were 
seen to be taking local jobs. It was the tipping point and the proximity of events 
enabled “the unions to use the Lindsey dispute as a vehicle to continue to air their 
dissatisfaction with the Court of Justice’s decisions in Viking, Laval and the 
subsequent case law.”312 The issue became a political one as the Lindsey dispute 
gained support beyond the ambit of trade unions, unfortunately with interest from 
the British National Party (BNP). Also, in 2007 Gordon Brown, the ex-UK Prime 
Minister and leader of the Labour Party, had promised, “British jobs for British 
workers.”313 This controversial statement, when used out of context, may provide 
the less-informed with a presumed innate hereditary right in the public 
procurement process. If taken at face value it clearly breaches the principles of the 
EU, however, in his keynote address, Brown speaks at length of British values and 
this statement directly relates to job creation, as opposed to discriminating others 
for not being British. To write the Lindsey dispute off as an act of national 
protectionism fails to appreciate its reality, “The unions, however, supported by 
the European Parliament, argued that painting their action as protectionist was 
wrongly to condemn it through cheap caricature.”314 
In order to reach a settlement, the contractors agreed to hire 102 locally 
sourced workers (these 102 jobs had not yet been filled therefore none of the 
posted workers would lose their jobs). However, this neither satisfied the British 
workers nor the internal market principles as the “locally sourced workers” 
included any workers walking into the local job centre; including nationals from 
other Member States. Also, intending to prioritise employment to local staff 
implies indirect discrimination and therefore does not satisfy the needs of the 
Union. Further issues in the dispute ensued including redundancies and more 
bouts of unofficial industrial action as a result before a settlement was finally 
reached which involved reinstating all of the workers that had undertaken 
collective action. The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) 
was used to reach the settlement. The chief executive of ACAS, John Taylor, said 
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of the dispute, “Whilst the report shows no evidence of the law being broken there 
is a source of tension around the Posted Workers Directive and its application to 
construction work and the UK’s industrial relations system. These issues have 
been highlighted by the recession.”315 
This “source of tension” has been heightened by media interest and the 
Directive has been cast as the main offender, highlighted by the fact that it 
governs the movement of temporary labour, “It is the short-term, fast-buck culture 
that is at the root of this, so we have to look at what incentives we can give 
companies so they do not rely on a pool of short-term temporary labour that will 
come to this country and go away again.”316 Ed Miliband, leader of the Labour 
Party, could be talking about posted workers here, revealing that this legal issue 
has generated a political debate on what is an emotive dispute concerning 
workers’ livelihoods and national autonomy, “The Total dispute provides an 
interesting case study of what happens when EC provisions on the four freedoms 
come face to face with angry protesters fearful about their jobs at a time of deep 
recession.”317 This is a delicate matter, which in the wrong hands, may unearth 
more sinister truths, such as British euro-sceptics using cases like Lindsey to 
generate dislike in respect of belonging to the internal market and even more 
dangerous, political parties such as the BNP revealing xenophobic tendencies 
under the ruse of sustaining national independence. These issues have escalated 
beyond the ambit of the Directive and its jurisdiction; which is concerned only 
with the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. 
However, it is inevitable that the subtle intentions of the Directive can be over-
looked when on the face of it: the Directive appears to support the employment 
interests of non-nationals over nationals, in the interests of service provision. 
A particular issue that has surfaced from the Lindsey dispute regards tax, 
“The unions feel that these major infrastructure projects, funded by the British 
taxpayer, should benefit British labour, at least in part.”318 However, the local 
workforce cannot rely on this argument as it would directly benefit the domestic 
employment market which would be discriminatory in the context of the Union 
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and thereby breach Article 18 TFEU which provides that any discrimination on 
grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. Nevertheless, the threat to jobs in the 
national labour market is clearly a problem that has been exacerbated by the 
Union, therefore, what solutions can the Union provide? The next section will 
discuss whether contracting authorities can require suppliers to use local labour. 
 
(ii) An Obligation to use Local Labour  
 
Barnard, in her article concerning the Lindsey dispute, attempts to manoeuvre 
carefully amongst the obligations of Union legislation whilst trying to incorporate 
domestic concerns by tactfully relying on the objectives of the Union such as 
aiming at full employment and social progress319 to determine whether contracting 
authorities can require suppliers to use local labour. Barnard answered this by 
focussing on the award stage and the performance stage of the procurement 
regime. 
 Barnard suggests that at the performance stage of the contract it could be 
required that a social requirement of the contract is to hire a certain percentage of 
long-term unemployed workers. Which would be prima facie less discriminatory 
and therefore arguably more justifiable than specifying that only long-term 
unemployed local labour may be used. The requirement to use “local labour” is 
incompatible with Union law, no matter how the expression is phrased, “While 
combating unemployment is an issue for the EU as a whole, every job given to a 
local is a job not given to a non-local, usually a non-national.”320 Barnard also 
considered the award stage of the contract to implement the social requirement. 
The fundamental difficulty in this respect is that social considerations will be 
secondary to the ultimate aim of having the contract fulfilled by the most 
economically beneficial tender. Therefore, with the ease of free movement of 
cheaper labour coming from new Member States of the Union, it is commercial 
common sense to opt for an economically advantageous tender over other social 
considerations, such as opting for a tender that will employ locally sourced and 
currently unemployed labour. There is no obligation on contracting authorities to 
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exercise their social conscience; the principal aim of the contract is to have it 
fulfilled, any additional advantages this grants to society is simply viewed as a 
bonus. Therefore, relying on an altruistic attitude of all contracting authorities 
may not be wholly feasible, but in reality, the public perception of the company 
will, at least indirectly, affect its business. Consequently, in attempting to 
maintain a decent reputation and to avoid public scenes being reported in 
newspapers of trade unions blockading sites, it is in the interests of the contractor 
to consider their actions in the public eye, before acting. Completing the contract 
is ‘the constant’ for the contractor, it formulates the unchanging concern and any 
social considerations will involve a variety of changing variables, differing 
opinions, and at times of recession these secondary concerns may be considered a 
luxury that cannot be adhered to; as the priority is to award a contract which will 
in any case generate employment for some. Barnard concludes that if argued 
carefully there is room for social requirements in the context of public 
procurement, “underpinning this argument is a view of the European Social 
Model that goes beyond the traditional economic-versus-social paradigm and 
looks instead at social policy as being part of a multi-layered system where an 
interpretation of the four freedoms provides space for other EU policies to be 
pursued, such as employment, regional and cohesion policies, which in 
themselves provide space for national or sub-national action.”321 Barnard’s 
argument which was superbly presented provides hope in an area that has 
generated a great deal of anger and bad-feeling. However, no solid solution has 
yet been provided for this predicament. 
In its interpretative communication on public procurement and the 
possibilities for integrating social considerations into public procurement, the 
Commission states, “a clause stipulating that a successful tenderer must employ a 
certain number or percentage of long-term unemployed or apprentices, without 
requiring the unemployed or apprentices to be from a particular region or 
registered with a national body, for instance for the execution of a works contract, 
should not, a priori, amount to discrimination against tenderers from other 
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Member States.”322 Clearly, the provision must comply with Union law and 
cannot discriminate on the grounds of nationality, but there is room for these 
social provisions, provided that they are phrased in such a way that will be 
deemed compatible with Union law. 
Discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited and it is submitted 
that this works both ways: just as a certain percentage of Italian or Portuguese 
workers may be used, a certain percentage of British workers can also be used on 
the British site, “No European worker should be barred from applying for a 
British job and absolutely no British worker should be barred from applying for a 
British job.”323 There is a concluded assumption that workers in their own country 
are not the ones in danger of discrimination, hence the emphasis on prohibiting 
discrimination of non-nationals, but the case law reflects a different reality; it is 
the host State workers that fear losing their jobs to posted workers whose position 
has been prioritised in favour of the freedom to provide services and it is the host 
State workers that have therefore felt the effects of discrimination. The prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of nationality is a fundamental EU principle and 
therefore must be maintained, but not at the expense of equality. The EU is 
intended to benefit all of its citizens; not only those crossing a border. 
 
(iii) Are there Enough Workers to Fill the Demands? 
 
It has been established that the employment of all Union citizens must be taken 
into consideration; both the national workers and the posted workers. However, a 
very practical consideration that must not be overlooked in this context is 
determining whether there are, in reality, enough British workers to fill the 
demands of the construction industry in the UK?  
The Chartered Institute of Building indicates that “77% of respondents 
believe a skill shortage exists in the construction industry.”324 This suggests that 
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the skills shortage identified in the UK construction industry can be filled by the 
opportunities presented by the Directive and as the workers are only temporary, 
the impact on resources in the host State should also only be a temporary issue. 
Therefore, the Directive does provide a much-needed service, especially in a host 
State experiencing a skills shortage in its domestic workforce and with the 
accession of twelve new Member States since 2004 the potential workforce has 
virtually doubled.  
 The skills shortage would therefore appear to be a domestic rather than a 
Union issue, but what is the cause? It is argued that the skills shortage in the UK 
can, in part, be attributed to a lack of apprenticeships undertaken nowadays.325 
There is a greater focus on attending university as opposed to undertaking skilled 
apprenticeships once students have left school and with fewer apprenticeships the 
skills force in the UK may have diminished as a result. David Cameron, the UK 
Prime Minister, intends to change this by advocating the importance of 
apprenticeships insisting that they will be “at the heart of our mission to rebuild 
the economy”.326 In light of the above, where there is a skills shortage in the UK, 
the posted workers deployed to fill those positions would undertake the skilled 
jobs; therefore most likely earning more than the minimum wage and in no sense 
‘undercutting’ national workers. Therefore, the Directive and Article 56 TFEU 
provide the solution to domestic problems, such as fluctuations in the national 
labour market. However, this does not negate the fact that the Court’s 
interpretation of the Directive has been executed so poorly so that only the 
minimum protection can be extended to the posted workers; a result that will not 
be welcomed by either the national or the posted workers. The only beneficiary 
will be the service provider as they are more likely to win a public procurement 
contract and the contractor in the host State as they will benefit from a more 
economically beneficial tender. 
 To conclude this section, the industrial action in the Lindsey oil refinery 
dispute and also in Laval was not an act of discrimination against the Italian and 
Portuguese and Latvian workers respectively, but frustration over their own rights 
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being relegated at a time when local unemployment was at its highest, “This is not 
to concede to protectionism or to oppose free movement, but to insist on 
fairness.”327 The text of the Directive has led to misinterpretations of its own 
intentions and the Court’s judgment has exaggerated the issues, “by imposing an a 
priori normative straitjacket in defining acceptable host-state standards, it fails to 
provide valuable space to respect normative pluralism in labour standard-setting 
in the Member States.”328 
 
(iv) Interim Conclusion 
 
The impact of the recession on local employment and the Directive should not be 
underestimated, Ewing said that the Lindsey dispute provides “a glimpse into a 
future where the toxic mix of globalisation and weak labour standards meets 
economic recession.”329 This issue has been heightened in the UK, in part, 
because the British Government did not implement any transitional controls on 
accession States which led to the largest peacetime migration to the UK in history, 
“We [the Labour Government] severely underestimated the number of people who 
would come here. We were dazzled by globalisation and too sanguine about its 
price.”330 Following the explosive EU enlargement in 2004 came the Global 
Recession in 2007; culminating in a genuine fear concerning the place of local 
labour. However, this fear was obviously not exclusive to the UK alone; the 
French first coined the expression and image of the threat of the “Polish Plumber” 
during the EU Constitution referendum. The pejorative expression of the Polish 
Plumber denotes the impact of social dumping from Eastern Europe. This threat 
of the ‘Polish invasion’ has recently been felt in the Netherlands and as a response 
Geert Wilders, a Dutch politician and leader of the Freedom Party, launched a 
website inviting Dutch nationals to make complaints about Polish, Romanian and 
Bulgarian workers in the Netherlands, “Wilders’ Freedom party (PVV) has 
already gathered thousands of denunciations since it launched a website this week, 
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asking Dutch citizens to report nuisance, pollution, problems related to housing or 
simply competition on the job market, caused by Europeans citizens coming from 
Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.”331 This reaction is a dangerous avenue that could 
ultimately lead to hostility and racism. However, the response of slogans such as 
“British jobs for British workers”, the “Polish Plumber” and this recent Dutch 
website reflect an emotive response to social dumping which is a very real threat 
following Laval which brought trade union collective action within the scope of 
the free movement provisions and the consequent repercussions have been 
damaging, “National social models based on the lawfulness of collective action 
are overruled by the direct effect of EU law where there is a cross-border element. 
The implications for ‘social dumping’ are potentially dramatic.”332  
 This section explored the possibility of including local hiring clauses in 
public procurement contracts. It was determined that such a requirement would 
not be compatible with Union law because of its discriminatory effect, however, if 
argued carefully, there is room for social requirements in public procurement that 
are not limited to local labour, such as using ‘long-term unemployed’ workers. It 
is also imperative to bear in mind the opportunities that the Union presents, for 
example the movement of labour works both ways – British posted workers are 
free to find employment abroad, as supported by Article 56 TFEU and the 
Directive; the internal market is open to all of its citizens. 
Finally, the British skills shortage outlined above can be repaired by use of 
the Directive. However, the Court’s interpretation of the Directive has magnified 
the problems by rigidly maintaining a minimum level of protection for posted 
workers and thereby contributing to the issue of undercutting the host State 
workers. Skills shortages, recession and high unemployment in the domestic 
labour market are timeless issues prone to fluctuations in an economy, however, 
the application of the Directive could assist at these times with its intentions of 
promoting a climate of fair competition and guaranteeing respect for workers’ 
rights. What is needed to get the best out of the Directive is an amendment of its 
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text to tighten and clarify its objectives and therefore avoid misinterpretations and 




Less than four months after Laval, the Second Chamber of the Court determined 
Rüffert333 with Judge Timmermans as the Rapporteur and Bot as the AG. The 
Court made its judgment on 3 April 2008 and on the same day the Commission 
issued a Recommendation on enhanced administrative cooperation in the context 
of posted workers.334 The Commission recommended three points for 
improvement: (i) better administrative cooperation through use of an electronic 
information exchange system; (ii) improved access to information for service 
providers and posted workers; and (iii) exchange of information and good practice 
among Member States via forums such as the Commission’s proposition to 
establish a High-Level Committee in the area of posting of workers. Also on 3 
April 2008 the Commission published a press release entitled, “EU calls for 
urgent action to improve working conditions for 1 million posted workers”.335 In 
the article Vladimír Špidla, the EU Employment, Social Affairs and Equal 
Opportunities Commissioner, warned, “Member States must improve cooperation 
if we are to effectively protect working conditions and avoid a race towards the 
lowest minimum rates of pay in the EU as a whole.” The article expanded on the 
Commission’s Recommendation and identified that the apparent poor 
enforcement of the Directive and lack of clarity concerning the applicable terms 
and conditions to posted workers, as seen in the case law, was undermining the 
Directive’s effectiveness. In light of the Commission’s concerns in respect of the 
Directive and their proposals for improvement, the case of Rüffert was very 
timely, yet, it is submitted, only added to the problem. 
 
(i) The Facts 
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The reference from the Oberlandesgericht Celle (Higher Regional Court, 
Germany) was on the interpretation of Article 56 TFEU. In the Rüffert case ‘Land 
Niedersachsen’ (the Land of Lower Saxony) awarded ‘Objekt und Bauregie’ a 
contract for the structural work in the building of Göttingen-Rosdorf prison. The 
contract contained a declaration regarding compliance with collective agreements 
under the ‘Buildings and public works’ collective agreement, specifically, paying 
the employees at least the minimum wage in force at the place where those 
services are performed. Objekt und Bauregie, of which Rüffert was liquidator, 
used a subcontractor established in Poland. However, the Polish workers posted to 
Germany to build the Göttingen-Rosdorf prison, were being paid a wage below 
that provided for in the Buildings and public works collective agreement. 
Specifically, 53 workers were paid 46.57% of the minimum wage.  
The Directive was transposed into German national law by the AEntG 
which sets out that in Member States where there is a system for declaring 
collective agreements to be ‘universally applicable’ (as is the case in Germany) 
the collective agreement may only apply if it has been declared universally 
applicable. However, the Buildings and public works collective agreement in 
force at the site had not been declared universally applicable and the minimum 
rate of pay laid down in the Buildings and public works collective agreement 
exceeded the minimum rate of pay applicable pursuant to the AEntG. The rules on 
minimum rates of pay in the German construction industry are set out in a 
collective agreement which applies in the Federal Republic of Germany entitled 
the “TV Mindestlohn” and has been declared universally applicable and therefore 
forms part of the ‘nucleus’ of protective rules as defined by the Directive. 
Accordingly, in Rüffert, it needed to be assessed whether the Buildings and public 
works collective agreement, that was in force at the site where the services were 
performed, was applicable to the posted workers in which case the higher wage 
would apply to them. The national court was uncertain as to whether the 
requirement to comply with the collective agreement was justified by overriding 
reasons relating to the public interest and was necessary for the protection of 
workers and therefore referred the following question for a preliminary ruling: 
does a national law that requires contractors, and indirectly their subcontractors, 
on the award of public contract to expressly agree to paying posted workers at 
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least the remuneration provided by the applicable collective agreement breach 
Article 56 TFEU? 
 
(ii) The Collective Agreement: “Universally Applicable” 
 
An overriding issue in the case was whether the collective agreement could apply 
at all. Article 3(1) Directive requires collective agreements to have been declared 
“universally applicable”, so that they are observed by all undertakings in the 
“geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned”. The Buildings 
and public works collective agreement of Lower Saxony, “covers only a part of 
the construction sector falling within the geographical area of that agreement, 
since, first, the law which gives it such an effect applies only to public contracts 
and not to private contracts and, second, the collective agreement has not been 
declared universally applicable.”336 The Court determined that such a rate of pay 
in the collective agreement cannot be considered to constitute a minimum rate of 
pay in respect of the Directive and further, it follows that it cannot be considered 
as a term or condition of employment that is more favourable to the workers under 
Article 3(7) Directive. 
As aforementioned, German law does provide a system for declaring 
collective agreements to be universally applicable. Accordingly, the minimum 
rate of pay must be assessed in line with Article 3(1) Directive and not Article 
3(8) Directive which only applies to labour systems that do not provide for 
collective agreements to be declared universally applicable. Article 3(1) Directive 
provides that Member States guarantee to posted workers in the host State the 
minimum rate of pay as laid down “by law, regulation or administrative provision, 
and/or by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared 
universally applicable”. Further, “For the purposes of this Directive, the concept 
of minimum rates of pay referred to in paragraph 1 (c) is defined by the national 
law and/or practice of the Member State to whose territory the worker is posted.” 
Personally, I accept that the collective agreement applicable at the work place had 
not been declared universally applicable and therefore had no legitimate 
expression for the Court to follow. Therefore, by default the collective agreement 
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that is universally applicable will apply to the posted workers, in accordance with 
the Directive, which can easily be relied on in this public law case, and therefore 
provided that the posted workers are being paid in accordance with the minimum 
laid down by the universally applicable collective agreement it is very difficult to 
challenge this judgment on a legal basis. However, there is one flaw to the Court’s 
reasoning and this was superbly argued by AG Bot in his Opinion under 
paragraphs 89 – 94, which has been paraphrased here: the rules on minimum rates 
of pay in the German construction industry are set out in the TV Mindestlohn 
collective agreement which has been declared universally applicable and therefore 
forms part of the nucleus of protective rules as defined by the Directive. The TV 
Mindestlohn expressly reserves the possibility of applying terms of employment 
that are more favourable to workers under other collective agreements or special 
agreements. These specific collective agreements are intended to complement the 
TV Mindestlohn, however, as they are normally not declared to be universally 
applicable they fall outside what is accepted by the Directive. The AG stated that 
he did not believe this discounts the application of these special, or more specific, 
collective agreements; since they ordinarily set higher wages than those specified 
by the TV Mindestlohn they constitute the implementation of enhanced national 
protection, “As I have previously demonstrated, such enhanced national 
protection is authorised under Article 3(7) of Directive 96/71.”337 
 
(iii) The More Favourable Term and Public Procurement 
 
The Directive was extensively discussed in this case; predominantly whether the 
law of Lower Saxony was covered by the favourability provision under Article 
3(7) Directive. The Court determined that the rate of pay in the collective 
agreement cannot be considered as a term of employment that is more favourable 
to the posted workers. The reasoning presented by the Court to justify this 
conclusion is very disappointing and does not provide a full explanation. 
Particularly in light of the ruling in Laval only four months previously, the Court 
had an opportunity to be more lenient here but avidly confirmed its position as set 
out in Laval by confirming that the minimum is the limit, “the level of protection 
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which must be guaranteed to workers posted to the territory of the host Member 
State is limited”338 and further clarification of this, “What is necessary for the 
protection of workers is defined by the mandatory minimum wage”.339 It is 
evident that the Court is satisfied with viewing the minimum as a maximum. 
The Commission stated that as the collective agreement only applied to 
public contracts and not private, the more favourable terms contained therein 
could not be justified by an overriding public interest objective as it does not 
apply to all areas of economic life.340 However, AG Bot disagreed with this line of 
argument for the following three reasons:341 (i) the Land of Lower Saxony, as a 
public contractor, was acting within its competence in the field of public 
procurement and would have to be granted delegated powers to declare a 
collective agreement as universally applicable; (ii) whether the prime contractor is 
public or private is not relevant from the viewpoint of Union law. What is relevant 
to Union law is the compliance of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality, 
“in my view it is crucial that, in the framework of the performance of the same 
public contract, local workers and posted workers be paid at the same rate. It is 
here, to my mind, that we must apply the yardstick that will enable us to detect 
possible discrimination in breach of Community law.”342; and (iii) as well as 
having the contract fulfilled, the award of public contracts may also meet the need 
of fulfilling public interest requirements such as social objectives, meeting these 
secondary aims has been recognised in the literature, “public procurement may be 
a means of combating unemployment and exclusion”343 and in the legislation, 
“The conditions governing the performance of a contract may, in particular, 
concern social and environmental considerations.”344 
Public procurement has the potential for advancing social policies and 
McCrudden based the majority of his analysis of the Rüffert case on the Court’s 
complete lack of reference to the public procurement context, “Those considering 
the Rüffert case tend to see the case through the lens of the Posted Workers 
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Directive rather than as one concerned with public procurement, and that is too 
blinkered an approach, in my view.”345 AG Bot did make reference to the 
Procurement Directives, but this was not expressly recognised by the Court. A 
possible explanation of this could be, “There is evidence that some members of 
the Court may have misunderstood this provision of EU procurement law quite 
profoundly and, as a result, may not have taken the procurement context of the 
case seriously enough.”346 However, even McCrudden admits, “it is arguable that, 
even if the Court had been fully briefed on the procurement dimensions of the 
case, it would have made little difference because in any event the Court’s Article 
[56] analysis would have trumped the Procurement Directives and the Court 
would therefore have determined the issue in the same way.”347 I have to agree 
with this conclusion and further, I believe that the Court made its decision before 
a thorough examination of all of the issues had been carried out and therefore it 
had to bend its analysis to suit the final judgement. Perhaps this submission is 
unduly cynical but where the Court has so rigidly committed itself to the decision 
of prioritising the economic freedoms without fully assessing and appreciating all 
of the social considerations at issue, it is difficult to see it in another way. If 
anything, the Court’s decisions during the Laval Quartet have almost become 
stricter; from initially leaving proportionality to the national court (Viking) to 
determining the proportionality test itself (Laval) to the Rüffert case where the 
Court has tightened its control even further by ignoring the public procurement 
context, “Public procurement is an area in which Member States must be given 
some discretion to decide how social policies… may best be implemented.”348 
McCrudden concludes his analysis of Rüffert by stating that, “The decision of the 
ECJ in the Rüffert case is per incuriam… In its apparent rush for consistency with 
the recent decisions in Laval and Viking, ignoring anything that stood in its way… 
it has risked undermining the coherence of the corpus of EC law relating to 
procurement linkages, a corpus of law that the Court itself partly constructed”.349 
Rüffert is extremely tendentious towards the freedom to provide services. 
Its treatment and application of Article 3(7) Directive is unsatisfactory. This 
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ruling leaves posted workers with no alternative other than to succumb to the less 
favourable wage than initially anticipated and the host State workers are even 
more vulnerable to the threat of posted workers offering a service at a more 
competitive rate. 
The national court acknowledged that the obligation to comply with a 
collective agreement that sets a higher wage will compromise the service 
provider’s competitive advantage which “constitutes an impediment to market 
access.”350 However, it is submitted that viewing the compliance of the host 
State’s collective agreement as an impediment to market access is a very 
dangerous interpretation that is the antithesis of the internal market, leading to a 
race to the bottom and social dumping; as pre-warned by Vladimír Špidla in the 
press release. AG Bot opined that Article 3(7) Directive permits Member States to 
improve the level of social protection to workers employed in its territory, 
therefore provided it is compatible with Union law, “in principle, this provision 
authorises the implementation of enhanced national protection.”351 However, 
these social interests are set against the interests of the freedom to provide 
services which is supported by Article 56 TFEU and is consequently very difficult 
to challenge in the Court, “since the Directive has its legal basis in the Treaty, any 
infringement of the Directive must entail infringement of the Treaty.”352 
 
(iv) Potential Justifications 
 
The referring court and the Polish Government maintained that the measure at 
issue does infringe Article 56 TFEU and further it cannot be justified as the 
purpose of the collective agreement in place is to protect German building 
undertakings from competition from other Member States thereby achieving an 
economic purpose which, according to the Court’s case law, cannot justify a 
restriction of a fundamental freedom.353 However, AG Bot did not view the 
purpose of the collective agreement as a means of protectionism, but recognised 
its purpose as “securing the attainment of the objectives of protecting workers and 
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preventing social dumping”354 by providing that, “local workers and posted 
workers on the same site will be paid equally [emphasis added].”355 It is submitted 
that equal terms and conditions are the very essence of social protection and 
reversion of social dumping, accordingly, it is something to work towards and not 
to set against Article 56 TFEU as a violation. Ultimately, it is for the national 
court to assess the true intention of the national measure at issue which is why it 
was disappointing that the Court was so quick to discount the measure as a means 
of worker protection. In my opinion, the Court must appreciate that just because a 
measure has the spill-over effect of protecting national businesses it does not 
authorise its condemnation where its primary purpose is protecting workers and 
preventing social dumping by prohibiting unfair competition; if the Court take the 
approach of condemning all secondary protectionist measures this will create an 
environment where social dumping can flourish and social interests, such as 
worker protection, will be quashed by the economic interests of the internal 
market which works against the Union’s objectives as prescribed by Article 151 
TFEU, “The Union and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social 
rights… shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved 
living and working conditions,… proper social protection,… dialogue between 
management and labour… To this end the Union and the Member States shall 
implement measures which take account of the diverse forms of national 
practices”. What can be learnt from this case is that a greater appreciation of the 
differing Member States’ labour systems is much needed. 
 
(v) Concluding Rüffert 
 
The reaction to the Court’s judgment in Rüffert emphasised the prior criticisms of 
Viking and Laval.356 The judgment also influenced the political scene in the EU as 
it was used as part of the ‘no’ campaign in Ireland’s referendum on the ratification 
of the Lisbon Treaty; the Technical, Engineering and Electrical Union (an Irish 
trade union) stated that these recent judgments (Viking, Laval and now Rüffert), 
“show that the pendulum has swung against workers’ rights and in favour of big 
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business.”357 The Court’s decision was not an obvious one as the following 
entities all disagreed with the ruling: AG Bot, Land Niedersachsen, the German, 
Danish, Irish, Cypriot, Austrian, Finnish and Norwegian Governments all stated 
that Article 56 TFEU does not preclude a national measure such as the one at 
issue in the main proceedings.358 AG Bot held that the measure at issue is an 
indistinctly applicable measure that restricts Article 56 TFEU, yet, in so far as the 
measure does restrict the freedom to provide services, it is justified by the 
objective of worker protection and it is proportionate in achieving that 
objective.359 Further, it was also assessed by some of the aforementioned 
Governments360 and the AG361 that the Directive also does not preclude a national 
measure such as the one at issue in the main proceedings. 
 It has been stated that the heavy reliance on the Directive in Rüffert 
implied that, “The answer turns on what is thought to be the rationale for the 
Directive, a matter which has always been unclear.”362 Davies suggested that there 
are “at least three, largely inconsistent, rationales for the Directive… promotion of 
cross-border services (suggested by the Directive’s Treaty bases), protecting 
posted workers and protecting host state workers (both mentioned in the 
Directive’s recitals).”363 These three inconsistent rationales have the potential to 
result in differing and inconsistent interpretations of the Directive, however, it is 
submitted that Rüffert made the rationale very clear; the legal basis of the 
Directive comprises Articles 53(1) and 62 TFEU which binds the Directive to the 
freedom to provide services as opposed to clarifying the legislation as a measure 
of employee protection. In Rüffert the Court clarified the rationale of the Directive 
as being inextricably linked to this freedom, “That interpretation of Directive 
96/71 is confirmed by reading it in the light of [Article 56 TFEU], since that 
directive seeks in particular to bring about the freedom to provide services”.364 
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Thus, it is submitted that one of the main issues with the case, as also exemplified 
in Laval, is the legal basis of the Directive.  
It is submitted that the second fundamental issue in the case is that the 
applicability of collective agreements has been meticulously scrutinised by the 
Court and it would appear that if they are not universally or generally applicable 
in the geographical area then they may be discounted. Further, what this case also 
shows is that if there is some form of sectoral minimum wage in the host State, 
collective agreements can be more easily relegated. Article 3(1) Directive 
specifies that the minimum rate of pay is defined by the host State. The German 
practice for setting out a minimum rate of pay in the construction industry is 
initially provided for in the universally applicable TV Mindestlohn collective 
agreement, however as aforementioned, this agreement expressly reserves the 
possibility of applying terms of employment that are more favourable to workers 
under other collective agreements or special agreements, these special agreements, 
that are not universally applicable, are intended to complement the TV 
Mindestlohn. Therefore, an argument that could have been submitted to the Court 
is that in respect of the German practice, these special arrangements garner some 
indirect universal applicability via the TV Mindestlohn collective agreement. 
However, this argument would most likely not have been accepted due to the 
Court’s stringent interpretation of the Directive, “To safely fit inside the Court’s 
interpretation of what counts as a ‘minimum’ would require a genuinely radical 
restructuring of collective bargaining in Member States.”365 
Rüffert has revealed a systemic problem in respect of the Court’s 
interpretation of the Directive; the Court has, without apparent guidance from the 
text, rigidly fixated its decisions to the ‘minimum’ provided by the Directive even 
where a potentially more favourable term may exist. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
the creation of the Directive was inspired by Rush Portuguesa which specified, 
“Community law does not preclude Member States from extending their 
legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry, 
to any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, no matter 
in which country the employer is established”.366 The Directive added the 
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minimum requirement and the universal applicability of collective labour 
agreements, which the Court has interpreted as a maximum and has added the 
requirement that where not universally applicable, collective agreements must be 
declared as applying in the implementing legislation. 
In essence, the national court’s question may also be read as: if service 
providers must expressly agree to pay posted workers in accordance with the 
going rate at the place where the service is performed, does that restrict Article 56 
TFEU? As the Court answered ‘yes’ this shows a real step back for the Court, in 
spite of the Commission’s publications on the day of judgment. The preliminary 
question asked whether the service providers may agree to pay “at least” the 
remuneration prescribed by the collective agreement in line with the “minimum 
wage” in force where the services take place. The fact that the service provider 
was only requested to pay in line with the minimum in practice at the site and no 
more and it was still held to restrict the freedom to provide services and breach 
the Treaty reveals that the Court was satisfied with its interpretation of the 
Directive in Laval in prioritising the interests of the internal market and have 
continued in the same line. The Court was able to justify this as ultimately there 
was no legitimate expression for the applicable collective agreement. Therefore, a 
greater acceptance of collective agreements and in turn differing Member States’ 
labour systems is what needs to be revised regarding the Directive. 
So, what is to be done? Either all Member States must accept that only 
collective agreements that have been labelled “universally applicable” will carry 
weight in the Court and therefore they must adapt their labour systems 
accordingly, or alternatively, and in my opinion more realistically, the Directive 
must be revised to not only adapt its legal basis so that the Court is not as tied to 
the freedom to provide services but also to make room for, and accept, a broader 
scope of collective agreements. Currently ten of the Member States do not have a 
statutory minimum wage and it is imperative that the Union shows a greater 
acceptance and tolerance of the alternative forms of laying down terms and 
conditions of employment in the Member States. 
 
VI. Commission v Luxembourg 
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Two months after Rüffert, the Court determined Commission v Luxembourg;367 
the final case in the Laval Quartet, “Just when it looked like things could not get 
much worse for trade unions in the ‘old’ Member States following the European 
Court of Justice’s decisions in Viking, Laval and Rüffert along comes the Court’s 
decision in Commission v Luxembourg… This will particularly benefit businesses 
from the ‘new’ Member States, even if this comes at the expense of labour laws in 
the host old Member States.”368 
 
(i) The Facts 
 
Commission v Luxembourg was decided on 19 June 2008 in the First Chamber 
with Judge Levits as the Rapporteur and Trstenjak as the AG. The Commission 
brought this action against the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg concerning their 
national Law of 20 December 2002 that transposed the Directive. The 
Commission claimed that the following four points were likely to be incompatible 
with Union law and therefore Luxembourg had failed to fulfil its obligations 
under Article 3(1) and (10) Directive and Articles 56 and 57 TFEU: (i) the 
national law required undertakings established in another Member State which 
posts its workers to Luxembourg to comply with terms and conditions of 
employment going beyond the requirements of Article 3(1) and (10) Directive, 
which included the following: (a) requirement of a written contract of 
employment or a corresponding document within the meaning of Directive 
91/533; (b) automatic adjustment of rates of pay to reflect changes in the cost of 
living; (c) compliance with rules on part-time and fixed-term work; and (d) 
compliance with collective labour agreements; (ii) Article 3(1)(a) Directive was 
incompletely transposed; given the failure to ensure that posted workers are 
granted any other rest period apart from the weekly rest period, by excluding daily 
rest periods and rest breaks; (iii) the basic information necessary for monitoring 
purposes lacked the necessary clarity to ensure legal certainty for service 
providers; and (iv) the freedom to provide services was restricted by requiring 
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undertakings established in other Member States to keep documents with an ad 
hoc agent resident in Luxembourg. 
Luxembourg replied to these complaints by conceding point (ii) 
concerning rest periods and accordingly amending the national law, but 
Luxembourg defended points (i), (iii) and (iv). Luxembourg stated that the subject 
of complaint in respect of point (i) constituted public policy provisions as 
provided for by Article 3(10) Directive; in respect of point (iii) on monitoring 
information, Luxembourg stated that the national law did not require prior 
notification; and in respect of point (iv) on keeping documents with an ad hoc 
agent, Luxembourg stated that it was a non-discriminatory requirement that 
enabled the authority to carry out better checks. Bearing in mind that the 
Commission issued a Recommendation on enhanced administrative cooperation in 
the context of posted workers369 that advocated better administrative cooperation, 
improved access to information and exchange of information and good practice 
among Member States just two months prior, it is surprising that its action against 
Luxembourg was challenged on the very basis of what it was advocating. 
The Court held that Luxembourg was unsuccessful on all four points. 
Luxembourg failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 3(1) and (10) Directive 
and Articles 56 and 57 TFEU for the following reasons: for point (i) requiring 
service providers to comply with terms beyond those specified in Article 3(1) and 
(10) Directive may only be permitted on grounds of public policy provisions and 
in this case, there was no defence of public policy. The Court held that the public 
policy exception is a derogation from the fundamental freedom to provide 
services and therefore must be interpreted strictly, the scope of which cannot de 
determined unilaterally by a Member State, “It follows that public policy may be 
relied on only if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental 
interest of society.”370 Luxembourg conceded to point (ii) which was well-
founded. Point (iii) raised the issue of the lack of clarity on basic information for 
monitoring purposes as the notification procedure requested under the 
Luxembourg legislation was held as being ambiguous and this ambiguity is likely 
to dissuade undertakings wishing to post their workers to Luxembourg thereby 
                                                 
369
 Commission Recommendation on enhanced administrative cooperation in the context of the 
posting of workers of 31 March 2008, OJ C85/1. 
370
 C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg, op. cit., [50]. 
 145 
hindering the freedom to provide services. Finally, it was held that the obligation 
imposed under point (iv) would have involved an additional administrative and 
financial burden for undertakings established elsewhere thereby dissuading them 
from providing services in Luxembourg. The Court suggested that a posted 
worker could take on the task of ensuring the necessary documents for monitoring 
were made available to the competent national authorities which would be a less 
restrictive measure to meet the same objective. Also, the retention of documents 
in the host State after the period of posting has ended was rendered superfluous by 
Arblade and Leloup371 and Article 4 Directive.  
 
(ii) The Advocate General’s Opinion 
 
AG Trstenjak also opined that Luxembourg had failed to fulfil its obligations 
under Article 3(1) and (10) Directive and Articles 56 and 57 TFEU. However, 
there was one minor point in which the AG held that the Commission’s complaint 
was unfounded, whereas the Court disagreed. This was in respect of Point (2) of 
Article 1(1) of the Law of 20 December 2002 concerning the automatic 
adjustment of pay in accordance with developments in the cost of living. 
Luxembourg argued that the provision aimed to protect employees and 
contributed to ensuring good labour relations in the host State. The Commission 
argued that the adjustment of pay refers to both actual wages and the minimum 
rate of pay, however, as Article 3(1)(c) Directive only refers to the “minimum 
rates of pay” it does not conform to the Directive. Whereas, AG Trstenjak stated 
that the provision is “neither ambiguous nor does it allow for an interpretation 
which is contrary to Community law… [and its objective is] that a general 
adjustment of pay is effected in line with developments in the cost of living which 
also operates to the benefit of the minimum wage”.372 The Court held that 
Luxembourg “merely cited in a general manner the objectives of protecting the 
purchasing power of workers and good labour relations, without adducing any 
evidence to enable the necessity for and proportionality of the measures adopted 
to be evaluated.”373 In my opinion, this confirms that, as the legislation stands at 
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present, posted workers are not legible to more than the minimum rate of pay; 
however, I do not submit that that is the wrong conclusion, after all, it is the rate 
that the host State has set as an appropriate wage for its own citizens. The 
difficulty is that the Court’s interpretation of the Directive is resolutely fixed on 
the very minimum; even where national law provides for fluctuations in the 
minimum rate this is deemed as beyond the parameters of the Directive. The 
Laval Triplet has unequivocally verified that if the Court’s interpretation is to 
change, the legislation must change. 
 
(iii) Concluding Commission v Luxembourg 
 
The irony of Commission v Luxembourg is that the infringement action has been 
brought with the intention of clarifying the provisions of the Directive and 
therefore ensuring its proper implementation. However, the effect of the decision 
appears instead to render certain provisions obsolete, “The effect of Commission v 
Luxembourg is to interpret Article 3(10) PWD and Article 7(2)/Article 9(2) of the 
Rome Convention/Regulation almost out of existence.”374 The Court construed 
public policy provisions under Article 3(10) Directive so tightly, that it would 
appear unless the national measure is intended to eliminate forced labour or child 
labour the provision will not be deemed serious enough to qualify as a genuine 
and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society. However, this 
is contrary to the Commission’s Communication on the implementation of Article 
3(10) Directive:  
 
“Finally, the group of experts which prepared the transposal of the Directive 
considered that the concept of “public policy provisions” referred to in 
Article 3(10) covers provisions concerning fundamental rights and freedoms 
as laid down by the law of the Member State concerned and/or by 
international law, such as freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
prohibition of forced labour, the principle of non-discrimination and 
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elimination of exploitative forms of child labour375, data protection and the 
right to privacy.”376 
 
The Commission therefore concluded that freedom of association and collective 
bargaining come within the public policy provisions of Article 3(10) Directive, 
yet the Court has not granted them due recognition. Further to this, it is submitted 
that the effects of enforcing minimum standards when more favourable terms are 
available contributes to lowering social standards leading to social dumping which 
is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of society, 
and the protection of labour and support of collective bargaining are fundamental 
social rights. 
This lack of recognition is accountable to the fact that the Directive is a 
dichotomy of social and economic factors; the legislation is based upon the 
freedom to provide services, yet this economic freedom directly relies upon 
posted workers to provide those services. Therefore, the rights and protection of 
the workers will inevitably come under the Directive’s immediate concern. It is 
therefore surprising that the social interests of the workers have been so blatantly 
relegated by the economic freedoms. The Court has also relegated the national 
interests below those of the EU by dismissing the differing labour systems, as 
influenced by the differing sociological traditions of the Member States. The 
Member States’ labour systems are so varied and layered in nuances reflecting the 
nation’s culture and sociology that the Directive, rather than being malleable and 
stretched to cater for the different regimes in some form of semi-harmonisation, is 
used by the Court in a rigid and unsophisticated manner by boiling down every 
interpretation to its legal basis – the fundamental freedom to provide services. The 
Court has magnified the problems, yet, it is submitted, it does not have the 
legitimacy to fix it. 
 
VII. Abuse of the Directive 
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The final issue to be discussed in this Chapter, in respect of the relevant issues, 
concerns the abuse of the Directive. Misuse and misinterpretation of the Directive 
have been highlighted in the case law, however this section will focus on the 
intentional abuse of the Directive in order to circumvent national laws.  
 
(i) Lack of Data on Posted Workers 
 
Arguably, one of the key factors that has contributed to the abuse of this 
legislation specifically, is that there is a definite lack of data and information 
available on posted workers, “There are no precise figures or estimates of posted 
workers in the EU.”377 There is no formal requirement of registering posted 
workers in the host State as the obligation to declare the posting was held as being 
an unjustified restriction on the freedom to provide services.378 Accordingly, “The 
only available data source at EU level is based on the systematic data collection of 
E101 certificates (2005-2009) in the field of social security”.379 However, this 
form of data collection has several limitations, “It measures the number of 
postings, not the number of posted persons (the same person can be posted several 
times). Furthermore, the E101 social security form is not issued to all posted 
workers, either because it is not required (postings of over 12 months are not 
considered for social security purposes) or because some countries do not apply 
E101 forms when workers are posted, especially in the cases of very short-term 
postings.”380 In the interests of effective monitoring, it is suggested that the use of 
declaring postings would be proportionate to ensure compliance with the 
Directive. 
 Article 4 Directive regulates cooperation on information and as such 
provides that Member States shall designate a liaison office for the purpose of 
implementing the Directive, however, difficulties have arisen in practice, “The 
report of the European Federation of Building and Woodworkers and the 
European Construction Industry Federation is very critical on the subject of 
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administrative cooperation, claiming that staff numbers are often inadequate, that 
very few requests for information are made, and that the liaison offices and 
monitoring authorities often fail to provide answers at all, or else provide only 
vague answers.”381 It is argued that these “vague answers” can be attributed to a 
general lack of certainty surrounding the Directive. The Member States must 
clearly present the terms and conditions available and the Union must show a 
greater respect of the varying ways in which this is done in accordance with the 
differing labour systems. The current lack of data and precision on what is to be 
applied allow for a greater circumvention of what the rules intended and clearly 
access to information and administrative cooperation must improve. This issue is 
magnified by the fact that posted workers are temporary, yet there is no definition 
of what “temporary” constitutes. Unfortunately, this has created an environment 
in which “fake postings” can exist, particularly seen in the form of letter-box 
companies.  
 
(ii) Letter-Box Companies 
 
Letter-box companies are created in order to tactfully avoid complying with all of 
the host State’s rules and regulations. As an example, an undertaking, which 
carries out its usual work in the host State will set up a subsidiary in the home 
State for the sole purpose of employing cheaper labour in the home State to post 
to the more expensive host State and pay them the minimum rate as opposed to 
the going rate which is lawful, in accordance with the Directive. The undertaking 
does not engage in genuine business in the home State, but manipulates the 
Directive and the objectives of the internal market to its advantage by exploiting 
the opportunities of the internal market and consequently contributing to the 
problems associated with the Directive by distorting competition from the inside. 
The posting of workers has been likened to a “Trojan horse”382 and these “fake 
postings” which push the limits of the freedom to provide services beyond what is 
legitimate lead to immigration problems, social dumping and an abuse of the law. 
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 In order to combat the fraudulent or improper use of the freedom to 
provide services and the Directive, the European social partners in the 
construction sector (the FIEC and the EFBWW) suggested that the condition 
under Article 1(3) Directive of a genuine employment relationship between the 
service provider and the posted workers during the posting should be set out 
explicitly in the national legislation transposing the Directive.383 Similarly, in the 
case of Plum, it was held that there must be a genuine link between the 
undertaking making the posting and the home State; the service provider “must 
normally carry on its activities in the [home] State, that is to say, it must 
habitually carry on significant activities there.”384 
  
(iii) Circumventing National Law 
 
The issue of abuse of the Directive will now be explored through the case of 
Rising Sun385 in which third country nationals were posted from Ireland to the UK 
under the pretext of being “posted workers” in accordance with EU law. The case 
was decided by the EWHC and even though Union law was discussed at length, it 
was determined by the national judge that it was not necessary to make a 
reference to the ECJ as the decision of the judge was so clear. The Claimants 
attempted to rely on Union law, specifically, the Directive and the freedom to 
provide services under Article 56 TFEU so as to circumvent national law, 
specifically, UK immigration law. It was held by His Honour Judge (HHJ) Pearl 
that such a reliance on Union law is abusive.  
 The facts of the case are as follows: Ms Low, Ms Leong and Ms Yang, all 
third country nationals (Malaysian and Chinese respectively), were employed by 
‘Rising Sun’, a catering company established in Ireland that provided catering 
services and staff in the European Union. In this case, they agreed an eighteen 
month contract with ‘Malaysian Delights Restaurant’ in the UK and the three 
employees were sent to the UK as posted workers, however, they did not have 
valid legal status in the UK. Rising Sun intended to rely on Article 56 TFEU and 
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the Directive in order to circumvent the UK immigration law. It was held that 
Rising Sun could not rely on Union law because the posted workers were not EU 
nationals nor were they legally resident in the home State from where they had 
been posted. In order to rely on the Directive successfully, the posted workers, in 
accordance with Article 2(1) Directive, had to carry out their posting in a Member 
State other than the State in which they “normally work”. However, “None of the 
first three claimants normally works in the Republic of Ireland. They normally 
work, on the evidence in this case, illegally in the UK.”386  
Abuse of rights was discussed in Rising Sun in light of the posted workers 
relying on the Directive and Article 56 TFEU to justify non-compliance with the 
obligations under UK immigration law. The notion of abuse of rights denotes a 
“purely artificial nature”387 by which Union law is relied upon, implicating that 
there is no genuine substance, or true connection to the case, with Union law. This 
concept of artificially relying on Union law for an ulterior purpose applies acutely 
to Rising Sun. For posted workers to be legitimately deployed under Union law 
they must be lawfully and habitually established in the home State to permit their 
posting to a host State, however, the Malaysian and Chinese posted workers were 
never lawfully resident in Ireland therefore their posting to the UK could not be 
protected by Article 56 TFEU, in accordance with the premise that, “Community 
law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends.”388 HHJ Pearl 
consequently concluded that, “the Irish company’s reliance on [Article 56 TFEU] 
is abusive.”389 The attempted use of the Directive in this manner reveals its 
potential to circumvent national law contributing to immigration problems and 
emphasising the need for more definite rules on the scope of the Directive’s 
application.  
 
(iv) Interim Conclusion 
 
The issues highlighted above reveal how the Directive can be manipulated to 
circumvent national immigration laws, and this combined with the temporary 
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nature of posted workers and the lack of data available all contribute to a climate 
that is potentially damaging to immigration. In the context of posting third 
country nationals, it is for the Member States to take responsibility and monitor 
the situation by checking whether a service provider is manipulating Article 56 
TFEU for an ulterior purpose, such as deploying their workers for the purpose of 
placing them on the host State’s national employment market.390 Checks can 
therefore provide the assurance that workers who are nationals of non-Member 
States are posted lawfully.  
It is suggested that the only way to prevent abuse of the Directive is 
through greater clarity of the provisions of the Directive and improved access to 
information concerning the applicable terms and conditions of employment. 
Where there is greater certainty there will inevitably be a greater opportunity for 
all relevant parties to be able to fulfil what is expected of them. This is 
particularly true when the abuse of the law can take many different forms, from 
letter-box companies and misuse of third country nationals, as discussed above, to 
companies circumventing certain administrative requirements such as re-
registering their company every year to take advantage of the perks of being a 
newly-founded company.391 Abuse of the law will potentially be a timeless issue, 
but it is submitted that where there is a genuine employment relationship between 
the service provider and the posted workers and the service provider is genuinely 




(i) Chapter Summary 
 
This Chapter has identified the fundamental issues of the Directive through 
analysing the case law. The case law, including the cases mentioned in Chapter 1 
Part 2, can be grouped into three parts consisting of the first case law following 
the Directive’s adoption in which the Court revealed a reluctance to fully invoke 
the provisions of the Directive, showing that its initial impact was not 
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overwhelming. Secondly, the early case law invoking the Directive proved more 
successful as the Court satisfactorily upheld all parts of the Directive’s objectives 
and then finally, there was an axiomatic shift in the Court’s interpretation of the 
Directive that can first be noticed in Commission v Germany392 and was solidified 
by the Laval Triplet. The purpose of grouping the cases chronologically therefore 
charters the changing interpretation of the Court.  
Kilpatrick similarly recognised this change in the Court’s attitude and 
grouped the cases into the following three stages:  
 
(1) Approach 1: Strong worker protection; 
(2) Approach 2: Diluting worker protection by lowering the Article 56 TFEU 
ceiling; 
(3) The New Approach: Making the Directive an exhaustive and restrictively 
interpreted statement of justification for host-State labour law application 
under Article 56 TFEU.393  
 
Kilpatrick’s first approach is most likened to my second grouping (the early case 
law invoking the Directive) as it is signalled by the “low level of scrutiny of host-
state labour laws under both the PWD and Article [56 TFEU] which is the hall-
mark of this approach.”394 Kilpatrick cited Wolff & Müller395 to exemplify this 
approach, which seems very fitting. Kilpatrick’s second approach is defined as 
follows, “This more demanding proportionality analysis under Article [56 TFEU] 
is the key feature of the second approach to posted workers. It means that host-
state worker protection rules will have to much more convincingly demonstrate 
their added value to home-state rules in order to be allowed under Article [56 
TFEU].”396 Kilpatrick cited Mazzoleni397 to exemplify the second approach. 
However, Mazzoleni was ruled in 2001, three years prior to Wolff & Müller, and 
the security officers in the case were not viewed as “posted workers” per se, it is 
therefore not a faultless analogy. Further, it is submitted that the chronological 
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presentation of the case law is a truer depiction of the changing approach of the 
Court. The case used to demonstrate Kilpatrick’s third approach is very clear, 
“Laval signalled the Court’s U-turn towards this new approach… The outcome is 
that posted workers are permitted to receive very little host-state protection, 
especially on the critical issue of pay.”398 Kilpatrick has described this “new 
approach” as “emasculating”399 the differing Member States’ labour systems, 
revealing a distinct “lack of respect for collective standards”,400 an assessment that 
this thesis upholds. Ultimately, the changes centre around Laval and the treatment 
of cases can be separated into pre- and post-Laval, hence why the majority of this 
Chapter has focused on that particular case. 
 
(ii) Laval Triplet and the “New Approach” 
 
The Court’s “new approach” confirmed the application of collective agreements, 
the favourability provision and the public policy provision therefore, it was only 
until these cases were determined that it could be revealed the majority of 
Member States had seemingly wrongly implemented these provisions, “it is only 
after Laval that it became clear that Member States had to explicitly ‘opt-in’ to 
relying on collective agreements to set minimum standards for construction 
workers.”401 However, it is submitted that the second limb of Article 3(8) 
Directive was complied with as the Swedish collective agreement for the building 
sector was entered into between Byggnads, the central organisation representing 
building workers, and Sveriges Byggindustrier, the central organisation for 
employers in the construction sector. In determining that the applicability of 
collective agreements must have been declared in the implementing legislation the 
Court either followed guidance from the Commission’s non-binding 
Communication or from the out-dated amended Proposal; either way, the decision 
was ultra vires. Interestingly, this issue has not been well-documented in the 
existing literature on the Court’s interpretation of the Directive; it would appear 
that this point has been accepted as correct, indeed, at first I found these cases 
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difficult to fault on a legal basis, in spite of their social controversies. However, I 
realised the fault of the Court once I had carefully re-read and compared the 
amended Proposal and the final version of the Directive. It occurred to me that the 
Court’s determination that the Member States should have declared the collective 
agreements’ applicability in the implementing legislation was an unfounded 
assumption and consequently should not have been automatically accepted as 
being self-evident. The effect of this conclusion is that if the Court had not made 
this mistake the outcome of Laval could have been different as the case hinges on 
the applicability of the Swedish collective agreement. The Court ruled that the 
collective agreement was not applicable as the “Member State has not made use of 
the possibility provided for in the second subparagraph of Article 3(8) of that 
directive.”402 This thesis intends to provide proof in the comparison drawn 
between the text of the amended Proposal and the Directive for the purpose of 
suggesting the very real possibility that the Court was not correct in reaching its 
conclusion.  
The 2003 Commission Communication even acknowledged that none of 
the Member States’ transposing legislation had made any mention of this option 
and rather than assuming the fault lay with the uncertain text of the Directive, the 
Commission concluded, “In these countries, therefore, only the terms and 
conditions of employment laid down in legislative provisions apply to workers 
posted on their territory.”403 This very unforgiving approach is echoed in the 
Court and has been attributed to a “fear of collective standards”404 which may 
stem from a fear of protectionism, “we can see that same fear—protection of 
national undertakings from foreign competition—runs like a red line throughout 
the regulation of posted workers.”405 National protectionism is the very antithesis 
of the proper functioning of the internal market. However, what the Laval Triplet 
reveals is that the prohibition of any form of protectionism, at any cost, will have 
a spill-over effect of diminishing social rights. 
The text of Article 3(7) Directive was also only fully explained through 
the case law. The Article states that, “[Article 3 Directive] Paragraphs 1 to 6 shall 
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not prevent application of terms and conditions of employment which are more 
favourable to workers.” From this it could reasonably be understood that more 
favourable terms for workers shall not be prevented. However, it was only in the 
cases cited above that specified that interpretation is not correct. The Court 
confirmed that the favourability provision only applies in two instances: (i) the 
more favourable terms of the home State that already apply to the posted workers; 
or (ii) the home State employer voluntarily agrees to the more favourable terms in 
the host State.   
The Directive extends certain terms and conditions of employment of the 
host State to posted workers. This essentially obliges the service provider to 
comply with two sets of laws and therefore the concept of the Directive itself 
could be seen as a restriction to provide services. Consequently, in order to reduce 
the burden on the service provider as far as possible in this context, the Court has 
interpreted the Directive as far as possible in the service provider’s favour. 
Evidently, the Directive has revealed ambiguities and uncertainties, which have 
been exaggerated by the Court’s (mis)interpretation of the relevant legislation. 
Accordingly, the issues that have been raised and examined in this Chapter intend 
to be resolved in the following Chapter; thereby reaching the primary purpose of 





















The ultimate purpose of this Chapter – and that of the PhD – is to provide the 
most suitable, practical and effective solutions to the Directive’s issues that have 
been identified in Chapter 2. It was imperative to explicitly detail all of the issues 
stemming from the Directive so as to prove that there is a real problem with the 
legislation; it would be futile to resolve problems that we as academics have 
created in theory or to only reveal potential problems foreseen by the Institutions. 
In conclusion of Chapter 2, it was substantively proved that the problems 
associated with the Directive are not artificial and judging by the length of the 
Chapter, neither are they limited.  
 The findings of Chapter 2 confirm that the Court exacerbated the issues, 
yet the primary cause stems from the Directive itself which is open to varieties of 
legitimate interpretation and, at times, misinterpretation, for example in respect of 
the Court’s requirement that Member States should have declared the collective 
agreements’ applicability in the implementing legislation.406 Accordingly, this 
thesis advocates amending the text of the Directive in order to close the loopholes 
and clarify the uncertainties. This Chapter, which presents three proposed 
solutions, will therefore begin with the favoured option: (i) amend the Directive, 
as amending the legislation grants the possibility to directly address the identified 
issues. However, alternative solutions should not be discounted at this stage, for 
example, significant developments have been undertaken in the political 
institutions of the Union since the Laval Triplet,407 culminating in the 
Commission’s proposed Enforcement Directive of 2012,408 which will be 
thoroughly reviewed and formulates the second proposed solution: (ii) adopt the 
Enforcement Directive. The final proposed solution entitled (iii) no changes to the 
Directive, details the significance of the legislative changes that have been made 
to the Union legal order since the Laval Triplet; Article 6 TEU substantially 
bolsters the significance of fundamental rights in the Union by granting legally 
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binding status to the Charter and vows to accede to the ECHR. This proposed 
solution therefore considers both the Court’s rulings in posted worker cases since 
the Laval Triplet and also judgments of the ECtHR in the context of collective 
action and bargaining in order to monitor how far the Lisbon Treaty and its impact 
has resolved the issues and accordingly whether amending the Directive is no 
longer necessitated. 
The format of this chapter uses those three broad solutions as the main 
headings and all of the associated solutions will be assessed therein. This Chapter 
is predominantly inspired by my own ideas and solutions, which will be 
interspersed by the suggested solutions from the European social partners – 
especially the ETUC, the EU Institutions – especially the Commission, the 
Parliament and an analysis of the Court’s potentially changing interpretation of 
the case law in light of the legislative changes. Finally, this Chapter includes a 
literature review that highlights where my own suggestions are either corroborated 
or challenged by the solutions offered in the academic doctrine. It is to be 
acknowledged from the outset that this Chapter has the luxury of being free from 
the practical constraints of being beholden to finding results for an EU Institution 
or delivering the answer that a client is looking for. Accordingly, the solutions 
presented in this Chapter will be bold and will have no alternative agenda other 
than to directly respond to the research results established in Chapter 2. 
 
II. Solution Number One: Amend the Directive 
 
It is suggested that the current text of the Directive is capable of producing 
satisfactory results in respect of the regulation it provides for posted workers. For 
example, the following areas are all already provided for: the right to undertake 
collective action;409 extending both the law and the collective agreements of the 
host State to posted workers;410 universally applicable collective agreements may 
be extended to posted workers and where there is no system for declaring 
universal applicability, there are other means of applying the collective 
agreements which the Directive has left open to the Member States;411 and more 
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favourable terms and conditions are available.412 Therefore, all of the solutions are 
already provided for in the text of the original Directive; yet there must be 
something fundamentally wrong as the Directive was interpreted so strictly by the 
Court, implicating that all of the Member States had transposed the Directive 
incorrectly. For the Court to change its interpretation now would require an 
inadvertent admission that its previous rulings were incorrect, which is very 
unlikely. Therefore, the text of the Directive has to be tightened to remove all of 
the uncertainties that led to the unfortunate rulings of the Laval Triplet, “current 
Community legislation has both loopholes and inconsistencies and therefore may 
have lent itself to interpretations of the PWD that were not the intention of the 
Community legislator, who was looking for a fair balance between the freedom to 
provide services and the protection of workers’ rights”.413   
Following the Laval Triplet there was a general consensus that change was 
necessary to improve this highly-criticised legislation, both at national level, as 
expressed by Ewing in the UK, “Politicians need to address the contradictions and 
stupidity of the Posted Workers’ Directive and recent European Court of Justice 
decisions”414 and also in the European Parliament, with the publication of the 
‘Andersson Report’, which called on the Commission to review the Directive, 
“[the review] should deal in particular with issues such as applicable working 
conditions, pay levels, the principle of equal treatment of workers in the context 
of free movement of services, respect for different labour models and the duration 
of posting”.415 The impetus and energy for change were present and attention 
therefore turned to the Commission for an answer, the Rapporteur for the 
Andersson Report stated, “It is now up to the European legislators to restore the 
balance between economic freedoms and social rights.”416 
This section on amending the Directive intends to directly respond to the 
main issues identified in Chapter 2, which can be summarised as follows: 
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(i) Legal basis of the Directive (Articles 53(1) and 62 TFEU);  
(ii) Defining the Directive’s scope (Article 1 Directive);  
(iii) Defining a posted worker (Article 2 Directive); 
(iv) Clarity of terms and conditions of employment (Article 3(1) Directive);   
(v) Minimum rate of pay (Article 3(1)(c) Directive); 
(vi) More favourable terms and conditions of employment (Article 3(7) 
Directive); 
(vii) Collective agreements and their applicability (Article 3(8) Directive); 
(viii) Collective action (paragraph 22 of the Preamble to the Directive); 
(ix) Public policy (Article 3(10) Directive); 
(x) Monitoring compliance with the Directive (Article 4 Directive). 
 
Those specific issues will form the structure of this section as they also follow the 
Article numbers of the Directive and as can be seen, the provision that requires 
the greatest clarification is Article 3 Directive. The format of this section will 
discuss each of the proposed amendments thoroughly in turn and then in the 
interim conclusion the finalised suggestions will be presented succinctly so that 
the amendments to the Directive, as proposed by this thesis, are absolutely clear.  
‘Solution Number One’ will therefore discover how solving the issues by 
directly amending the legislation may be realised. However, there is one question 
that needs to be asked prior to analysing how the Directive may best be amended; 
it needs to be considered whether a directive is the most suitable legislative 
instrument for meeting the objectives of this legislation. 
 
(i) Should the Directive become a Regulation? 
 
Following the Laval Triplet, José Manuel Barroso, the President of the European 
Commission, made a promise to the European Parliament to propose amending 
the Directive, “I have clearly stated my attachment to the respect of fundamental 
social rights and to the principle of free movement of workers. The interpretation 
and the implementation of the posted workers Directive falls short in both 
respects. That is why I commit to propose as soon as possible a Regulation to 
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resolve the problems that have arisen.”417 It is interesting that the Commission 
initially considered a regulation to solve the Directive, as Barroso said, “A 
Regulation has the advantage of giving much more legal certainty than the 
revision of the Directive itself, which would still leave too much room for 
diverging transposition, and take longer to produce real effects on the ground.”418 
There was clearly an urgency required in resolving this matter and therefore the 
general application of a regulation over a directive was appealing on the basis that 
it would be directly applicable with immediate effect.  
A prominent difference between regulations and directives is that the 
former can be invoked by private parties against other private parties as they have 
horizontal direct effect, whereas directives, formally at least, only have vertical 
direct effect. Accordingly, a regulation on posted workers could potentially be 
more damaging to trade unions, however, as discussed in Chapter 2 this argument 
against a regulation does not necessarily carry much weight as the Directive was 
relied on extensively in Laval, a private law case. Added to this, the recent case of 
Prigge419 has strongly indicated the horizontal power of directives.  
The legal certainty and immediacy of regulations do offer a much-needed 
alternative, however, despite these factors, there is also the danger that a 
regulation would provide absolutely no room for manoeuvre; it is argued that the 
national transposition available with directives is capable of maintaining the 
peculiarities of the national labour systems to a greater extent than a regulation 
which could threaten that flexibility by enforcing more definite, and potentially, 
more restrictive guidelines.  In accordance with Article 288 TFEU, regulations are 
binding in their entirety, whereas directives are binding as to the result to be 
achieved; the choice and form of methods of which is left to each Member State 
to determine. It is concluded that as the posting of workers requires a greater 
flexibility420 in terms of accepting the differing Member States’ labour systems, 
this will be more suited to a directive.  
In the end, a regulation was never seriously considered or mentioned again 
to resolve the Directive, indeed a revision of the Directive itself was also 
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considered by Barroso at this stage, “If we discover during the preparation of the 
Regulation that there are areas where we need to revisit the Directive itself, I will 
not hesitate to do so. And let me be clear: I am committed to fighting social 
dumping in Europe, whatever form it takes.”421 Thus, it was clearly an initial 
suggestion in the preliminary stages of assessing the most suitable solution. 
 
(ii) Legal Basis of the Directive  
 
This thesis emphatically urges an amendment to the legal basis of the Directive, to 
the extent that if I could only choose one change that could be made to the 
Directive, this would be it. It is submitted that unless the legal basis changes, 
nothing will change. The Court has unduly prioritised the freedom to provide 
services in the posted worker cases, but this could be due to the fact that it has 
scrupulously kept its interpretation in line with the only legal basis available; this 
thesis has presented a critical assessment of the Court, however, it must also be 
appreciated that the Court can only do so much – it cannot create an interpretation 
where there is no legislative support for that reasoning. Accordingly, if the legal 
basis of the Directive reflected a more balanced approach of both the economic 
and social policy objectives of the legislation, the Court would have a greater 
scope for a more balanced interpretation, “the choice of legal base would suggest 
that the posted workers Directive has been adopted with the aim of facilitating the 
cross-border provision of services, rather than as a measure of employee 
protection.”422 
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Paragraph 5 of the Preamble to the Directive sets out, “any such promotion 
of the transnational provision of services requires a climate of fair competition 
and measures guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers” thus, despite the fact 
that fair competition and workers’ rights are included, it could be read that their 
roles are merely subsidiary and they are only effective because they support the 
primary objective of the Directive: promoting the transnational provision of 
services. However, this thesis interprets paragraph 5 to mean that all three 
elements are needed in order to be achieved, as opposed to preferencing one over 
the others, yet, the Court has significantly preferenced service provision and it is 
submitted that this can be re-balanced by amending the legal basis, an amendment 
which has also been suggested in the academic literature, “it would be wise to 
broaden the legal base of the Posting Directive”.423 
The Directive’s current legal basis is Article 62 TFEU on services and 
Article 53(1) TFEU on establishment. This not only confirms the Directive as an 
instrument of the internal market, which does not aptly reflect all of its objectives, 
but it also ties the Directive to the freedom of establishment which indicates a 
certain level of permanence to these “temporary” workers. It is understandable 
that Article 62 TFEU on services constitutes part of the legal basis as that is one 
of the Directive’s main objectives, however, Article 53(1) TFEU on 
establishment, which refers to the pursuit of activities of self-employed persons, is 
not as obvious. Posted workers are not self-employed, by their nature they are 
employees subordinate to the home State undertaking. Therefore, perhaps the self-
employment factor refers to the undertaking itself, but this would indicate that in 
some sense that undertaking is a beneficiary of the freedom of establishment, 
however, there should be no such ‘establishment’ in the host State; the only party 
that crosses a border are the posted workers and neither should they in any sense 
establish themselves in the host State. The rules on establishment should not form 
part of the legal basis as it pertains too closely to the option of applying all of the 
host State’s rules which would eradicate the temporary nature of this unique 
category of worker. Arguably, the reason that Article 53(1) TFEU forms part of 
the legal basis is because it provides for the ordinary legislative procedure as the 
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means for adopting the Directive. However, it is hereby submitted that that is 
unnecessary as Article 62 TFEU already indicates this, “The provisions of 
Articles 51 to 54 shall apply to the matters covered by this Chapter.” Thereby, 
Article 62 TFEU brings Article 53(1) TFEU and the procedure for adopting the 
Directive within its scope without needing to make explicit reference to the 
chapter on establishment. To conclude, from the current legal basis Article 62 
TFEU on services should be maintained, whereas Article 53(1) TFEU on 
establishment should be removed. 
As aforementioned, the social policy provisions of the Treaty should be 
added to the Directive’s legal basis in order to grant a legitimate expression to 
these social rights, that also form part of the Directive’s objectives, so that they 
can be effectively relied on by the Court in practice, as opposed to only being 
granted theoretical support; it is all very well declaring equality, but ultimately, 
the legislation needs to prove it. The fact that the Directive does not have a legal 
footing on the social policy provisions of the Treaty was recognised as an issue 
from its earliest stages of development.424 The lack of social responsibility is most 
likely due to the time in which this Directive was adopted, “As an alternative the 
Social Chapter of the Treaty, for regulating with its accent on working conditions, 
did not offer a sound legal basis in 1996 (being of pre-Amsterdam era).”425 It is 
submitted that given the legislative changes that have occurred since the Lisbon 
Treaty,426 an inclusion of one of the Articles from the social policy chapter into 
the Directive’s legal basis would prove both timely and effective. 
Article 153 TFEU should become part of the Directive’s legal basis as it 
sets out to achieve the objectives of Article 151 TFEU which has been recognised 
as a “significant mechanism in the toolkit… a (sound) device that may be used to 
embed employment rights in EU Law.”427 Article 151 TFEU makes reference to 
the European Social Charter and the Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Social Rights of Workers and intends to promote social protection and dialogue 
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between management and labour whilst respecting the diverse forms of national 
practices. Article 153 TFEU provides the requisite detail to these objectives by 
specifying which areas of social policy come within the Union’s competence and 
it authorises the Union to adopt directives in this area. The inclusion of Article 
153 TFEU into the Directive’s legal basis should aptly bolster workers’ rights and 
re-balance the Directive’s objectives of attaining both economic and social 
values.428 
The ETUC also proposed that the legal basis should be amended to 
incorporate the social policy articles in the Treaty and it suggested that the stated 
aims of the Directive, in respect of the protection of workers as well as a climate 
of fair competition, should be included in the body of the Directive itself, not just 
in the Preamble. This latter suggestion is not necessarily an urgent measure as it is 
submitted that provided the legal basis changes to expressly support social 
policies, this should suffice. Also, this thesis aims for balance not for primacy 
over either the economic or social objectives of the Directive. Therefore, it must 
be borne in mind that the social policies should not be over-endorsed to the extent 
that the freedom to provide services loses its value. As opposed to reiterating the 
well-versed economic versus social paradigm, this thesis intends to show that 
these elements do not need to be continuously pitted against one another, but 
instead some form of balancing can be attained.  
Finally, in respect of amending the legal basis, it is necessary to consider 
incorporating Article 45 TFEU on the free movement of workers. It is well-
established that posted workers are unique and accordingly they do not fit neatly 
into one of the four categories of services: (i) active (service provider moves); (ii) 
passive (service recipient moves); (iii) corresponding (only the service moves); 
(iv) externally induced (both the service provider and recipient move).429 In the 
                                                 
428
 Notably, Article 153 TFEU has already been implemented as the legal basis for a number of 
directives, including: Council Directive 89/391/EEC on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, [1989] OJ L183/1; Directive 
2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning certain aspects of the 
organisation of working time, [2003] OJ L299/9; Directive 2008/104/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on temporary agency work, [2008] OJ L327/9. 
429
 Schroeder, Grundkurs Europarecht (Second Edition, 2011) Verlag C.H. Beck, 287. These four 
categories are prevalent in the Germanic legal tradition whereby, arguably, the academics’ voice is 
stronger in comprising the doctrine and where there is a great enthusiasm to categorise certain 
elements and group cases together, which is helpful initially but can also be restrictive, or even 
artificial, if the type of service does not easily fit into these boxes, as is the case with posted 
workers. 
 166 
case of postings the service provider remains in the home State and the service 
recipient remains in the host State during the posting, therefore, the service itself 
comprises the only cross-border movement. The difficulty is that this 
“corresponding” provision normally relates to examples such as the radio or the 
internet crossing the border, however, in this case it is the posted workers that 
constitute the service, which starkly opposes the ILO’s fundamental principle that 
labour is not a commodity.430 The seminal free movement case of Dassonville431 
revealed the opportunities presented by the internal market through parallel 
trading; buying goods more cheaply in one Member State and selling them on at a 
higher price in another. This is accepted as profiting from the economic market 
and maximising on the advantages of the EU. However, exploiting people in this 
way under the protection of ‘service provision’ destroys any attempt at a social 
market. The danger is that the workers themselves are not adequately protected as 
the current legal basis has the effect of only supporting the undertaking making 
the posting and as the posted workers are not able to rely on Article 45 TFEU they 
are merely marionettes playing their part as subject to the service provider. 
Therefore, if workers’ rights are truly going to be accounted for, Article 45 TFEU 
should be implemented into the legal basis.  
Prior to the Directive, and provided the workers were not “key personnel”, 
posted workers would have been covered by the free movement of workers, not 
services, “As a main rule [in the early 1960s] it was stipulated that all workers, 
whether permanently or temporarily moving to another Member State, were 
covered by the free movement of workers… an exception to the main rule was 
created for this ‘very specialised, technical or managerial key personnel’: they 
could be posted to another Member State under the freedom to provide 
services.”432 Accordingly, Article 45 TFEU was initially considered as 
formulating part of the legal basis, “Article [45 TFEU] (free movement of 
workers) was several times proposed as being the necessary legal basis for the 
instrument but the Commission always firmly rejected it. One reason for avoiding 
Article [45] was to reject also Article [115 TFEU] and thus keep the Directive 
under qualified majority voting (with the European Parliament in the co-decision 
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position), notwithstanding the British criticism.”433 The interest in passing the 
legislation seemed to overtake consideration of the most suitable legal basis. 
Article 46 TFEU stipulates that the ordinary legislative procedure is to apply to 
the issuing of directives and regulations on the free movement of workers thereby 
rendering this previous reasoning redundant. However, it is clear that Article 45 
TFEU has always been strongly associated with the posting of workers. 
 More recently, the European Parliament has suggested incorporating 
Article 45 TFEU into the legal basis. Point 8 of the Andersson Report434 
emphasised the need to safeguard and ensure equal treatment and equal pay for 
equal work in the same workplace as laid down in Articles 45 and 18 TFEU. 
Furthermore, Point 21 of the Andersson Report stated, “the limited legal basis of 
free movement of the PWD may lead to the PWD being interpreted as an express 
invitation to unfair competition concerning wages and working conditions; 
therefore considers that the legal basis of the PWD could be broadened to include 
a reference to the free movement of workers”.435 Article 45 TFEU would provide 
a greater scope for equality of treatment compared to Article 56 TFEU, “Under 
the free movement of workers [Article 45 TFEU] pay discrimination between 
nationals and non-nationals is not allowed. Migrant and domestic workers must be 
treated equally in their access to the labour market, wages and other working and 
employment conditions.”436 
 Article 45 TFEU is therefore an imperative element to the posting of 
workers, however, it needs to be considered whether posted workers already come 
within its scope. The definition of a worker has been established by the case law 
to entail “the pursuit of effective and genuine activities.”437 This is a very broad 
definition and Levin confirmed that it includes part-time workers and also work-
seekers. Trojani later added to this by establishing, “the existence of the 
constituent elements of any paid employment relationship, namely subordination 
and the payment of remuneration.”438 In light of this, posted workers do fall 
within this definition as their work is under the subordination of the service 
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provider, in return for payment and therefore constitutes an effective and genuine 
economic activity. Article 45 TFEU includes any form of gainful employment 
including service provision, as corroborated by Regulation No. 492/2011, “Such 
right should be enjoyed without discrimination by permanent, seasonal and 
frontier workers and by those who pursue their activities for the purpose of 
providing services.”439  
It could be argued that nothing need be done to the legal basis as there is 
already some scope for posted workers to invoke Article 45 TFEU, however, that 
would not be advisable for two reasons: (i) “Laval gives the Posting of Workers 
Directive a ‘pre-emptive’ effect, reading it, contrary to its own clearly expressed 
intent, as if it were a ceiling not a floor. The justification for doing this is that the 
Directive gives expression to Article [56 TFEU], and, therefore, protects above all 
the interests of service providers, rather than those of workers, either their own 
employees or those employed elsewhere.”440 Therefore, the scope for 
interpretation must be broadened;441 and (ii) as posted workers do not migrate to 
the host State but their deployment is temporary, the Court has interpreted this to 
infer that posted workers do not become part of the host State’s national labour 
market442 thereby exclusively falling within the scope of service provision as 
opposed to the free movement of workers. This thesis does not agree with the 
Court that access to the labour market is negated on the condition that the posted 
workers return to their home State following completion of the work – for the 
reason that during the period of posting the host State’s labour market will 
inevitably be disrupted; regardless of how long the workers will be present in the 
host State (and bearing in mind there is no time limit on what constitutes 
“temporary”) they do, for a finite period of time, access the labour market. 
Moreover, the Court has inadvertently expressed that posted workers may gain 
access to the host State’s labour market, “the posting of workers via temporary 
agencies, was explicitly mentioned by the ECJ in Rush Portuguesa as not falling 
under the freedom to provide services but under the free movement of workers. 
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Here, the ECJ drew the line where it can no longer be denied that the posted 
workers indeed have access to the labour market of the host country.”443 Due to 
the Court’s general take on the posted workers’ temporary deployment and for the 
sake of clarity, it cannot be assumed that Article 45 TFEU will be available and 
therefore needs to be added to the legal basis in order to boost worker protection.  
It is apparent that the posting of workers is not a typical services scenario, 
indeed if this was a provision of services in its truest sense it could be argued that 
the Directive is ultra vires as it obliges the service provider to comply with certain 
host State laws. Subsequently, it is somewhat hypocritical that these unique 
workers that are subject to the rules of the host State under Article 3(1) Directive 
can only rely on the protection of a service provider, which in effect only protects 
the employer. Therefore, it is argued that as the obligations of the legislation are 
unique, it follows that the protection available should also be unique so that the 
workers themselves may have an alternative Treaty provision to rely on, such as 
Article 45 TFEU.  
 
(iii) Defining the Directive’s Scope  
  
Article 1 Directive defines the Directive’s scope. However, it is as if the Directive 
has always suffered from an identity crisis; in the Commission’s first Proposal it 
stated that, “this is not a labour law instrument, but a proposal concerning 
international private law closely related to the freedom to provide services 
[emphasis added].”444 Yet, it regulates the movement of labour. Therefore, what is 
it? It is most likely that this somewhat unsettling statement intended to firmly 
place posted workers under the provision of services so as to divorce them from 
the concept of the free movement of workers, as opposed to substantively 
reshaping the very purpose of the Directive which is to govern the movement of 
temporary labour.  
Article 1(3) Directive provides that there are three settings in which 
workers may be posted: (i) a service provider posts workers to a service recipient 
in another Member State; (ii) a service provider posts workers to an undertaking 
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that it owns in another Member State; or (iii) a temporary employment 
undertaking or placement agency hires out workers to a user undertaking in 
another Member State. The key issue here is that the Directive does not 
adequately define how established an undertaking must be in the home State in 
order to qualify as a genuine service provider and the specification that in all three 
settings there must be an employment relationship between the undertaking 
making the posting and the posted worker is limited to it being only during the 
posting. What about the employment relationship on completion of the period of 
posting? There needs to be a firm guarantee that the posted workers will return to 
their home State, as so many of the service provider’s privileges hinge on this 
condition. These points of neglect are capable of leading to a misuse of the 
Directive.  
In tackling this issue, and avoiding potential abuses such as letter-box 
companies, the ETUC stated that what is needed is a clearer definition of a 
“posted worker” and “transnational provisions of services”.445 A greater clarity is 
certainly required from an amended Directive; the issue of a lack of clarity was 
recognised by the Council and the Parliament as early as the Directive’s first 
Proposal.446 The ETUC suggested that whereas before postings could take place in 
three contexts: (sub)contracting; intra-corporate transfers; and temporary agency 
work, the Directive must be revised to remove the option of intra-corporate 
transfers providing a platform for posting as it can too easily be used to create 
artificial corporate structures so as to circumvent all of the obligations of the host 
State and, in reality, it might not incorporate an actual provision of services. 
However, the ETUC added that the Directive would apply to such transfers where 
they do involve the provision of services. In my opinion, this introduces 
unnecessary ambiguity and could lead to misinterpretation. Rather than stating 
that the Directive only sometimes applies to intra-corporate transfers, it would be 
far more beneficial to provide greater clarity on what that transfer must constitute 
in order to qualify, for instance, it must involve a cross-border economic activity 
in which the service provider must be genuinely established in the home State and 
the subsidiary must undertake genuine economic activity in the host State.  
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These three different methods of posting have been transposed 
divergently, “The definitions of the three possible posting situations in Article 
1(3) are not transposed precisely in many Member States. This increases the 
chance of confusion between national and European definitions of posting... 
Therefore Member States should revise their national implementation legislation 
on this point.”447 However, as opposed to obliging the Member States to amend 
their legislation, the legislation itself should be revised to specify the importance 
that the service provider and recipient should be genuinely established in the 
home and host States respectively, thus, the posting of workers involves a genuine 
cross-border economic activity.  
As for guaranteeing that the posted workers return to work for the service 
provider in the home State on completion of the posting, whilst this is a necessity 
in terms of guaranteeing that they do not enter the host State’s labour market, the 
practical implementation of such an obligation would prove unfeasible for two 
reasons: (i) in the case of a placement agency under Article 1(3)(c) Directive the 
agency would have deployed the worker for that specific posting; and (ii) 
requiring the worker to return to the same undertaking would conflict with their 
freedom to choose an occupation and right to engage in work under Article 15 
Charter. Therefore, imposing a time limit on the period of posting would be the 
most suitable solution, as discussed below. 
 
(iv) Defining a Posted Worker 
 
Article 2 Directive does not define what a “limited period” constitutes and 
therefore the notion of ‘temporary’ can be exploited. “The PWD is based on the 
assumption that posted workers do not become part of the host country’s labour 
market. However, this assumption is increasingly becoming a fiction.”448 This 
thesis is in complete agreement with this opinion; the premise is that technically, 
as the work is temporary, the workers do not enter the host State’s labour market, 
but the disruption that has been seen in the labour markets in the posted worker 
cases denies this premise. This same issue can be seen in relation to GATS Mode 
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4 on posted workers who are also considered by the trade negotiators not to enter 
the local labour market as they are only temporarily in the host State and they 
themselves do not seek residency, however, “Immigration officials, on the other 
hand, argue that ‘temporary’ often extends to periods as long as three years and 
therefore, even if service providers do not seek to, they do in fact participate in the 
local labour market”.449 
The temporary nature of posted workers needs to be maintained as it is the 
very definition of “posted”, yet there also needs to be a more definite guarantee 
that the workers will leave the host State in order to complete the posting. As 
discussed above, it would be unfeasible to impose that posted workers return 
specifically to the service provider that posted them, on completion of the posting, 
therefore, stipulating a time frame on what constitutes a “limited period” is the 
most practical solution. Subsequently, the follow-up question is: how long is 
temporary? 
Houwerzijl suggested imposing a time limit in accordance with the social 
security Regulation, “It would have been better if the Posting Directive had 
referred – at least for the postings mentioned under (a) and (c) – to the time limit 
with regard to social security (in Regulation 1408/71 and – in the future – 
Regulation 883/2004).”450 Notably, in 2010, Regulation 883/2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems451 prolonged the period during which 
employees may remain subject to their home State’s social security system from 
twelve to twenty-four months. It is submitted that this time limit sets a precedent 
for workers to be in a host State and still affiliated to their home State’s social 
security system and accordingly should also be applied to the Directive to 
establish the period of time that constitutes a posting; it is necessary that the time 
period is not arbitrarily reached but the figure is grounded in reasoning, and in this 
case, it follows the reasoning of Regulation 883/2004. If a period of posting will 
take longer than twenty-four months to complete, then this period can be extended 
on the condition that the Commission is informed of the extended period. This 
requirement is inspired by the transitional period which dictates that limiting 
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accession States to the old Member States’ labour markets beyond the initial two 
year probationary period may be done, provided that the Commission is informed 
thereof. 
 
(v) Clarity of Terms and Conditions of Employment  
 
Article 3(1) Directive sets out the terms and conditions of employment that will 
be extended to posted workers, inevitably, these will greatly differ from State to 
State and within the relevant sectors, therefore, it is vital that these terms and 
conditions are made abundantly clear to the posted workers in an accessible 
format so as to improve worker protection and legal certainty, “Member States 
should translate their labour conditions, laid down in legislation and extended 
collective agreements, into an accessible package of conditions that corresponds 
with the conditions mentioned in Article 3(1).”452 The major condition of 
employment that has been a point of contention is the minimum rate of pay under 
Article 3(1)(c) Directive. This thesis advocates that the “minimum” provision 
should be likened to the 30 mile per hour limit on the roads; it is the limit, not the 
goal. 
 
(vi) Minimum Rate of Pay 
 
The Directive does not take into account the fact that not every Member State has 
a minimum rate of pay and for those that do, the form of minimum wage differs 
greatly from State to State; from being hourly, daily, weekly or even monthly.453 
It must be asked how much of a problem is this? In reality, most Member States 
do make provision for a statutory minimum wage454 or set out the minimum wage 
in universally applicable collective agreements.455 However, there are six Member 
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States in which there is no statutory minimum wage or minimum wage set out in 
universally applicable collective agreements, even on a sectoral basis,456 and 
therefore there is a heavy reliance on collective agreements to negotiate wage 
rates in those Member States. Accordingly, the differing methods of extending the 
minimum rate to posted workers must be broadened by the Directive. 
Article 3(1)(c) Directive has been interpreted by the Court as a maximum, 
as opposed to a minimum. The effect of this is that it aggravates social dumping, 
caused by undercutting the host State workers, leading to greater hostility and 
consequent collective action that could be avoided if there was a greater scope for 
equality. Lowering labour standards is a major problem of the Directive that can 
be seen most prevalently with the minimum rate of pay, “At a time when active 
steps are being taken to increase the money supply, it does not need an economist 
to contemplate the contradiction of a labour market policy geared to low 
standards. Nor – in current circumstances – does it need an economist to 
contemplate the stupidity of labour laws such as the EU’s Posted Workers’ 
Directive and the accompanying ECJ judgments, which remove more of the 
remaining fences in the galloping ‘race to the bottom’.”457  
 It is argued that equality must be the aim, thus, the notion created by the 
Court whereby anything more than the minimum rate of pay goes above and 
beyond what the Directive guarantees needs to be quashed. When the Directive 
was first reviewed in 2003 by the Commission it stated that the mandatory rules 
provided under Article 3(1) Directive, “constitute a nucleus of minimum 
protection for posted workers, while respecting the principle of equality of 
treatment between national and non-national providers of services… and between 
national and non-national workers.”458 Only a minimum is guaranteed by the 
legislation, but equality is also an aim of the Directive. Accordingly, it needs to be 
determined whether the minimum rate should be reinforced, or whether the 
Directive should be amended to cater for the going rate. 
The Andersson Report called on the Commission to consider “the need to 
safeguard and to strengthen equal treatment and equal pay for equal work in the 
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same workplace”.459 Therefore, the European Parliament clearly endorsed the 
going rate, however, arguably this pursuit of equality was somewhat diminished 
in the final Report as the Draft Anderson Report was even more bold and decisive 
in urging the Commission to consider, “a possibility in the Directive for Member 
States to refer in law or collective agreements to the ‘habitual wages’ applicable in 
the place of work in the host country as defined in the ILO 94 and not only 
‘minimum’ rates of pay.”460 The explicit reference to ‘habitual wages’ cannot be 
found in the final Report and the reason for the Parliament’s reluctance to include 
it is unclear. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the slight change in the 
Parliament’s proposal and lessening of its endorsement to uphold the ‘going rate’ 
is also reflected in this thesis. Following the Laval Triplet my opinion was that the 
Directive must be amended to incorporate the ‘going rate’ for a suitable solution. 
However, upon reading the reasoning of the ETUC’s suggestion of restoring the 
minimum character of the Directive, my opinion has changed and this thesis has 
been inspired by the ETUC’s proposed solution on this issue. 
The ETUC considered amending the Directive to guarantee the ‘prevailing 
rate of pay’ of the host State but, however decided against it as there may be 
uncertainty in respect of which pay rate represents the prevailing rate of pay in 
legally binding collective agreements. It is surprising that the ETUC; arguably, 
the entity most likely to insist on guaranteeing the ‘prevailing rate of pay’ in the 
Directive, has instead opted to reinforce the minimum character of the Directive. 
In an ideal world, this thesis supports the imposition of equal working conditions 
in the Directive,461 however, it is submitted that there are four very important and 
practical reasons why this would not be workable: (i) as recognised by the ETUC, 
the uncertainty of which wage is the prevailing rate of pay could lead to greater 
misinterpretation than guaranteeing the minimum rate and as uncertainty has been 
a major issue of the Directive the need to ensure clarity in respect of pay is a 
necessary step; (ii) the issue is not the ‘minimum’ character of the Directive, but 
that the Court has interpreted it as a ‘maximum’; (iii) the minimum wage has been 
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prescribed by the host State as a suitable wage to live on in that Member State. 
The greater issue is when service providers are able, in accordance with the 
Directive, to pay rates below the collectively agreed industry levels and wages are 
thus pushed below the minimum; and (iv) the opportunities of the internal market 
must be supported as an equally important objective of the Directive and this 
includes commercial opportunities available to service providers, such as 
benefiting from lower wage and employment conditions in the Union, this is after 
all one of the unique selling points of using posted workers. 
The ETUC proposed, “The legislator must state unequivocally the 
minimum character of Art 3.1 in its stated aims and objectives as well as by 
recognizing the autonomy of social partners to fight for, negotiate and agree 
higher levels of protection.”462 The ability to negotiate more favourable conditions 
should have the effect of depriving the Directive of its maximum character, 
therefore, this also incorporates the difficulties that have been encountered by 
Articles 3(7) and 3(10) Directive. In defining the applicable ‘rates of pay’ the 
ETUC clarified that allowances shall in principle not be considered as part of the 
wage and, when defining the rate of pay, as well as the national law and/or 
practice, it may also be defined by collective agreements, in order to bolster the 
significance of collective agreements which is imperative in those Member States 
where a statutory minimum wage does not exist.  
Reinforcing the minimum conditions as opposed to amending the 
Directive to provide the going rate is arguably the most pragmatic solution. The 
key distinction is altering the interpretation available to the Court so that it is clear 
that the minimum standards represent the limit, not the goal. In achieving this, the 
ETUC has simply suggested removing the word “minimum” from the list of hard 
core terms under Article 3(1) Directive. However, my concern is that the word 
may be removed but its legacy may not; the Directive was adopted seventeen 
years ago in 1996 and its minimum character has been enforced more and more 
over the years. Therefore, in the interests of greater clarity, this thesis submits that 
the Directive should prescribe “at least the minimum” which prohibits anything 
below the minimum and allows the minimum rate of pay where appropriate in the 
interests of encouraging service provision, whilst the use of “at least” should be a 
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constant and explicit reminder that the legislation encourages aiming for equality. 
Subsequently, the counterpart requisite to prescribing “at least the minimum” is 
ensuring the possibility of more favourable conditions so that the opportunity to 
improve the terms and conditions of employment beyond the minimum rate is 
guaranteed. 
The final amendment that must be made in this respect is ensuring that the 
conditions stipulated under Article 3(1) Directive apply to all workers from day 
one of the period of posting. The fact that this thesis has endorsed “at least the 
minimum rate of pay” as opposed to the going rate, is in itself some form of 
compromise, therefore, it must consequently be ensured that, just as the service 
provider has been granted this benefit, there must be equal protection for workers’ 
rights. Article 3(2-5) Directive makes provisions for derogating from Article 
3(1)(b) and (c) Directive where the length of the posting does not exceed, as an 
example, one month. However, this could be manipulated by rotating the posted 
workers every month, so to negate this possibility and in respect of the issues 
surrounding any such threshold,463 the Directive must insist that under no 
circumstances can there be an option, at any time, to exempt the host State’s 
mandatory terms and conditions of employment. 
 
(vii) More Favourable Terms and Conditions of Employment 
 
As described above, the Court has clarified that posted workers are not legible to 
more than the minimum rate of pay, yet, due to Article 3(7) Directive it is 
submitted that that was not the intention of the Directive as this provision 
indicates that the Directive encourages more favourable terms where possible.  
 Article 3(7) Directive states, “Paragraphs 1 to 6 shall not prevent 
application of terms and conditions of employment which are more favourable to 
workers.” Barnard stated, “While many commentators, together with Advocate 
General Bot in Rüffert, assumed this meant that the host state could impose higher 
standards, the ECJ disagreed.”464 Whilst this thesis is in agreement with AG Bot’s 
reading of the Directive on this point, other authors have argued that the Court’s 
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interpretation was not unexpected, “This stance could hardly come as a surprise. 
Quite apart from the drafting history, from a free movement of services 
perspective, host State freedom on this point could easily undermine the effective 
exercise of the freedom.”465 From my perspective, this adds further reason to 
change the legal basis so that the favourability provision may be more effective in 
practice. 
The case law established that this provision only refers to more favourable 
terms of the home State and can only apply if the posted workers already receive 
more favourable terms in their home State (bearing in mind that the home State 
employer continues to be responsible for paying the posted workers) or, if the 
home State employer voluntarily agrees to the more favourable terms in the host 
State. The Court’s interpretation of Article 3(7) Directive favours the service 
provider over and above the workers, however, it is submitted that this provision 
has the potential to fulfil the objective of enhanced worker protection, whilst 
having a spill-over effect of also supporting fair competition by encouraging more 
comparable work conditions between the posted and host State workers. 
Accordingly, the provision needs to be re-worded, as supported by the legal 
scholarship,466 so that the tone of the Directive encourages the service provider 
and recipient to aim high rather than entrenching labour standards at the very 
lowest. It is suggested that Article 3(7) Directive is amended to specify that the 
favourability provision applies to the terms and conditions of employment of the 
host State as well as the home State. Also, it needs to be added that the workers 
may undertake collective action to ensure this provision.  
It should be recognised by this stage that all of the suggested amendments 
build on from each other in order to create a well-functioning Directive that truly 
incorporates all elements of its objectives. For example, the terms and conditions 
of employment need to be set out more clearly by the Member States, in 
particular, the minimum rate of pay needs to be clarified as the limit, not the goal, 
this is to be supported by improving the applicability of the more favourable 
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conditions of employment, which can be laid down by statutory provisions or 
collective agreements. 
 
(viii) Collective Agreements and their Applicability 
 
The sub-heading above entitled, ‘Clarity of Terms and Conditions of 
Employment’ stipulated that the information on terms and conditions, with a focus 
on the minimum rate of pay, must be set out by all Member States in a clear and 
accessible format in order to improve worker protection and legal certainty. This 
is because the Directive provides a hardcore list of mandatory conditions to be 
extended to posted workers which is positive in theory, as it should improve fair 
competition by ensuring that the host State’s laws are respected, however, it is 
problematic in practice as the conditions do not exist in the same format in all 
Member States, for example, as aforementioned, not every Member State has a 
minimum rate of pay. As has been well-documented, Sweden does not have a 
statutory minimum rate of pay but relies heavily on the social partners through 
collective bargaining to agree on the rate of pay that will be laid down in a 
collective agreement. Unfortunately, the Court has made the application of 
collective agreements very restrictive and the emphasis that has been bestowed 
upon statutory minimum conditions undermines the self-regulated labour model, 
“Directive 96/71/EC… breaks with the tonic which seemed to be confirmed in the 
nineties as regards the ‘recognition’ of collective bargaining as a first rate means 
of regulating European work conditions”.467 Therefore, as well as improving the 
clarity and availability of the terms and conditions of employment, the Directive 
must be amended so that it is more accommodating of the differing methods by 
which this is accomplished.468 The Court can only work within the legal 
parameters that are available, therefore, in light of the differing national labour 
systems and the fact that the Directive is not intended to be a harmonising 
directive, the political institutions must show a greater recognition of the differing 
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forms of collective agreements that will apply to posted workers and not just the 
statutory terms and conditions.  
The applicability of collective agreements in the Directive has been an on-
going saga and it is necessary to contextualise this by briefly revisiting it history. 
From the Directive’s first Proposal in 1991 it was stipulated that collective 
agreements may only apply if they cover the whole of the occupation and industry 
concerned and have an erga omnes effect. In the co-decision procedure the 
Council recognised that this was an unduly steep requirement and suggested that 
collective agreements which apply generally should suffice. Therefore, in the 
1993 amended Proposal the provision of ‘erga omnes effect’ does not appear. 
Article 3(4) of the amended Proposal provides that collective agreements which 
are observed by all undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or 
industry concerned will apply, or in the absence thereof, those which have been 
declared generally applicable, “The expanded formula takes greater account of the 
diversity of collective bargaining systems within the Community, whilst moving 
further away from the paradigm case of the legally binding norm.”469 However, 
Article 4(3) of the amended Proposal added that if collective agreements which 
are deemed to be generally applicable have not been published, the foreign 
undertaking will not be bound by the collective agreement.  
Two further amendments were made, that appear in the final version of the 
Directive: (i) the ‘universally applicable’ requirement was added, which suggests 
that the legislator has manipulated the Council’s advice by removing the words 
‘erga omnes’ yet maintaining their effect; and (ii) Article 4(3) of the amended 
Proposal was removed so that generally applicable collective agreements do not 
need to be declared in the implementing legislation. As has been extensively 
discussed in Chapter 2, the Court wrongfully invoked this obsolete provision in 
reaching its decision in both Laval and Rüffert. 
Both Laval and Rüffert failed because the collective agreements in the 
cases were seen to have no legitimate expression. In Rüffert the collective 
agreement at stake had not been declared universally applicable and as there is a 
universally applicable collective agreement in the construction industry in 
Germany, the Court held that that must apply, despite the fact that the latter 
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agreement reserves the possibility of applying terms of employment that are more 
favourable to workers under other collective agreements. Therefore, the national 
law and practice would have authorised the collective agreement that was 
intended to apply to the construction site, but due to the Court’s narrow reading of 
the Directive, it was dismissed. The Member States cannot be expected to amend 
their national labour systems to suit this restrictive, and at times incorrect, 
interpretation of the secondary legislation; Article 3(8) Directive must be 
amended. 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the prioritised use of universally 
applicable agreements over any other type of collective agreement is not the most 
suitable approach for this Directive, “The problem lies in that, on one hand, large 
countries have problems in negotiating national agreements,470 and on the other, 
national or broadly-based usually govern relatively imprecise aspects, for instance 
structural details, while the Directive envisages the application of clauses on 
working days, overtime, work periods and rest, etc.”471 In view of this reasoning, 
the prominence granted to collective agreements that are universally applicable is 
not the perfect marriage in meeting the requirements of the Directive and so 
collective agreements that are simply generally applicable should be granted equal 
priority. Also, the erga omnes effect was omitted due to the Council’s advice in 
1992, therefore, it is high-time that the legislator genuinely acknowledged that 
advice.  
Where there is no system for declaring collective agreements to be of 
universal application, Article 3(8) Directive details that Member States may base 
themselves on collective agreements which are “generally applicable to all similar 
undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned, 
and/or collective agreements which have been concluded by the most 
representative employers’ and labour organizations at national level and which are 
applied throughout national territory” and this must be in line with the equal 
treatment principle. Several amendments need to be made to this provision: (i) 
arguably, this should have been interpreted to mean that de facto collective 
agreements are applicable, but this possibility was not considered by the Court, 
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therefore, it must be added to Article 3(8) Directive so that the instruction is 
unequivocal: both universally and generally applicable collective agreements shall 
be extended to posted workers; (ii) currently, collective agreements that are not 
universally applicable may only apply in the construction sector,472 arguably, this 
is due to the fact that, “The sector that most commonly uses posted workers is 
construction (25%)”.473 However, this has an unjustified limiting effect, “The 
political compromise to limit the obligatory part of the PWD to extend collective 
agreements in the construction sector (see the Annex to the PWD) cannot 
logically or legally be defended.”474 Therefore, this needs to be amended to 
incorporate all sectors in order to broaden the scope of applicability; (iii) in Laval, 
the Court determined that collective agreements which are not universally 
applicable need to have been declared in the transposing legislation, but Article 
4(3) of the amended Proposal was omitted from the final Directive, thus the 
Court’s inspiration for this interpretation of Article 3(8) Directive has no 
legislative support and so this point needs to be amended to clarify that the 
applicability of collective agreements is not contingent on their declaration in the 
transposing legislation; and (iv) the requirement that the agreement applies to all 
similar undertakings, indirectly has the effect of introducing a more ‘universal’ 
requirement and therefore needs to be amended to the ETUC’s insightful 
suggestion, “a majority of similar undertakings and/or similar workers in the 
geographical area and in the profession or (part of the) industry concerned”.475 
This introduces enough flexibility to achieve the applicability of de facto 
collective agreements. 
The ETUC suggested a number of amendments to Article 3(8) Directive 
under Proposal 5 entitled, “Respecting and safeguarding the plurality of industrial 
relations systems in the Member States” and it is suggested that the title itself 
should be included in the body of the Directive. The ETUC suggested that as 
generally applicable collective agreements can only be applied where the Member 
State does not have a system for declaring collective agreements universally 
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applicable, this can lead to problems in Member States which rely on both types 
of agreement, such as Germany and Italy. So, to resolve this, the ETUC 
recommended removing the condition in which there is no system for declaring 
collective agreements universally applicable so that Member States can apply the 
universally applicable or generally applicable ‘de facto’ collective agreements. 
This thesis supports this recommendation as it shows a true reflection of the 
workings of the Member States’ labour systems, as opposed to imposing a rigid 
structure and obliging all of the Member States to substantially adapt their own 
systems. Also, the amended text should specify that collective agreements made 
applicable by public procurement law should be accepted, this ETUC suggestion 
supports the differing methods by which collective agreements become applicable 
and therefore is a welcome amendment.  
In the Andersson Report the European Parliament also advocated that the 
provision on collective agreements in the Directive must be amended. Arguably, 
the Draft Report was far more decisive in offering positive solutions as it called 
on the Commission to review the Directive and consider “the recognition of a 
wider range of methods of organizing labour markets than those currently covered 
by Article 3(8)”,476 whereas the finalised Andersson Report only called for 
“respect for different labour models”.477 These can be understood to have the 
same teleological interpretation, but it is submitted that the literal interpretation of 
the two can be read differently by the Court; indeed, the Court may well profess 
that in Laval it did show respect for the differing labour models yet did not have 
the legitimate expression at its disposal to implement a collective agreement that 
had not been declared as being applicable in the implementing legislation. In the 
finalised Andersson Report, the Parliament was clearly inciting the Commission 
to show a greater respect for the differing labour models, however, the Draft 
Report encouraged consideration of those beyond the limitations of Article 3(8) 
Directive by using more direct guidance in doing so and it is this definite and 
certain language that is needed when the issue stems from misinterpretations. 
 Finally, the academic literature has also advised amending Article 3(8) 
Directive. Kilpatrick initially opined that the solution to this “regulatory 
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conundrum” could be to fully embrace the Court’s “new approach” adopted in the 
Laval Triplet, “It might appear to EU lawyers that there is a straightforward way 
of resolving the conundrum: simply to dispense with collective standard-setting 
for posted workers, given its chilling effect on cross-border provision of services.” 
However, after momentary consideration, Kilpatrick swiftly concluded “that this 
is profoundly impractical and undesirable, on a number of grounds.”478 Kilpatrick 
set out four reasons that substantiate why collective standard-setting cannot be 
entirely ousted by statutory standards:  
 
(1) Practical reasons: “Collective bargaining is quite simply an unavoidable 
fact of working-life regulation in the Member States of the European 
Union… over 60 per cent of workers in the European Union are covered 
by collective bargaining”;479 
(2) Democratic reasons: “Collective bargaining promotes workplace 
democracy by giving workers a voice and this in turn acts as an important 
bridge or ‘school’ for broader democratic participation.”;480 
(3) Compliance with international human rights’ obligations: “Article 11 
[ECHR] provides that everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
association, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of their interests. In two recent decisions… [the ECtHR found 
for the first time] that the right to bargain collectively with the employer 
has, in principle, become one of the essential elements of the ‘right to form 
and join trade unions’ protected by Art. 11.481 Decisions by the EU 
institutions which impact upon collective bargaining and action must be 
taken in compliance with these international human rights’ 
obligations.”;482 
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(4) Internal EU constitutional reasons: “In its development the European 
Union has expressly and increasingly given constitutional support in three 
different ways to the specially strong tradition of collective bargaining 
within its constituent states: through development of a social dimension to 
balance its project of economic liberalisation; through development of a 
distinctive EU social dialogue to mirror at EU level the traditions of social 
partnerships in its constituent states; and through respecting as a 
fundamental right both the existence and the diversity of collective 
bargaining in the Member States.”483 
 
This thesis corroborates all of the arguments set out above; collective bargaining 
is not only a key aspect to the Member States’ individual labour systems but is 
also a key component to the overall direction and values reflected in the EU. 
However, Kilpatrick then went on to consider moving whole-heartedly in this 
direction by implementing that collective bargaining should become the “primary 
locus of a regulatory solution.”484 It is suggested that this route would not be a 
sensible option as it would ultimately only result in marginalising Member States 
that do rely on statutory standard setting and this thesis aims to avoid an either/or 
approach. It is submitted that a greater acceptance and respect for the plurality of 
industrial relations systems in the Member States can be achieved by amending 
the Directive to broaden the scope of applying collective agreements. 
 
(ix) Collective Action  
 
Paragraph 22 of the Preamble to the Directive states, “this Directive is without 
prejudice to the law of the Member States concerning collective action to defend 
the interests of trades and professions”. This sentiment does not appear in the text 
of the Directive; only in the Preamble, and given its importance to enforce the 
application of collective agreements, it needs to be specified in the text that posted 
workers may undertake collective action to ensure all of the provisions that they 
are entitled to are guaranteed, especially the more favourable conditions, so as to 
boost worker protection and equality. However, as well as promoting this 




 Ibid., 863. 
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message, should more be done? How far should collective action be protected, 
especially when considering its special place in accordance with Article 153(5) 
TFEU? 
The ETUC has instructed the European legislator to safeguard the 
autonomy of the social partners by introducing the ‘Monti Clause’485 into the 
Directive: 
 
“This Directive may not be interpreted as affecting in any way the exercise 
of fundamental rights as recognised in Member States and in international 
treaties, including the right or freedom to strike and the right to collective 
bargaining. These rights may also include the right or freedom to take other 
actions covered by the specific industrial relations systems in Member 
States.”486 
 
This provision does not regulate the right to strike but expresses its special place 
within EU law, which is ultimately a necessary element that is missing from the 
current Directive, especially in light of Article 153(5) TFEU which excludes the 
right of association and the right to strike from the Union’s competence. However, 
this provision is not an easy or uncomplicated solution, as collective bargaining 
and collective action appear to fall within the shared competence of the Union and 
the Member States, in accordance with Articles 152 and 153(1)(f) TFEU 
respectively. Therefore, excluding collective bargaining and other forms of 
collective action would be a very progressive gesture that may ultimately cause 
unintended results. Also, the Monti Clause originates in Article 2 Monti I 
Regulation on the functioning of the internal market in relation to the free 
movement of goods among the Member States. Thus, it is based on the free 
movement of goods; not workers or services, and it does not focus on industrial 
action, further, the free movement of goods is still free from horizontal direct 
effect, unlike the free movement of workers and services. Therefore, the Monti 
Clause may not be of great assistance to draw upon in this context, as 
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transplanting a Clause from a Regulation on goods to a Directive based on 
services, is not the most obvious or coherent solution. 
In conclusion, to exclude collective bargaining and action from the reach 
of the Directive, specifically in this context, may lead to an unbalanced approach 
in favour of social policies thereby allowing more restrictions to service provision. 
To be clear, this thesis acknowledges the undue priority that has been granted to 
service provision in this context, but cannot accept that the solution is to entirely 
remove one element from the equation and state that it has become ‘untouchable’. 
Therefore, I am unconvinced by this suggested solution as extracting collective 
bargaining and action from a Directive that will inevitably encounter industrial 
action as the predominant obstacle to its equally important objective of service 
provision goes a step too far. 
The ETUC has also suggested adding the Monti Clause to the primary law, 
“to amend the Treaty in order to introduce a clause that would exclude the right to 
strike from its scope of application – the so-called ‘social progress clause’.”487 
This Clause would immunise the right to strike from internal market rules. 
Considering that the Lisbon Treaty, an amending Treaty, had only recently come 
into force, it is submitted that a Treaty amendment at this stage was a highly 
unlikely proposition. Also, it is submitted that even in the long-term such a 
proposition is unlikely as the Court has maintained that Article 56 TFEU would 
be deprived of some of its effectiveness if private actors were permitted to act in a 
way that obstructed service provision.488  
This thesis accepts that the right to strike cannot be absolutely immune 
from the laws of the internal market and equally, it is highly unlikely that the 
Treaty will be amended to provide for such a predicament – it is not a realistic 
proposition. Ultimately, this thesis emphatically advocates that there cannot be a 
‘one-or-the-other’ solution between the internal market and social rights – such a 
proposal is unfeasible and naïve. What is really needed is the compatibility of 
both elements and accordingly a greater acceptance of the differing labour 
systems and equally the economic opportunities of the market; to pit one against 
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the other, in whichever direction, would only result in a cyclical occurrence of the 
same fundamental issue whereby the economic and social principles are 
continuously at loggerheads. Therefore, to truly develop and move forward there 
absolutely has to be an appreciation of what both sides can, and do, offer. 
Furthermore, it is a very draconian response to amend the Treaty in the way 
suggested by the ETUC and it is opined that it is no longer necessitated; if reform 
had been implemented immediately after the Laval Triplet then, from a subjective 
point of view, that reform should have been substantial: tweaking the Directive 
and reinstating what is already there would have proved futile. However, since the 
Laval Triplet EU law has moved on and developed, particularly in the context of 
fundamental rights and social considerations. Therefore, amending the Treaty at 
this stage is both unnecessary and unrealistic. However, amending the Directive 
itself to tip the balance towards greater social protection is imperative. 
 
(x) Public Policy 
 
One of the most influential ways that the Directive can support social protection is 
via Article 3(10) Directive, which has two elements: (i) the Directive will not 
preclude the application of terms and conditions of employment outside Article 
3(1) Directive in the case of public policy provisions; and (ii) the Directive will 
not preclude the application of collective agreements beyond the construction 
sector. The second element has already been dealt with above within the sub-
heading, ‘Collective Agreements and their Applicability’, therefore, this section 
will concentrate on the first element. Unfortunately, the Court has effectively 
“neutered”489 this provision490 so that unless the public policy objective is 
tantamount to preventing child labour, only then will it be genuinely considered as 
a potential justification for restricting the economic freedoms; this provision must 
be more encompassing and consequently more realistic. 
The public policy ground is corroborated by Article 52 TFEU which sets 
out the Treaty derogation. The derogation in the primary law is available whether 
the restriction is distinctly or indistinctly applicable, thereby guaranteeing an ever-
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present justification. As promised in Chapter 1 Part 2, aside from specifically 
providing solutions to the Directive, a sub-aim of this thesis is to provide an 
intellectual, valid and robust justification to protecting national interests in the 
context of posted workers. The national interests have predominantly been voiced 
in the form of collective action that has opposed unequal conditions, a threat to 
the employment of host State workers and disruption to the host State’s labour 
market.  
Public interest objectives reflect the political, cultural and moral choices of 
the host State and the Court has recognised that public policies will vary from one 
Member State to another and from one era to another, hence, competent national 
authorities must be allowed a margin of discretion, within the limits imposed by 
the Treaty.491 The importance of public policies therefore should not be 
underestimated as they have gradually evolved to become a part of the general 
acquis communautaire, “all the public policies that have been accepted by the 
Court, in the course of the years, as justifying the creation or preservation of 
Member State obstacles to trade or mobility (they form a long and open-ended 
list) may, by logical extension, also form an aim of internal market 
harmonisation.”492 Nevertheless, their validity is truly tested in practice and the 
Court has taken a very firm approach, “the Court has ruled that the concept of 
public policy must be interpreted strictly and should not be determined 
unilaterally by each Member State.”493 The public policy justification must be 
reasoned on overriding general interest grounds that presupposes the existence of 
a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of society.494 
Consequently, the host State’s national laws that fall outside of Article 3(1) 
Directive, and were not intended to be extended to posted workers, are 
automatically viewed as a restriction to trade and are very much subordinate to the 
primacy of Article 56 TFEU. However, as those national laws reflect the public 
interest objectives of the Member State that they were created to protect and 
represent, they are of fundamental importance and Article 3(10) Directive needs 
to be bolstered so that it is capable of sufficiently protecting the host State’s 
national laws. 
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It is submitted that the way in which an argument is made will be 
influential on how it is received by the Court, “rhetorical reordering does 
influence the reasoning process, both in public debate and in judicial 
proceedings.”495 Therefore, in spite of the evolution of social rights in the Union 
legal order, “it is asserted that the Court’s machinery operates on the basis of 
economic programming. In other words, claims are more likely to be successful if 
framed through the economic semantic.”496 It is necessary to structure the public 
policy argument in favour of the objectives of the internal market, but equally, the 
justification should not be dressed up as something that it is not. The disruption to 
the host State’s labour market is not caused by posted workers themselves, but by 
the application and interpretation of the Directive497 and this disruption is a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interests of the society 
in which the posting takes place and the legislator must recognise this issue before 
a solution can be reached. 
László Andor, the Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion, gave a speech at the Conference on ‘Posting of Workers and Labour 
Rights’.498 A criticism of Andor’s speech would be his lack of judgement 
concerning one of the causes that triggered this problem area, “The phenomenon 
is much more widespread and the problems it raises are far from new. And they 
are not necessarily linked to recent enlargements of the Union. The large case-law 
on posting dating back to the 1990s makes that clear.” This is a very one-
dimensional view presented by the Commissioner; saying that the issues are not 
linked to the recent enlargements is simply not true – the issues originated in the 
early case law because of EU enlargement at the time and the disparities that it 
highlighted – Rush Portuguesa499 is the seminal case on posted workers in which 
Portuguese workers were posted to France and the Director of the Office national 
d’immigration in France attempted to impose additional conditions on the 
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Portuguese workforce due to the fact that Portugal had only just acceded to the 
EU in 1986 and the French Government feared an influx of cheaper labour 
coming from Portugal. The most prevalent posting cases concerned posted 
workers specifically from new accession States, “It should be remembered that 
Rush Portuguesa as well as Viking, Laval and Rüffert, all concerned EU citizens, 
but at a time when their individual right of free movement were suspended by 
virtue of a transitional period.”500 Accordingly, European enlargement exacerbates 
the issues of the Directive as posted workers bring their own wage and labour 
conditions with them and along with this the threat of social dumping and 
lowering employment conditions. Therefore, to purport that the issues are not 
necessarily linked to recent enlargements of the Union creates a false impression 
of why the Directive was called for in the very beginning; to create a climate of 
fair competition and therefore avoid undercutting the host State due to differing 
labour standards across the Union.  
However, it is also important to recognise, in order to appreciate the whole 
picture, that these differing labour standards are the very reason that make posted 
workers so attractive to contractors as they present a commercial advantage that is 
not available in the host State, which in turn presents greater opportunities to 
service providers and the functioning of the internal market. Therefore, in finding 
a solution to the Directive, there is something to be said for ‘unequal conditions’. 
The commercial gain and ability to fill skills shortages in Member States are the 
‘Unique Selling Points’ of posted workers, thus, wage differences highlight the 
importance, and need, of posting. Nevertheless, this thesis maintains that equality 
should be the aim in order to fulfil the well-established principle that the internal 
market should not aspire to low standards.  
 The Commission’s Communication provides the following guidance on 
implementing public policy objectives, “the concept of ‘public policy provisions’ 
referred to in Article 3(10) covers provisions concerning fundamental rights and 
freedoms as laid down by the law of the Member State concerned and/or by 
international law, such as freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
prohibition of forced labour, the principle of non-discrimination and elimination 
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of exploitative forms of child labour,501 data protection and the right to 
privacy.”502 Therefore, the freedom of association and collective bargaining have 
been identified by the Commission as coming within Article 3(10) Directive, as 
corroborated by the ILO Convention. Combined with the fact that, in Laval, AG 
Mengozzi included “the fight against social dumping”503 as a legitimate public 
interest objective and the Court stated that “the right to take collective action for 
the protection of the workers of the host State against possible social dumping 
may constitute an overriding reason of public interest within the meaning of the 
case-law of the Court”.504 The impetus is there, but it is still very sensitive ground 
as this potential justification can so easily be written-off as being disproportionate. 
If the posted workers had undertaken collective action in Laval to demand the 
more favourable terms, the result may have been different as that would have been 
a more outward representation of worker protection, but as it came from the host 
State workers it could be seen as pertaining to national protectionism. The Court 
must recognise that undertaking collective action against social dumping is not a 
form of protectionism and this can be achieved by the Commission 
acknowledging the reality of the cause of the issues presented by the Directive 
and amending the legislation accordingly.  
The protection of workers, which is an objective of the Directive, is a 
well-established overriding reason of public interest capable of restricting service 
provision, as evidenced by the case law.505 This is such a highly-important 
objective that it provides some scope to include other public interest objectives by 
proxy. In Wolff & Müller506 the Court did not preclude the national law which 
provides that the service recipient is liable as guarantor as it was recognised that 
the minimum rate of pay guaranteed to posted workers constitutes a feature of 
worker protection, thus, procedural arrangements must ensure the observance of 
that right. The objective of implementing liability as guarantor in the national law 
was specified as follows, “the explanatory memorandum to the legislation states 
that the objective of liability as guarantor is to make it more difficult to award 
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contracts to subcontractors from so-called cheap-wage countries so as thereby to 
revive the German labour market in the construction sector, protect the economic 
existence of small and medium-sized establishments in Germany and combat 
unemployment in Germany.”507 This suggests that the potential scope for a public 
policy justification could extend to combating unemployment and thereby 
protecting the labour market. However, before getting too enthusiastic about this 
ruling, it is important to bear in mind that the protection of workers is a well-
established public interest objective by the Court, but the protection of the 
domestic labour market is not. In Wolff & Müller, the Court did not state that the 
protection of the domestic labour market is now recognised as a valid justification 
for restricting the provision of services, but if liability as guarantor robustly 
protects workers and an ancillary objective of liability as guarantor is to protect 
the domestic market, the Court will seemingly be more lenient to the spill-over 
effect of the national measure. The only difficulty with this solution is that the 
protection of the labour market and combating unemployment as justifications to 
the restriction of trade may only be activated where there is a well-established 
public policy objective at stake; such as the protection of workers. 
 Another objective of the Directive is the prevention of unfair competition, 
which was also protected as a corollary of worker protection in Wolff & Müller by 
guaranteeing the minimum wage, “Inasmuch as one of the objectives pursued by 
the national legislature is to prevent unfair competition on the part of undertakings 
paying their workers at a rate less than the minimum rate of pay… such an 
objective may be taken into consideration as an overriding requirement capable of 
justifying a restriction on freedom to provide services”.508 It is interesting to 
consider how far this principle can be stretched. For example, can it extend to 
preventing unfair competition on the part of undertakings paying their workers 
less than the ‘going rate’? The answer to this is simple – not unless the going rate 
is provided for in the legislation.  
 In conclusion, the protection of the domestic labour market against social 
dumping in an enlarging Union is unlikely ever to become a genuine public policy 
justification for three reasons: (i) it is not a constant provision such as the 
protection of workers but relates to fluctuations in the labour market; (ii) 
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protection of the domestic market is too obviously compatible with national 
protectionism which has no place in the internal market; and (iii) it has been 
established by the case law509 that economic grounds, such as considerations 
linked to the employment market, cannot be relied upon to justify a restriction on 
the freedom to provide services. 
However, there may be an additional avenue by which public policy 
objectives can be incorporated into the context of posted workers. There is 
currently no provision for public procurement in the Directive which is 
unfortunate as it can be used to implement social requirements into the contract, 
“The conditions governing the performance of a contract may, in particular, 
concern social and environmental considerations.”510 That is why it is of particular 
concern that the Court did not make any mention of public procurement in 
Rüffert,511 despite it being one of the main features of the case, “The fact that it is 
an important issue of public policy to give special protection to workers on public 
procurement, which is internationally accepted in the International Labour 
Organisation and also at EU level in the legal framework of public procurement, 
has completely escaped the Court.”512 As there is no reference to the public 
procurement Directives in the Directive,513 as seen in Rüffert, any additional 
requirements will not be allowed as they are not part of the mandatory rules laid 
down in the Directive. The interface between the posting of workers and public 
procurement needs to be rectified,514 in order to confirm the connection between 
social clauses as provided for in public procurement contracts and the Directive, 
this thesis proposes making a direct reference to the public procurement 
Directives515 under Article 3(10) Directive.  
In Chapter 2, the possibility of including local hiring clauses (particularly 
at times of recession when local unemployment is at its highest) in public 
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procurement contracts was, in general, concluded as being incompatible with 
Union law because of its discriminatory effect. However, if argued carefully, there 
is room for social requirements in public procurement that are not limited to local 
labour, such as using ‘long-term unemployed’ workers. This has been a 
possibility since 1988, as created by the case law, “the condition relating to the 
employment of long-term unemployed persons is compatible with the [public 
procurement] directive if it has no direct or indirect discriminatory effect on 
tenderers from other Member States of the Community.”516 Barnard advocated517 
the more balanced stance taken in Commission v Germany (occupational 
pensions) between economic and social interests. The case showed mileage in 
terms of public procurement influencing which workers may be selected for the 
relevant work, “Nor can application of the procurement procedures preclude the 
call for tenders from imposing upon interested tenderers conditions reflecting the 
interests of the workers concerned.”518 Using this to the host State workers’ 
advantage, whilst remaining in-keeping with EU law, would obviously take a 
confident and creative argument. Such an argument does not come easily or 
naturally as it attempts to harmonise two polarised policies, yet the case law, from 
Beentjes in 1988 to Commission v Germany in 2010, has certainly showed 
moments of promise, “Essentially, the Court's argument is that the [public 
procurement] Directives apply as a result of the fact that it is possible to 
accommodate the various social objectives of the national scheme with the 
Directives.”519 
To build on this promise, the use of SMEs (small and medium enterprises) 
has the potential to take a greater role in public procurement and hiring local 
workers. For example, if there is a large building project, such as a bridge in the 
United Kingdom, that project will most likely need to employ a large company in 
order to fulfil the task, however, there will be smaller jobs, such as the use of 
electricians, and these subcontracts may be awarded to local SMEs. It makes 
greater commercial sense to employ local workers who do not have the ‘hidden 
costs’ associated with posted workers, such as travel and accommodation. The use 
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of local workers cannot be solely justified by ‘greater commercial sense’ as that 
would pertain to a purely economic reasoning, which is not accepted as a public 
interest objective by the Court. However, the Communication from the 
Commission that sets out the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth, repeatedly endorses the use of SMEs.520 Accordingly, by 
adopting the language and aims of the Commission as one of its social 
considerations to encourage the involvement of SMEs, there will be a greater 
scope to make use of SMEs in the procurement process and therefore potential to 
incorporate use of local companies and consequently local labour. The 
justification for such action can rely on the Commission’s Communication, 
thereby meeting the interests of both the Union and the national labour market. 
The public policy justification that this thesis has promised therefore needs 
to be a sophisticated and tactful argument that carefully selects its objective in 
order to truly reflect the reality and also consider how this will be read by the 
Court. The most viable justification is likely to be on the basis of avoiding social 
tensions that are caused by the market. Surely, the Court cannot rule that “social 
tensions” comprise an “economic aim”. The most prominent social tension is 
demonstrated by the timeless issue of social dumping; from the Directive’s origins 
to future cases in which there will no doubt always be an availability of cheaper 
labour from elsewhere, this is the crux of the matter. Preventing social tensions is 
also in line with the ETUC’s suggestion of adding ‘social policy provisions’ to the 
concept of public policy. The ETUC suggested that the social and public policy 
provisions should include “provisions which are appropriate to the attainment of 
the protection of workers, equal treatment, the prevention of social dumping, or 
fair competition”.521 
This thesis has endorsed that “at least the minimum rate of pay” is 
extended to posted workers in favour of the service provider, as well as 
recommending that the favourability provision is bolstered and ensured by 
respecting the fundamental right to undertake collective action in favour of 
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granting higher labour standards for the protection of workers’ rights and 
therefore the final objective of ensuring fair competition must be met by 
guaranteeing that the host State can apply conditions to posted workers that it has 
identified as fulfilling public interest objectives. 
 
(xi) Monitoring Compliance with the Directive 
 
Article 4 Directive provides for cooperation on information and Article 5 
Directive provides for measures to be taken in the event of failure to comply with 
the Directive, which have been interpreted stringently by the Court to the extent 
that reasonable measures are ruled as being disproportionate in meeting their 
objectives. This unduly diminishes respect for the Directive’s objectives, 
particularly the protection of workers. 
It is intended that a combination of all of the amendments outlined above 
should contribute to boosting the cooperation on information and as for the most 
effective measures, the ETUC’s final proposal entitled, “Securing effective 
enforcement” is one of the most substantive. The ETUC suggested amending 
Article 5 Directive to include sanctions that are both effective and dissuasive and 
the ETUC has proposed a joint and several liability system for the recovery of 
pay, damages and fines, which it specifies is imperative in light of the increasing 
use of subcontracting across the Union, “By creating extremely complex networks 
of subcontractors, main contractors can create easy ways to circumvent legal or 
collectively agreed labour standards and working conditions.”522 Article 5 
Directive currently does not include any concrete measures in the event of failure 
to comply with the Directive, “This is definitely a lost opportunity: at least the 
responsibility – or better still liability – of the service provider and the receiver of 
the service for the payment of wages and other employment conditions of the 
posted workers should have been included.”523 As the application of joint and 
several liability has already been accepted by the Court de facto by Article 5 
Directive in Wolff & Müller,524 it is suggested that a provision on joint and several 
liability should be included into the text of Article 5 Directive. The ETUC has 
                                                 
522
 Ibid., Proposal 8, 43.  
523
 Houwerzijl, ‘The Posting of Workers Directive: About the Background, Content and 
Implementation of Directive 96/71/EC’, op. cit., 386.  
524
 Wolff & Müller, op. cit.  
 198 
also proposed adding a new section to Article 5 Directive which entitles the host 
State to require a copy of the E101 form, the employment contract, timesheets, 
payslips, health and safety risk assessment, a representative of the service 
provider present on the territory of the host State and where the worker is a third 
country national, copies of the work and residence permits. Further to this, the 
host State can require that these documents are available without delay during the 
period of posting and the host State can require a prior notification of posting. 
Finally, the ETUC has suggested the use of ‘designated representatives’ in order 
to sufficiently facilitate complaints. 
It is clear that if all of these conditions were made applicable the chance of 
a fraudulent use of the Directive would be virtually extinguished, however, it can 
also be argued that the administrative and financial burden that so many 
requirements would impose on the service provider would also virtually 
extinguish any service provider from wanting to post their workers! Furthermore, 
“SMEs and micro-businesses are especially affected by administrative 
requirements”,525 therefore, it is these smaller businesses that would be most ‘hard 
hit’ by the ETUC’s proposed requirements which would in turn negatively affect 
the employment opportunities of workers in the Union. Of course, the Directive 
needs to be amended to increase the protection of workers, however, it would 
appear that the ETUC has included every single possible obligation on a service 
provider that is available. Much of the documents listed above have been the 
cause of potential obstacles to service provision in the case law and although the 
intention is that the documents are made available for inspection so as to ensure 
compliance with the Directive and therefore guaranteeing worker protection, in 
general, the Court has ruled that such requirements restrict Article 56 TFEU. 
However, this was not always the case; in Commission v Germany526 the 
obligation on the service provider to translate into German the documents that 
were to be kept on site during the posting, including the employment contract, pay 
slips, time sheets and proof of payment of wages, was held as being justified in 
accordance with Article 4 Directive on the ‘Cooperation on information’ and as 
the documents were relatively short they did not impose a disproportionate 
financial or administrative burden on the service provider in order to achieve the 
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objective of the social protection of workers and the monitoring of that protection. 
This suggests that the ETUC’s proposal is somewhat superfluous, but it must be 
appreciated, if the ETUC does not propose such obligations on the service 
provider, then who will? The ETUC should be the body that workers can rely on 
in order to continuously campaign for their protection. 
It is apparent that the ETUC has suggested as much as it can without 
proposing an entirely new directive which suggests that the ETUC approves of the 
Directive’s original objectives but not its execution. This thesis recognises that 
change is necessary, which is in stark contradiction to the other European social 
partner BusinessEurope, that has expressed the Directive does not need amending, 
“Employers do not agree with the trade unions that the Posting of Workers 
Directive should be revised.”527 However, some of the amendments suggested by 
the ETUC do go too far.  
In order to achieve a true social market economy, what is needed is a 
greater balancing of all of the Directive’s objectives and not a pendulum approach 
that will only ever be capable of appeasing one side at a time. Accordingly, this 
thesis suggests that the four documents approved in Commission v Germany, as 
set out above, should be provided by the service provider, as they have already 
been accepted by the Court as being justified. This needs to be included in a non-
exhaustive list under Article 4 Directive to avoid the Court being too limiting in 
its interpretation. In order to ensure legality and compliance,528 this thesis also 
endorses requesting copies of third country national posted workers’ work and 
residence permits to confirm their lawful and habitual employment.529 Finally, as 
there is currently no formal system of registration of posted workers, which leads 
to a lack of necessary and precise information, the use of a prior declaration is an 
appropriate national control measure and it is less restrictive than prior 
authorisation.530 The prior declaration should include how many workers will be 
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posted,531 the type of service that will be provided, the location and duration of the 
posting and any changes therein need to be added. 
Aside from these additional national control measures imposed on the 
service provider, it is essential, in the interests of a well-functioning Directive, 
that the competent authorities in the host and home States improve their 
cooperation on information, “Most liaison offices in the Member States seem to 
suffer from understaffing and lack of adequate information. Alarmingly, these 
liaison offices scarcely receive requests for information from service providers or 
workers. The mutual cooperation among liaison offices needs improvement” and 
finally, Houwerzijl identified that, “One of the complications for direct 
communication is the language problem.”532 Therefore, it is suggested that the 
liaison offices could be improved by making use of the Internal Market 
Information System (IMI), which is also suggested by the Commission in the 
proposed Enforcement Directive.533 The IMI is an online tool that assists national, 
regional and local authorities to cooperate with their counterparts across borders 
and as it is comprised of a multilingual directory of authorities it works with pre-
translated questions and answers, thereby reducing the need for translation of 
correspondence and documents, which would assist with the language problem.534 
 
(xii) Interim Conclusion 
 
Solution Number One, which is the favoured solution of this thesis as it can 
directly respond to the identified issues, is to amend the Directive. Eleven 
amendments have been discussed, both my own and those of the European social 
partners, the EU Institutions and the academic doctrine. A summary of the 
amendments is presented below: 
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(i) Should the Directive become a Regulation?: No, a directive is a more 
appropriate legislative instrument;  
(ii) Legal Basis: From the current legal basis Article 62 TFEU on services 
should be maintained as it supports one of the Directive’s main objectives, 
whereas Article 53(1) TFEU on establishment should be removed as it implies too 
much permanence to these temporary workers. Articles 153 and 45 TFEU should 
be added in order to provide practical, as opposed to merely theoretical, support to 
social rights and worker protection; 
(iii) Defining the Directive’s Scope: Article 1(3) Directive needs to be 
amended so as to deter potential letter-box companies by specifying that the 
service provider and recipient must be genuinely established in the home and host 
States respectively, thus, the posting of workers involves a genuine cross-border 
economic activity; 
(iv) Defining a Posted Worker: Article 2 Directive needs to be clarified so 
that the notion of temporary cannot be abused; the “limited period” should be 
defined as twenty-four months, as inspired by the time limit specified by 
Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security systems. This period 
may be extended, provided that the Commission is informed, as inspired by the 
transitional period; 
(v) Clarity of Terms and Conditions of Employment: The terms and 
conditions of employment under Article 3(1) Directive must be set out by the 
Member States precisely and in an easily accessible format, for example this may 
be done electronically, to improve worker protection and legal certainty; 
(vi) Minimum Rate of Pay: Article 3(1)(c) Directive needs to be amended 
to provide at least the minimum rate of pay and, ideally, the going rate, in order to 
guarantee a greater scope for equality. However, this thesis does not fully endorse 
the prevailing rate of pay as it is not always clear which pay rate prevails, 
therefore, reinforcing the minimum character of the Directive will provide greater 
certainty and establish it as a minimum, not a maximum, Directive for the Court’s 
interpretation. 
The fact that this thesis has endorsed “at least the minimum rate of pay” as 
opposed to the going rate, is in itself some form of compromise, therefore, it is 
conditional on the following two points: (i) Article 3(2-5) Directive needs to be 
amended so that the conditions stipulated under Article 3(1) Directive apply to all 
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workers from day one of the period of posting, irrespective of the total length of 
the posting; and (ii) the possibility to negotiate and fight for more favourable 
terms and conditions of employment, beyond the minimum, under Article 3(7) 
Directive must be ensured; 
(vii) More Favourable Terms and Conditions of Employment: Article 3(7) 
Directive needs to be amended to create a genuine possibility of attaining more 
favourable conditions of employment for the workers. In particular, this must 
include the more favourable terms and conditions of employment of the host 
State, as well as the home State, and collective action may be undertaken to 
ensure this provision in order to truly boost the protection of workers and the 
scope for greater equality; 
(viii) Collective Agreements and their Applicability: Article 3(1) Directive 
needs to be amended to provide that the terms and conditions of employment to be 
extended to posted workers are to be laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative provision and/or by collective agreements and these can be 
extended to posted workers in all sectors, not just construction. Article 3(8) 
Directive needs to be amended to expand on the definition of collective 
agreements to include both universally applicable and generally applicable 
collective agreements in equal measure. Collective agreements do not need to 
have been declared in the transposing legislation in order to apply. Collective 
agreements that are not universally applicable, merely need to apply to “a majority 
of similar undertakings and/or similar workers in the geographical area and in the 
profession or (part of the) industry concerned”535 as this definition is sufficient in 
ensuring the general significance of the agreement yet also broad enough to 
incorporate a wider scope of the types of collective agreement that can apply to 
posted workers. Accordingly, the second limb of Article 3(8) Directive which 
states that, “collective agreements which have been concluded by the most 
representative employers’ and labour organizations at national level and which are 
applied throughout national territory” may be omitted. 
The amended text should specify that collective agreements made 
applicable by public procurement law should be accepted, as inspired by the 
ETUC’s suggestion. Finally, in order to ensure a more flexible and practicable 
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interpretation from the Court, the following sentiment needs to be added to Article 
3(8) Directive, “This Directive respects and safeguards the plurality of industrial 
relations systems in the Member States.”;536 
(ix) Collective Action: The only guidance on the implementation of 
collective action can currently be found in paragraph 22 of the Preamble, “this 
Directive is without prejudice to the law of the Member States concerning 
collective action to defend the interests of trades and professions”. This needs to 
be included in the Directive, preferably following on from Article 3(8) Directive 
on collective agreements under a new Article 3(9) Directive. Added to this should 
be the ETUC’s suggestion that posted workers shall not be used to replace 
workers on strike.537 However, the ETUC’s suggestion of including the Monti 
Clause into the Directive is not supported by this thesis; 
(x) Public Policy: As aforementioned, excluding collective bargaining and 
action entirely from the Directive would create an artificial context of posting 
workers, whereas, granting greater strength to the social interests from the text of 
the Directive itself would more suitably rectify the balance. The compatibility of 
public procurement and the Directive would suitably bolster the recognition of 
social clauses, thus, Article 3(10) Directive needs to include a reference to the 
public procurement Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC in order to specify 
that public contracts can include matters beyond those referred to in Article 3(1) 
Directive in the interests of public policy. 
The only drawback to including public procurement as a method of 
implementation in the Directive is that only public contracts would be covered, 
therefore, private postings could not rely on the additional social clauses in this 
context. Accordingly, one option is that “private contracting authorities might also 
argue that a requirement to respect host state labour standards reflects a 
commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR)”.538 Also, Article 3(10) 
Directive needs to be amended further to be more inclusive by including both 
social policy and public policy provisions and these need to be explicitly 
identified as including (in a non-exhaustive list) the provisions identified by the 
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Commission’s Communication.539 The direct instruction from the Commission’s 
Communication to the host State’s fundamental rights and freedoms should satisfy 
protection of their public interest objectives and the reference to the ILO 
Convention should suitably bolster the freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. Added to this should be the protection of workers, fair competition, 
equal treatment and the prevention of social dumping. The former two provisions 
meet the Directive’s objectives, equal treatment is a general principle of Union 
law and including the prevention of social dumping is necessary as it is the 
greatest source of social tension in the context of posted workers, which has 
already been recognised by the Court and AG Mengozzi as a legitimate public 
interest objective. In fact, it is proposed that the wording of paragraph 8 of the 
Preamble to the proposed Monti II Regulation should be applied to Article 3(10) 
Directive, “The protection of workers, in particular their social protection and the 
protection of their rights against social dumping, as well as the desire to avoid 
disturbances on the labour market have been recognised as constituting overriding 
reasons of general interest justifying restriction of the exercise of one of the 
fundamental freedoms of Union law.”540 The implementation of this provision is 
somewhat of a tactical manoeuvre as it confirms, from the Commission itself, that 
these elements are recognised as public policy objectives that are in accordance 
with the objectives of the internal market. Accordingly, the emphasis of Article 
3(10) Directive must be on avoiding social tensions, but there is to be no mention 
of directly protecting the host State’s labour market as that would pertain to 
protectionism and therefore should be avoided in case of misapplication and abuse 
of such a provision, bearing in mind that the provision of services must equally be 
maintained; 
(xi) Monitoring Compliance with the Directive: As inspired by 
Commission v Germany,541 the documents to be kept on site during the posting 
should include the employment contract, pay slips, time sheets and proof of 
payment of wages. This needs to be included in a non-exhaustive list under 
Article 4 Directive so that service providers and recipients have the flexibility of 
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requesting additional documents in each specific case. As aforementioned, the 
ETUC’s proposal on this point goes too far and unduly burdens the service 
provider, however, there are two further requirements that should be imposed on 
the service provider, namely: (i) the provision of a prior declaration of posting 
including the number of workers that will be posted, the type of service that will 
be provided, the location and duration of the posting and any changes therein need 
to be added;542 and (ii) in the case of third country national posted workers, copies 
of their work and residence permits.543 The final amendment to Article 4 Directive 
that this thesis deems necessary is the requirement that liaison offices improve 
their cooperation on information by making use of the IMI system. Finally, 
Article 5 Directive currently does not include any concrete measures in the event 
of failure to comply with the Directive and therefore needs to be amended to 
include a provision on the application of joint and several liability. 
 
III. Solution Number Two: Adopt the Enforcement Directive 
 
This thesis has so far proposed amending the Directive itself, however, the 
Commission has published a legislative initiative in the form of an Enforcement 
Directive.544 The proposal was published on 21 March 2012, as a legislative 
package, along with the Monti II Regulation.545 Solution Number Two analyses 
the potential of the Commission’s proposals and both will be discussed separately 
in turn, with a stronger emphasis on the proposed Enforcement Directive as that 
has greater relevance to this thesis. 
 
(i) Lead Up to the Legislative Initiative 
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The Laval Triplet showed the issues of the Directive at their peak and accordingly 
highlighted the need for change. From the final judgment in this group of cases on 
19 June 2008, it took nearly four years for the Commission to finally propose its 
solution. As the “long wait”546 ensued it was not clear whether the delay was 
emblematic of a lack of political will or that the legislator simply did not know 
what was the best solution. The European Parliament made the first move for 
change by encouraging the Commission to review the Directive547 to which the 
Commission responded with its somewhat lacklustre Decision on setting up the 
Committee of Experts on Posting of Workers.548 Then President Barroso made a 
promise to the European Parliament to propose amending the Directive, which 
was necessary in order to commit the Commission to making a change.  
On 27 October 2010 the Commission finally committed itself to adopting 
a legislative proposal for the Directive and it was now apparent that this would not 
entail a revision of the original Directive but would constitute another legal act 
aimed at improving the implementation of the Directive,549 “The result of this 
clarification should show if a revision of the Posting of Workers directive is 
needed.”550 This indicates a very roundabout, and potentially long-winded, 
approach of instigating change; this long-awaited Commission proposal is 
intended merely to ‘test the waters’ to see if the original Directive needs 
amending. It is hoped that the proposal will sufficiently improve its 
implementation so as to avoid a complete lack of confidence in respect of this 
Directive.  
On 27 and 28 June 2011 the DG for Employment, Social Affairs and 
Inclusion of the Commission held a Conference in Brussels on ‘Fundamental 
Social Rights and the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Single 
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Market’.551 The Conference was concluded by a Roundtable discussion entitled 
“Future action and priorities”552 in which Philippe de Buck, Director General of 
BusinessEurope, made some very interesting points. On the proposed Monti II 
Regulation, De Buck opined, “ETUC believes that the ECJ rulings have 
undermined workers’ right to take collective action. We do not agree with this 
interpretation, rather the reverse! Why? Because the real novelty of the Viking 
and Laval rulings is that the right to strike has been recognised by the ECJ as an 
EU fundamental right for the first time.” Unfortunately, I was not present at the 
Conference and therefore was unable to witness the reaction of the ETUC to this 
comment; to imply that the Viking and Laval judgments were a step forward for 
the right to strike is certainly a different interpretation of the judgments! However, 
if considered carefully, there must be some truth to this; never before has the issue 
of the place of social rights been so well-documented and discussed as it has been 
since these judgments. In some respect, therefore, the case law was responsible 
for raising this issue and pushing it to the forefront of the political sphere so that 
now there are conferences, such as this one, dedicated to the topic. On the issue of 
posted workers, De Buck reiterated an aspect that has been stated before by 
BusinessEurope, “Posting is and remains a limited phenomenon on European 
labour markets.” However, the implication that it does not affect the majority of 
the labour market and therefore is a less relevant issue for the EU at large was set 
aside by De Buck who clarified that, “due to the high concentration of posting in 
some countries and sectors, its incidence can be much more significant in selected 
cases.” Furthermore, it has been established that every year around one million 
workers in the EU are posted from their home State to a host State553 and it is 
submitted that this figure is substantial enough to warrant an interest in improving 
the area. 
                                                 
551
 European Commission ‘Conference on Fundamental Social Rights and the Posting of Workers 
in the Framework of the Single Market’ 27-28 June 2011: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=88&eventsId=347&furtherEvents=yes 
[accessed 13 June 2013]. 
552
 European Commission ‘Conference on Fundamental Social Rights and the Posting of Workers 
in the Framework of the Single Market: Conference Documents’ 27-28 June 2011: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=88&langId=en&eventsId=347&moreDocuments=yes&ta
bleName=events [accessed 13 June 2013].  
553
 EUROPA Press Release ‘Mr. László ANDOR EU Commissioner responsible for Employment, 
Social Affairs and Inclusion “Balancing economic integration and social protection” Conference 
on Fundamental Social Rights and the Posting of Workers in the framework of the Single Market 
Brussels, 27 June 2011’: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-478_en.htm?locale=en 
[accessed 13 June 2013].  
 208 
To date, the Council has not officially expressed its position following the 
Laval Triplet and out of all the Member States, only Luxembourg in 2008 has 
demanded the re-opening of the Directive, in fact, certain Member States 
(Denmark, Sweden, Luxembourg and Germany) have amended their legislation in 
order to comply with the rulings.554  
The Commission’s legislative solution was expected in the fourth quarter 
of 2011,555 but it was not until 2012 that the proposal was published. The apparent 
urgency on publishing the proposal in 2012 could, in part, be attributed to the 
Danish Government, that held the Presidency of the European Council for the first 
six months of 2012, and stated that during its term the issue of posted workers 
would be placed at the top of its list of priorities.556 At last, the legislative 
proposal was published and the “long wait” was finally over on 21 March 2012. 
The delay and postponements were partly due to the fact that draft copies of both 
initiatives were leaked in December 2011, “Some interviewees argue that it was 
the Commission itself that leaked the proposals to get an unofficial reaction to the 
proposals. This caused the Commission to revise the proposals substantially, and 
the revision process entailed a huge internal battle within the Commission.”557 It 
has not been confirmed if it was the Commission that leaked the proposals but the 
delays and postponements do not indicate a strong confirmation that the 
Commission was entirely satisfied with the final drafts. Nevertheless, the 
Commission finally published its legislative proposals in the form of an 
Enforcement Directive, intended to improve the implementation of the Directive 
and the Monti II Regulation, on the relationship between fundamental social rights 
and economic freedoms that, without reversing the decisions of the Court in the 
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Laval Quartet, “would confirm that the right, or freedom to strike, should not be a 
mere slogan or a legal metaphor.”558  
Even though these two proposals have been published collectively as a 
legislative package they are to be considered independently as the process of 
adoption is separate; the Enforcement Directive may be adopted under the 
ordinary legislative procedure whereas the Monti II Regulation is subject to 
unanimity in the Council of Ministers and through the consent procedure by the 
Parliament, thus, procedurally the Enforcement Directive will be easier to pass 
than the Monti II Regulation.  
 
(ii) The Enforcement Directive 
 
It is self-evident that this thesis focuses on the law; it presents a legal problem and 
offers legislative solutions, thereby looking at the issues through a legal lens. 
However, the political and economic perspectives must equally be included in this 
part in order to show the full picture and the reality of the economic turmoil that 
was playing out in Europe at the same time as the publication of this legislative 
package in spring 2012. The rate of unemployment in Greece reached a record 
high in February 2012 at 21.7% (bearing in mind that from 1983 to 2010 Greece’s 
unemployment rate averaged 9.43%).559 By May 2012 there were eleven EU 
countries in recession (Spain, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Portugal and Slovenia in the eurozone and Denmark, Czech Republic and the UK 
outside of the eurozone).560 As the Greek Government struggled to form a 
coalition and outcries from the British public for a referendum to determine 
whether the UK should continue to be a part of the EU, the newly elected French 
President François Hollande challenged the German-led austerity approach in 
finding a way out of the crisis. Therefore, the backdrop for the publication of the 
Enforcement Directive was tense, uncertain and uneasy. The only certainty was 
that there must be a way out of this economic crisis that was not only causing 
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world speculation on the success of the European Project,561 but also highlighted 
the personal tragedies that were resulting from the current state of the economy.562 
At this time of economic crisis, the Commission was still debating the 
Directive and its associated issues concerning the place of social rights, 
confirming its continued importance and relevance. It therefore needs to be 
considered how the Directive was affected by the crisis at this time and how the 
legislative proposal relates to its economic back-drop. In the press release 
announcing the legislative package, the following objective was provided, “To 
make the EU single market work better for workers and for business, the 
Commission has proposed new rules to increase the protection of workers 
temporarily posted abroad.”563 It is not suggested that this will have the effect of 
simultaneously solving the economic crisis of the Union, but it does show that the 
Commission was attempting to tackle two of the most prevalent symptoms of the 
crisis: rising unemployment and declining businesses. This is reminiscent of this 
thesis’ objective in finding a solution that can equally support social rights and 
economic freedoms in balance; in order to reflect all of the Directive’s objectives. 
Social rights clearly need increased support from the legislative bodies of the 
Union, yet during the recession, the economic interests also need support – both 
are needed equally in order to achieve “a highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress” in accordance with 
Article 3(3) TEU. “The possibility to provide services internationally represents 
an opportunity for business expansion across Europe, particularly for SMEs. 
Posting provides business and job opportunities, and is a source of additional 
income in sending countries; it contributes to the improvement of competitiveness 
and efficiency in receiving countries.”564 Furthermore, the opportunity of posting 
workers is not, as is commonly perceived, isolated to Eastern Europe as the only 
posting States, “Contrary to some perceptions, posted workers are not always just 
moving from East to West. The main departure countries for posted workers are 
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Poland, France and Germany. And the main destination countries are Germany, 
France and Belgium.”565 
In the interests of protecting these workers, “the Commission has put 
forward concrete, practical proposals as part of an enforcement Directive to 
increase monitoring and compliance and to improve the way existing rules on 
posted workers are applied in practice.”566 The need for concrete and practical 
guidance on the posting of workers is highly sought-after, during the co-decision 
procedure one of the reoccurring themes that came from the Council and the 
Parliament was that the proposal for a Directive needed clearer definitions, 
arguably, the Directive has always lacked clarity. The legislative package also 
intends to prove that the Union has evolved beyond a trade organisation by 
incorporating social policies into its core values. This sentiment is prevalent in the 
legislative proposal, “To send a strong message that workers’ rights and their 
freedom to strike are on an equal footing with the freedom to provide services”.567 
The Commission has therefore expressly confirmed that the new legislative 
package ensures that economic freedoms do not have primacy over social rights; 
they are equal. 
The objective of the Enforcement Directive is to clarify the application of 
the Directive in practice, thus, it does not propose an entirely new Directive; its 
intention is to clarify (through better information), enforce (both State 
enforcement through sanctions and inspections and private law enforcement 
through joint and several liability) and generally solidify what is already there 
through more concrete guidance on its practical application. Accordingly, the 
original Directive remains valid.568 
The provisions of the proposed Enforcement Directive are presented in a 
table below, that follows on from the table provided in Chapter 1, in order to 
display the Directive’s full story to date. An analysis of the provisions is detailed 
thereafter, summarising each Chapter as opposed to every Article.  
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Chapter I: General Provisions 
 
Article 1(1) Enforcement Directive sets out its objectives, “to guarantee respect 
for an appropriate level of minimum protection of the rights of posted workers for 
the cross-border provision of services, while facilitating the exercise of the 
freedom to provide services for service providers and promoting fair competition 
between service providers.” There are several points that need to be raised here: 
(i) the level of protection is confirmed as being set at the ‘minimum’. The ETUC 
also suggested restoring the minimum character of the Directive569 but made this 
conditional on the fact that the social partners can fight for more favourable 
conditions, whereas the Commission has not included this condition in the 
Enforcement Directive; (ii) the freedom to provide services remains as one of the 
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core objectives, which is inevitable as the legal basis has not changed; (iii) fair 
competition and the protection of workers’ rights have also remained as the core 
objectives, however, there is a subtle change – it only mentions the protection of 
the rights of posted workers and promoting fair competition between service 
providers. Whereas, the Directive does not make such distinctions. This may 
appear to be a subtle change but the implications could be very dangerous and in 
fact a step back in terms of social protection as it is only the interests of the 
service provider and the posted workers that are protected, not the host State 
workers or the host State undertaking which could in turn lead to decreased 
protection against social dumping.  
 This is not a strong start for the Enforcement Directive. However, this 
might be counteracted by Article 1(2) Enforcement Directive which contains the 
‘Monti Clause’, as inspired by Article 2 Monti I Regulation570 and also Article 
1(7) Services Directive,571 it provides the following: 
 
“This Directive shall not affect in any way the exercise of fundamental 
rights as recognised in Member States and by Union law, including the right 
or freedom to strike or to take other action covered by the specific industrial 
relations systems in Member States, in accordance with national law and 
practices. Nor does it affect the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce 
collective agreements and to take collective action in accordance with 
national law and practices.” 
 
This provision is very promising and is a strong move on the part of the 
Commission in validating the importance of social rights and respect for the 
national industrial relations systems; the Directive shall not affect collective 
action, bargaining and agreements, in accordance with national law and practices. 
Whereas, the previous interpretation of the Court was that collective action, 
bargaining and agreements shall not affect the Directive. However, in principle, 
this thesis does not support the inclusion of the Monti Clause into the Directive as 
it would overly compensate the right to take collective action and create an 
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‘either/or’ solution, as opposed to developing a more realistic solution that intends 
to balance the competing interests of economic freedoms and fundamental rights.  
Article 2 Enforcement Directive provides definitions intended to improve 
the clarity of the Directive, however, considering one of the major issues with the 
Directive is its lack of clarity it is somewhat disappointing that the only 
definitions provided are for the ‘competent authority’, ‘requesting authority’ and 
‘requested authority’. 
Article 3 Enforcement Directive is more helpful as the provision is entirely 
dedicated to preventing abuse and circumvention; something that was not 
mentioned in the original Directive, perhaps because the loopholes were only fully 
realised in practice. There are two sub-paragraphs included in this Article and, just 
as the thesis has proposed under Solution Number One, the first one intends to 
determine whether an undertaking is genuinely established in a Member State, this 
should combat the use of letter-box companies, “the criteria relating to what 
constitutes a genuine establishment of the service provider in a Member State will 
help avoid ‘creative use’ of Directive 96/71/EC for situations that are not proper 
postings in the sense of the Directive.”572 For example, the criteria include the 
place where the undertaking has its registered office and administration, pays 
taxes and performs its substantial business activity and the place where posted 
workers are recruited. The second sub-paragraph intends to clarify the temporary 
nature of the posted worker, in order to avoid the predicament in which migrant 
workers circumvent all of the rules of the host State under the guise of being 
‘posted’. Criteria to establish this include that the posting is carried out for a 
limited period and it takes place in a Member State other than the one in which the 
posted worker habitually carries out work and the posted worker must return to 
the home State following completion of their work in the host State. However, the 
Enforcement Directive was not bold enough to stipulate a fixed time limit that 
constitutes a “posting” in the interests of clarity and reducing potential abuses, 
which is somewhat disappointing, especially as other Union legislation has made 
use of such a provision, “social security rules (Regulation 883/2004) set a limit of 
two years, which if exceeded obliges the employee to be covered by the social 
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security regime of the host country.”573 Accordingly, this thesis maintains, as set 
out under Solution Number One, that a time limit is required. 
 
Chapter II: Access to Information 
 
Article 5 Enforcement Directive encourages an improved access to information by 
offering very detailed instructions as to how this information should be made 
available which certainly indicates an improvement in the area. Article 5(4) 
specifies that where the conditions are laid down in collective agreements, the 
social partners shall identify these and provide the relevant information for service 
providers and posted workers. This will not only grant greater transparency of the 
applicable conditions for service providers and posted workers but will also assist 
in recognising the applicability of the relevant collective agreements.  
However, despite the access to information improving, the information 
itself, embodied in the seven terms and conditions of employment under Article 
3(1) Directive, has not been amended at all by the proposed Enforcement 
Directive and as concluded above, Article 3 Directive is the provision that 
requires the greatest clarification in light of the identified issues. Accordingly, 
improving the access to information without improving the information itself 
merely provides better lighting to the same problem. This is the first indicator that 
the Enforcement Directive’s effect will ultimately enforce the problems.     
 
Chapter III: Administrative Cooperation 
 
This Chapter establishes the importance of improved information as one of the 
main priorities of this proposed legislation. Article 6 Enforcement Directive 
encourages mutual assistance between Member States, such as replying to 
reasoned requests for information and carrying out checks, inspections and 
investigations. After all, it is the competent authorities of the Member States that 
are best placed to identify any abuse or misapplication of the Directive, therefore, 
cooperation between the Member States is essential. Article 7 Enforcement 
Directive details the role of the home State. It specifies that the service provider 
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continues to control, monitor and take supervisory or enforcement measures in 
accordance with its national law, practice and administrative procedures in respect 
of the posted workers and it shall assist the host State to ensure compliance with 
both the Directive and the Enforcement Directive. As is well-established, this 
Directive has granted a great deal of support to the interests of the service 
provider and it is high-time that an equal amount of responsibility is apportioned.  
 
Chapter IV: Monitoring Compliance 
 
The Commission has stressed the importance of this Chapter, “an effectively 
functioning system of this kind may render certain obligations superfluous.”574 
Ideally, this is how the Directive should work in practice; whereby the monitoring 
and cooperation is so effective that further requirements imposed on the service 
provider are rendered redundant. 
The issue of national control measures has been a sticking point in the case 
law and often the Court has found the measures to be a restriction of the freedom 
to provide services, accordingly, Article 9 Enforcement Directive supports the 
application of the following control measures: (i) an obligation of the service 
provider to make a declaration including the identity of the service provider, the 
presence of one or more clearly identifiable posted workers, the number of posted 
workers, the duration of the posting, their location and the nature of the service 
being provided; (ii) an obligation to keep or make available and/or to retain copies 
in paper or electronic format of the employment contract, payslips, time-sheets 
and proof of payment of wages or copies of equivalent documents during the 
period of posting; (iii) a translation of the documents referred to above, provided 
the documents are not excessively long; and (iv) an obligation to designate a 
contact person in the host State to negotiate on behalf of the employer with the 
relevant social partners. It is submitted that these provisions show an enormous 
step forward and improvement of the Directive. As they are provided in the body 
of the text of this proposed Enforcement Directive, the Court would have more 
concrete guidance on which obligations may be imposed on service providers 
thereby guaranteeing greater clarity. However, the requirements provided in 
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Article 9 are the limit, as it states, “Member States may only impose the following 
administrative requirements and control measures [emphasis added]” and the 
declaration that is permitted under Article 9(1)(a) “may only cover” the elements 
stipulated. This is not necessarily a bad thing as the intention is to impose more 
obligations on the service provider, but not to the extent that it becomes 
disproportionate and so onerous that it would inevitably dissuade undertakings 
established in another Member State from posting their workers under the 
provision of services. The exercise of codifying the requirements that can be 
imposed on the service provider has the effect of making clear those that cannot, 
by process of elimination, such as an obligation to obtain an authorisation or have 
any form of establishment in the host State. However, this thesis still maintains 
that it would be more suitable to provide a non-exhaustive list, in the interests of 
greater flexibility in practice. 
Article 10 Enforcement Directive provides that adequate inspections must 
be carried out based on risk assessment by the competent authorities in order to 
control and monitor compliance with the Directive. This may also be carried out 
by other bodies, “In order to reflect the different industrial relations systems and 
diversity of systems of control in the Member States, other actors and/or bodies 
may also monitor certain terms and conditions of employment of posted workers, 
such as the minimum rates of pay and working time.”575 In order to make this as 
effective as possible, again the principle of cooperation between the posting and 
hosting States is required. The tone of the Enforcement Directive is that the 
Commission is willing to bolster social rights and place more necessary 
obligations on the service provider so that the Directive is not just a Directive for 
service providers but is also there for the host State, for instance to fill skills and 
labour shortages, and also for the posted workers themselves. However, the 
Directive, and its proposed Enforcement counter-part can only do so much; on the 
ground, the competent authorities must also be willing to accept responsibility for 
complying and monitoring that compliance with the provisions of the Directive. 
 
Chapter V: Enforcement 
 




Article 12 Enforcement Directive is the joint and several liability provision that 
ensures posted workers may enforce the obligations as per the Directive, “abuses, 
exploitation and unfair competition seem to be concentrated in the construction 
sector which also represents the highest number of the postings (about 25%).”576 
Thus, this section is limited to direct subcontractor situations in the construction 
sector, however, Member States may, if they so wish, extend these provisions to 
other sectors. It is intended to be used in combination with State enforcement so 
that the service recipient in the host State can be held liable for non-compliance. 
Article 12 provides that the contractor can, in addition to or in place of the 
subcontractor (this would be the service provider), be held liable by the posted 
worker and/or common funds or institutions of social partners for non-payment of 
any outstanding remuneration and any back-payments or refund of taxes or social 
security contributions that have been unduly withheld from the posted worker’s 
salary. This section adds that the liability is limited to the worker’s rights acquired 
under the contractual relationship between the contractor and the subcontractor. 
However, a contractor that has undertaken due diligence will not be liable in 
accordance with the above. Paragraph 25 of the Preamble to the Enforcement 
Directive adds that, “In specific cases, other contractors may, in accordance with 
national law and practice, be also held liable for failure to comply with the 
obligations under this Directive,” as the Commission has stated some networks 
and chains of subcontracting can be complicated, therefore, it is important to add 
a certain degree of flexibility to the joint and several liability provision so that it 
may be implemented on a case-by-case basis.  
This is likely to be one of the more contentious elements of the 
Enforcement Directive as joint and several liability does not exist in every 
Member State577 and therefore there may be additional administrative costs in 
implementing these measures, which could have the effect of restricting the 
freedom to provide services, but the Commission stated that would be “justified 
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by the protection of workers rights”578 highlighting the elevated status of social 
rights in the Union.  
 
Chapter VI: Cross-border Enforcement of Administrative Fines and Penalties 
 
This Chapter intends to guarantee that the enforcement provisions, as detailed 
above, are completely followed through, so that the identified penalties and fines 
may be recovered in full, “Given the transnational nature of posting, the mutual 
recognition and enforcement of fines and penalties, [particularly in the home 
State], is crucial… Part of the problem is caused by the fact that non-compliance 
with the obligations under Directive 96/71/EC is sanctioned differently in the 
Member States.”579 This Chapter does not harmonise the rules in this area, but 
respects and accepts the national laws, regulations and administrative practices. 
For example, Article 13 Enforcement Directive provides that the request for 
recovery shall be made in accordance with the rules in force in the requesting 
Member State and the recovery or notification will be made in accordance with 
the rules in force of the requested Member State.  
Article 14 Enforcement Directive details the information required for the 
request for recovery, information or notification, “shall at least indicate” the name 
and address of the addressee, the purpose of the request and the relevant dates of 
the enforcement process, the amount of the fine or penalty and other relevant 
information. As is expected, in line with the principle of cooperation, the 
requested authority must provide any information and mutual assistance to the 
requesting authority to assist with the recovery of the fine or penalty. 
Article 15 Enforcement Directive stipulates that where the request is 
contested by the service provider, or an interested party, the enforcement 
procedure shall be suspended whilst awaiting the decision of the appropriate 
national authority and finally, Article 16 Enforcement Directive stipulates the 
provisions on costs.  
These cross-border enforcement provisions are not specified in the 
Directive and have not been considered under Solution Number One. However, it 
is submitted that if Solution Number One is adopted, these provisions suggested 
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by the Enforcement Directive, should be included. This is because Solution 
Number One has also advocated the importance of including joint and several 
liability for worker protection and, as a follow-on, this necessitates that workers 
must also be guaranteed the recovery that is due, which needs to be specified in 
the Directive.  
 
Chapter VII: Final Provisions 
 
Article 18 Enforcement Directive, which is intended to support the administrative 
cooperation provisions, endorses the IMI System, which has also been suggested 
under Solution Number One. The IMI is an electronic information exchange 
system that allows authorities to communicate more easily with the relevant 
authorities in other Member States and is intended to assist with the principle of 
cooperation, as provided for throughout the Enforcement Directive. A further 
benefit of implementing IMI is financial, “The use of an IT tool such as IMI could 
have a significant cost-reducing impact, facilitating direct contacts between 
competent administrations and reducing the need for translation of 
correspondence and documents.”580 It is specified that the competent authorities 
shall use IMI as much as possible, however, Member States may continue to 
apply bilateral agreements between the competent authorities in respect of the 
application and monitoring of the terms and conditions of employment under 
Article 3 Directive. 
 
(iii) Responses to the Enforcement Directive  
 
The Enforcement Directive shows some promise and it makes some progressive 
and welcome suggestions. For example, greater cooperation on information via 
use of the IMI System, increased monitoring and national control measures and 
the inclusion of joint and several liability which are all intended to improve the 
effectiveness and clarity of the Directive in an effort to combat circumvention and 
abuse of the applicable rules and to boost worker protection. Also, during the 
development of the proposed legislation the social partners were given the 
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opportunity to provide their feedback on the legislative initiative at both the public 
consultation launched on the Single Market Act and also at the stakeholder 
Conference in June 2011 on the posting of workers. The explicit respect for social 
partners is a welcome addition by the Enforcement Directive, particularly, as it 
extends to the Member States’ industrial relations systems, “Respect for the 
diversity of national industrial relations systems as well as the autonomy of social 
partners is explicitly recognised by the Treaty.”581 The Enforcement Directive 
cited Article 152 TFEU in this respect, thereby confirming the importance of this 
provision at Treaty level. Paragraph 8 of the Preamble adds, “Trade unions play 
an important role in the context of the posting of workers for the provision of 
services since social partners may, in accordance with national law and/or 
practice, determine the different levels (alternatively or simultaneously) of the 
applicable minimum rates of pay.” This is a vital addition as the Directive, as 
interpreted by the Court, lacks respect for the differing labour systems and thereby 
has previously allowed no room for manoeuvre in situations where, for example, 
certain Member States do not have a minimum rate of pay. 
 However, in spite of these positive elements, the Enforcement Directive, 
as it currently stands, should not be adopted as it has failed to address three major 
issues. These three issues are so prominent that unless they are specifically 
addressed and rectified, the Enforcement Directive has done no more than tweak 
various elements and left the substantive issues untouched. Therefore, in light of 
the bigger picture, adopting the Enforcement Directive as it is, would prove futile.  
The first major issue is that the Enforcement Directive has left the legal basis 
untouched and, in fact, enforces Article 56 TFEU as the legislative foundation by 
only promoting the rights of posted workers and the interests of service providers 
in accordance with its objectives under Article 1(1) Enforcement Directive. The 
legal basis has been identified by this thesis as one of the most important elements 
to amend; unless the legal basis changes, nothing changes. 
 Secondly, the Enforcement Directive does not touch on Article 3 Directive 
at all. This provision is the main bone of contention in the Directive and it has not 
been enforced or amended in any way. Accordingly, in respect of Article 3(1) 
Directive, the Enforcement Directive has committed itself to the minimum level 
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of protection. Paragraph 22 of the Preamble to the Enforcement Directive 
provides the following, “Member States are particularly encouraged to introduce a 
more integrated approach to labour inspections. The need to develop common 
standards in order to establish comparable methods, practices and minimum 
standards at Union level should equally be examined.” This is problematic 
because it is well-established that the Directive does not intend to require Member 
States to set minimum wages,582 neither does it intend to harmonise certain 
standards, yet this provision stipulates that Member States are particularly 
encouraged to develop common standards for the purpose of establishing 
minimum standards at Union level, which can easily be interpreted as an 
invitation to endorse social dumping. It is highly unlikely that that was the 
intention of the Commission, nevertheless, there is scope for misinterpretation 
here and accordingly it is advised that any future amended Directive or 
Enforcement Directive should steer clear of so avidly pursuing the minimum 
standard. 
As aforementioned, guaranteeing the minimum rate of pay may be the 
most pragmatic response, however, the emphasis on pursuing the minimum could 
inevitably, as has been done before by the Court, turn this provision into a 
maximum. Therefore, this thesis suggests that applying the two words “at least” in 
front of “the minimum” would make a much-needed difference, thus, granting the 
Court an alternative interpretation to aim higher and provide a greater scope for 
equality. After all, Article 153(5) TFEU specifies pay as being excluded from the 
Union’s competence and Article 157(1) TFEU expands on this by stating, “Each 
Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and female 
workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied.” Despite there being no 
Union competence in respect of pay, the Court conferred horizontal direct effect 
on Article 157(1) TFEU in Defrenne583 which acknowledged that the work of an 
air stewardess is identical to that of a cabin steward and accordingly equal pay for 
equal work must apply in light of the EU general principle of equality. Therefore, 
the general principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value forms a 
fundamental principle of the Union and is reminiscent in the Directive which 
provides for equality of treatment between men and women and other forms of 
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non-discrimination.584 In the Q&A press release from the Commission it was 
asked, “Why not revise the 1996 Directive… in order to provide for equal 
treatment between posted workers and nationals?”585 The Commission’s answer 
to this pertinent question reads as follows, “There is nothing wrong with the 
current posting rules… Introducing an obligation for ‘equal pay for equal work or 
work of equal value’ with respect to posted workers would ignore the fundamental 
difference between a posted worker and a migrant worker: the posted worker is 
not integrated into the labour market of the host country, whereas the migrant 
worker is.” Firstly, declaring that there is nothing wrong with the current rules is 
clearly wrong; if there was nothing wrong with the current rules, there would be 
no need for better enforcement. The latter part of the answer appears to be the 
Commission’s mantra in defending its position that posted workers, whilst 
working in the host State, do not enter the host State’s labour market. This reveals 
that the Commission does not view the equality principle as being compatible 
with posted workers and therefore maintains the distinction between the free 
movement of workers and the freedom to provide services and thereby excluding 
the possibility of invoking Article 45 TFEU for the protection of posted workers.  
Therefore, in spite of the equality principle being a fundamental principle 
of Union law that has been granted horizontal direct effect in prior case law, it 
cannot be extended to the equality of treatment between posted and national 
workers; the Directive is allowed to distinguish/discriminate between those 
workers. To use an example to better illustrate this point, the national minimum 
wage in the UK is £6.31,586 and in the UK a bricklayer can earn up to £15.06 per 
hour.587 The Directive, and now its Enforcement counter-part as well, provide that 
posted workers shall be guaranteed the minimum rate of pay of the host State. 
Therefore, on the same construction site in the UK, posted workers can be paid 
£6.31 per hour whilst the host State workers can earn up to £15.06 per hour. From 
a commercial perspective, this is one of the appeals of employing posted workers 
and therefore should be granted for the benefit of the internal market, however, it 
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is emphatically urged that these minimum standards are not embedded into the 
legislation; there must be room for improvement. Therefore, advocating the 
minimum is only appropriate when there is room to apply more favourable terms 
and conditions of employment. Unfortunately, however, the Enforcement 
Directive does not propose amending or enforcing the favourability provision 
under Article 3(7) Directive, thereby reinforcing that the minimum should be read 
as the minimum (or, in fact, the maximum). 
 Consequently, as Article 3 Directive has not been considered for 
amendment, this inevitably means that the limiting rules in respect of applying 
collective agreements will remain the same. It can be argued that paragraph 7 of 
the Preamble to the Enforcement Directive supports respect for the diversity of 
national industrial relations systems, as well as the autonomy of social partners, 
however, in Laval the Court could have argued that it showed respect for the 
differing labour systems and the social partners but did not have the legitimate 
expression at its disposal to apply the Swedish collective agreement to the posted 
workers. Therefore, it is clear that to instigate real change the Court needs specific 
instruction so that it cannot so easily disregard certain terms and conditions of 
employment, for example, the prominent issue concerning whether collective 
agreements need to be declared in the implementing legislation has been left open 
by the Enforcement Directive and therefore the problem remains. It is the detail of 
Article 3 Directive that needs amending in order to ensure greater regulation of 
posted workers and subsequently more suitable future rulings by the Court. 
 The final provision of Article 3 Directive that has been left untouched by 
the Enforcement Directive is Article 3(10) Directive, so that the very restrictive 
interpretation of this provision, as seen in Commission v Luxembourg,588 could be 
a precedent for any future rulings on public policy. 
 Thirdly, the final substantive element that is missing from the 
Enforcement Directive is the express protection for all workers and fair 
competition between all undertakings; Article 1(1) Enforcement Directive states 
its objectives, “to guarantee respect for an appropriate level of minimum 
protection of the rights of posted workers for the cross-border provision of 
services, while facilitating the exercise of the freedom to provide services for 
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service providers and promoting fair competition between service providers 
[emphasis added].” This enforces the minimum level of protection in its 
objectives and also, only mentions the protection of the rights of posted workers 
and the interests of the service providers. Whereas, the original Directive sets its 
objectives as “any such promotion of the transnational provision of services 
[supposedly for the benefit of both service providers and recipients] requires a 
climate of fair competition [not necessarily just with the service provider in mind] 
and measures guaranteeing respect for the rights of [supposedly all] workers”.589 
This suggests that only posted workers and service providers are protected by the 
Enforcement Directive. Accordingly, it could be interpreted that the Monti Clause 
will only apply to the protection of posted workers to negotiate, conclude and 
enforce collective agreements and to take collective action. This interpretation 
proves that the Enforcement Directive does not directly address the issues 
revealed in practice as the collective action in Laval was undertaken by the host 
State workers; not the posted workers.  
The response from the European social partners has not been positive, 
“The ETUC deplores the minimalistic approach taken by the Commission by 
proposing an Enforcement Directive instead of a revision of the Posting of 
Workers Directive itself.”590 In respect of the provision on joint and several 
liability, the ETUC proposed removing the concept of ‘due diligence’ as the 
objectives of joint and several liability are “undermined by the stipulation that a 
contractor that has taken due diligence cannot be held liable.”591 This is because, 
“There is no definition [of due diligence] at the European level and it would 
therefore vary from one Member State to the other. It has been indicated that in 
order to escape liability, it might be sufficient for the contractor to check the 
identity of the subcontractor and their history.”592 This thesis agrees with the 
ETUC’s suggestion; in practice the inclusion of the due diligence provision could 
provide a loophole for the application of joint and several liability and, as 
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discussed above, liability has been used before in posted worker cases593 
therefore, the irony is that the legislative introduction of the provision with the 
condition of due diligence might actually have the effect of rendering its use 
ineffectual, as contractors will have legislative support so as to be excluded from 
liability.  
BusinessEurope has not welcomed the legislative package, in fact it stated, 
“Employers are highly concerned about the Commission proposals adopted on 21 
March 2012”.594 The main concern from BusinessEurope was the provision on 
joint and several liability, which it stated would only hamper development of the 
single market at a time when all EU policies should support economic growth and 
providing better information and improving administrative cooperation are the 
main factors that should better enforce the Directive. This thesis agrees with 
BusinessEurope that the Commission’s proposal is concerning, however, quite 
clearly, this is for different reasons. 
Finally, an advocate for the Enforcement Directive has been the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC). The EESC has welcomed the 
Commission’s proposal by opining, “The message is clear: protect posted workers 
without neglecting the needs of businesses.”595 This is undeniable; the 
Enforcement Directive has catered for the interests of posted workers and, 
primarily, service providers. However, the same cannot be said for protecting the 
host State workers and upholding fair competition in the host State. “In the 
EESC’s view… it is important to have equal minimum conditions of 
employment… the directive should aim at preventing unnecessary administrative 
costs that place burdens on companies.” The two elements stressed by the EESC 
are worrying as it implies supporting minimum conditions applying equally to all 
workers and therefore driving down labour conditions in the host State and 
emphasises the priority not to restrict the freedom to provide services above other 
interests, which is surprising bearing in mind this Committee should be the voice 
of both economic and social policies. 
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This thesis therefore cannot agree with the EESC’s view and does not 
support the proposed Enforcement Directive. It can be appreciated that it has 
clearly been deeply considered and it provides some useful solutions, however – it 
is incomplete – and therefore to adopt it as it stands would be a mistake as it does 
not rectify all of the existing problems. In fact, what this Enforcement Directive 
has achieved is the enforcement of an unsatisfactory Directive. If this proposed 
legislation is adopted in its current form, it will enforce the most pertinent 
problems of the Directive, namely, the one-sided legal basis, the deeply 
problematic Article 3 Directive and the apparent lack of protection for all workers 
and all undertakings concerned. This legislative proposal has attempted to give the 
impression of granting greater support and solving the problems that needed 
amending, however, through its subtle changes and extensive provisions it is 
masking the fact that it has not even attempted to address the fundamental 
problems witnessed in the Laval Triplet and it has in fact created legislative 
loopholes for the service providers, such as the due diligence provision on joint 
and several liability and the fact that when it drew attention to the most relevant 
rights and principles of the Charter that are due notable protection in the 
Enforcement Directive, under paragraph 33 of the Preamble, it chose to omit 
Article 12 Charter on the freedom of assembly and of association. It has ingrained 
the minimum level of protection and therefore promises to drive down labour 
conditions even further and firmly places them at the very bottom, guaranteeing 
social dumping and rising social tensions.  
It is implored: the Enforcement Directive is no solution for the Directive; 
it is an elaborate decoy that seemingly allows the Commission to be seen to be 
doing something but as it has not even attempted to address the fundamental 
issues it is no more than a wasted opportunity. 
 
(iv) The Monti II Regulation 
 
According to the Monti Report, the Laval Quartet “revived an old split that had 
never been healed: the divide between advocates of greater market integration and 
those who feel that the call for economic freedoms and for breaking up regulatory 
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barriers is code for dismantling social rights protected at national level.”596 
Therefore, the Commission, along with the European social partners, felt that now 
is the time to work towards finally healing this divide and to provide legislative 
guidance on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of 
the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. A Regulation 
was considered to be the most suitable legal instrument for this task as “The direct 
applicability of a Regulation will reduce regulatory complexity and offer greater 
legal certainty for those subject to the legislation across the Union by clarifying 
the applicable rules in a more uniform way.”597 In the Monti II Regulation the 
Commission clearly intended to provide very strict and concrete guidance on this 
issue, especially as the right to strike is outside the scope of the Union’s 
competence therefore this proposed Regulation has the potential to be the seminal 
legislative instrument in this area. 
 In spite of its great potential, the Regulation itself is actually very short, 
only consisting of five Articles. The first paragraph of the Preamble to the 
Regulation emphasises the importance of the right to take collective action; citing 
the European Social Charter, ILO Convention No. 87 and No. 98, the Community 
Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (particularly Article 28) as well as enjoying constitutional 
protection in several Member States. The Preamble also cites Article 152 TFEU, 
stressing the importance of the role of social partners and the diversity of national 
systems. The right to take collective action does not stand alone and is a corollary 
to the right to collective bargaining and to negotiate and enter into collective 
agreements, as protected by Article 11 ECHR. However, the right to take 
collective action, as is the case with the fundamental economic freedoms, is not an 
absolute right, but is subject to certain limitations which may have to be 
reconciled, as specified by paragraph 11 of the Preamble, in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality by national authorities – importantly, this grants the 
national authorities control of assessing proportionality, thereby respecting that 
the right to strike is not a competence of the Union. Paragraph 8 of the Preamble 
is, in my opinion, an incredibly important provision and it is suggested that this 
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should also be included in the Directive (as aforementioned under Solution 
Number One) as it directly addresses one of the main issues as seen by the case 
law on posted workers, “The protection of workers, in particular their social 
protection and the protection of their rights against social dumping, as well as the 
desire to avoid disturbances on the labour market have been recognised as 
constituting overriding reasons of general interest justifying restriction of the 
exercise of one of the fundamental freedoms of Union law.” This would not only 
support the interests of the host State workers but also the host State, particularly 
against social dumping and disturbances to the labour market. The Commission 
refuses to accept that the use of posted workers causes a disturbance on the labour 
market of the host State as they are only ‘temporary’ but as argued previously, 
their temporary nature does not negate the fact that they are present. Therefore, 
this provision would suitably assist in rectifying the balance in the case of posted 
workers. Paragraph 9 adds to this by stating that trade unions should be able to 
take collective action “provided this is done in compliance with Union and 
national law and practice.” The exercise of collective action has been made 
conditional on the fact that it complies with Union and national law and practice 
which satisfactorily sets the correct balance of the competing interests at stake.   
Article 1 contains the ‘Monti Clause’ and, interestingly, there is a 
difference between this Clause and that of the Enforcement Directive; in Article 
1(2) Enforcement Directive it provides, “This Directive shall not affect in any 
way the exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in Member States and by 
Union law”, however, in the Monti II Regulation it has deleted the words “and by 
Union law”, suggesting that the Clause has a greater deference to the Member 
States’ interests in the Monti II Regulation. 
Article 2 specifies that the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services will respect the fundamental right to take collective action and 
equally, this fundamental right will respect those fundamental freedoms. This 
provision intends to place these competing interests on an equal footing, however, 
notably, it does not go so far as to state that there is no primacy between the two, 
even though that is the implication, presumably because by saying nothing at all 
this silently leaves the option open to grant primacy to economic freedoms and the 
Commission would not want to grant primacy to fundamental rights. This 
intended balance aims for equality and by expressly stating the equal value of 
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social rights and economic freedoms clearly there is progression, however, the 
difficulty is that in practice, the Court will still have to choose one over the other 
when there is a conflict of interest. Therefore, implicating that no primacy exists 
between economic freedoms and fundamental social rights is in fact “implausible, 
and is either naïve or disingenuous. It is in the nature of disputes between 
economic freedoms and social rights that both cannot prevail simultaneously.”598 
Clearly, the aim of equality between the two is necessitated, however, in reality it 
may be nothing more than rhetoric. This is particularly true in the case of the 
Enforcement Directive as the legal basis has remained the same, thus, the Court is 
restricted in its scope and is likely to continue to uphold the freedom to provide 
services above all else. 
 
(v) Responses to the Monti II Regulation  
 
“In my view, there is nothing of merit in the Draft Monti II Regulation”.599 
Ewing’s response to the draft Monti II Regulation is pithy and resolute. Ewing 
opined that the legislative proposal is a wasted opportunity as it has failed to 
acknowledge the developments that have been made since Viking and Laval and 
instead “fossilizes”600 these two cases in which, “the ECJ developed a standard for 
the protection of the right to strike that is lower than that existing in many EU 
Member States.”601 Member States have a duty to comply with certain 
international conventions such as ILO Convention No. 87 on the freedom of 
association and protection of the right to organise, No. 98 on the right to organise 
and collective bargaining and Article 11 ECHR on the freedom of assembly and 
association; these international agreements are also part of the fabric of Union 
law. The developments as seen in the ECtHR, including Demir and Baykara602 
and Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen,603 which have contributed to the development of the 
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rights of collective bargaining and action respectively and the first of which was 
decided within a year of Viking and Laval, indicate that, “The first weakness of 
Monti II is that it writes into a legislative form and preserves in aspic a judicial 
formulation that was out of date within a year of its expression.”604  
It is understood that the Monti II Regulation was expected to show a 
concerted move away from the judgments of Viking and Laval in order to make a 
real promise for change and to take into account the developments that have been 
made since the judgments. However, it is submitted that just because Monti II did 
not legislate the rulings of Demir and Baykara and Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen, does not 
mean that the Court cannot take them into account. Furthermore, it is submitted 
that the developments in the ECtHR since Viking and Laval have not been ignored 
by the drafters of the Monti II Regulation as paragraph 2 of the Preamble 
explicitly refers to Article 11 ECHR and then cites the case Demir and Baykara 
and further, the first paragraph of the Preamble cites ILO Convention No. 87 and 
No. 98. 
The concern that the jurisprudence of Viking and Laval has been written 
into the Monti II Regulation may be attributed to Article 2 Monti II Regulation 
which specifies that both the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services shall respect the fundamental right to take collective action and vice versa 
– which is arguably the central clause of the Regulation. The issue is that this 
provision embodies the principle of proportionality, “Yet, because the application 
of the principle of proportionality by the ECJ was at the core of the Viking and 
Laval rulings (and at the core of the criticism to these decisions) it is difficult to 
see how this provision of the proposed regulation was likely to trigger a change in 
the case law of the ECJ and enhance the protection of the right to strike.”605 In 
Viking and Laval the Court recognised that the right to strike is a fundamental 
right of the Union constitutional order, nevertheless, the economic freedoms 
prevailed. Accordingly, the fear generated by these cases, now re-ignited by this 
legislative proposal, is that the fundamental right to strike, which is a 
constitutional right in some Member States, is merely declaratory at Union level. 
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Barnard discussed the application of the proportionality test in the Monti II 
Regulation at the FORMULA Conference.606 In Barnard’s presentation entitled 
“Free movement and labour rights – Is it possible to square the circle?” in light of 
the case law and its consequent ‘chilling effect’ on industrial action, three options 
were considered as alternative solutions to the Monti II Regulation: (i) Be more 
robust about the scope of application of EU law, for example, excluding the 
application of the internal market freedoms from collective action – currently, the 
lines are blurred, therefore this option would introduce a threshold element. There 
are uncertainties in this area, not only seen in the judgments but also in the 
primary law itself,607 nevertheless, it is suggested that, on balance, by instigating 
these stricter parameters, the Court will have less flexibility in making its 
decisions, which would certainly be a detriment; (ii) Reverse the priority of the 
rights which would grant primacy to social rights. This is what the ETUC has 
called for, however, Barnard stated that this would solve one problem, yet create 
another, which this thesis is in full agreement with; and (iii) Engage in proper 
balancing, of which the Monti II Regulation attempted to secure via the three-
pronged proportionality test:  
 
“A fair balance between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms will 
in the case of conflict only be ensured when a restriction imposed by a 
fundamental right on a fundamental freedom is not permitted to go beyond 
what is appropriate, necessary and reasonable to realise that fundamental 
right. Conversely, a restriction imposed on a fundamental right by a 
fundamental freedom cannot go beyond what is appropriate, necessary and 
reasonable to realise the fundamental freedom.”608 
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The first option presented by Barnard of introducing a defined threshold regarding 
the application of EU law in an area that is technically outside the Union’s 
competence, yet which the Court has brought within its scope, oversteps the 
jurisdiction of a sensitive area that is intended to be left to the Member States’ 
prerogative and secondly, by re-prioritising the interests, the problem will only 
change direction. Therefore, the third option of expressly bolstering social rights 
by placing them on an equal footing with the economic freedoms is a valid 
response that has been accepted in other fundamental rights’ instruments such as 
the Charter; Article 52(1) Charter stipulates that any limitation on the exercise of 
the rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter will be subject to the principle 
of proportionality and as social rights are not absolute, they can be limited if the 
limitation is necessary and genuinely meets the objectives of the general interest. 
This also inspired AG Trstenjak’s Opinion in Commission v Germany which 
provided the three-pronged approach to proportionality – appropriateness, 
necessity and reasonableness – by essentially mimicking word-for-word 
paragraph 13 of the Preamble to the Monti II Regulation.609 AG Trstenjak’s 
statement on proportionality followed her argument that there is not a hierarchical 
relationship between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights, AG Trstenjak 
“calls for a ‘fair balance’ between rights and freedoms, emphasizing repeatedly… 
that the proportionality enquiry cuts both ways.”610 This shows true balance – a 
premise that this thesis whole-heartedly pursues – and it is submitted that the 
proportionality principle does not erode the significance of fundamental rights; it 
bolsters their significance by equally applying to fundamental freedoms. The 
starting point is the same: neither element is an absolute, they are both subject to 
equal treatment and both must be open to yield to the other. 
Therefore, presumably, it is not the proportionality test itself that is at 
issue, but its application in the collective relations context,611 which has never 
been accepted as a natural fit, “While the concept may be sufficiently broad and 
flexible to satisfy both employers and trade unions in some situations, it also 
leaves a lot of room for interpretation by national courts and influence by national 
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political sentiments.”612 Accordingly, it has been stated that the very essence of 
collective relations is incompatible with the principle of proportionality: 
 
“Courts in the Member States, very sensibly, have been extremely cautious 
in invoking any test of proportionality as regards the right to strike… It is in 
the very nature of negotiations that both parties set demands at their highest 
and through negotiation over time seek a compromise… At what stage of 
this process and against what criteria is the test of proportionality to be 
applied? Any test based on proportionality in assessing the legitimacy of 
collective action is generally avoided in the industrial relations models of 
Member States for the very reason that it is essential to maintain the 
impartiality of the state in economic conflicts.”613 
 
In her presentation, Barnard said that the difficulty with the proportionality test in 
respect of collective action is that the more successful a strike will be, the less 
likely it will be held as being proportionate. This indicates that leaving this area to 
balancing the interests via proportionality, gives the impression of great social 
progress, yet, in reality, it pertains to balancing the unbalanceable and the very 
notion that these rights can be made subject to balancing undermines the essence 
of their fundamental status, therefore, in spite of the progression, it will always 
result in the same decision by the Court. However, it is submitted that that feared 
conclusion is not guaranteed, due to the fact that social progress is currently one 
of the most dynamic areas of Union law and it is submitted that this, contrary to 
other opinions, has been appreciated by the Monti II Regulation; paragraph 8 of 
the Preamble provides that the protection of workers, particularly against social 
dumping and the desire to avoid disturbances on the labour market are recognised 
as overriding reasons of general interest that can restrict the economic freedoms. 
The fact that this has been subject to proportionality does not determine that these 
rights and their fundamental status have been negated; the fundamental freedoms 
are also subject to the proportionality test. The principle of proportionality is a 
general principle of EU law, integral to the functioning of the internal market and 
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is provided for within the ‘Common Provisions’ of the very first Title of the TEU 
under Article 5(4). It is not the principle of proportionality itself that is the issue 
but the fact that collective action has been caught by this principle. However, this 
concept is not new; it is submitted that from the moment Viking and Laval ruled 
that the right to strike is capable of restricting the freedom of establishment and 
the freedom to provide services, the right to strike automatically became subject 
to the principle of proportionality. 
The guidelines of the Monti II Regulation were genuinely encouraging the 
Court to embrace social rights, including the right to strike. The crux of the matter 
appears to be that all trust for the Court’s decision-making has been broken and 
therefore it has been suggested that the legislator makes absolutely clear that 
social rights can trump economic rights and anything less will be written off as 
‘not doing enough’. It is as if the academic doctrine is calling for a firm guarantee 
that in future case law economic freedoms will yield to social rights, specifically 
collective action. However, in reality, this is unfeasible as the concept of 
proportionality must be flexible in order to be an effective judicial tool. Its 
flexibility will depend on the degree of scrutiny to which it is applied, either 
strictly or in a broader manner, if it is the latter then the diversity of Member 
States’ laws will have a greater opportunity for being upheld. Moreover, the 
application of the proportionality test in national courts will inevitably be 
influenced by two variables: (i) the proportionality test may be implemented to 
varying degrees depending on the courts’ familiarity with the principle in general, 
for example, this will depend on the legal tradition614 of the State and accordingly 
whether the principle is a new legal paradigm in which its usage may be more 
tentative compared to Member States in which it is a well-established part of the 
jurisprudence; and (ii) the application of the test specifically in the area of 
industrial action is unchartered territory in some Member States, “the notion of 
assessing the proportionality of collective action is entirely alien to the UK 
courts.”615  
Viking and Laval truly caused a fear amongst the academics and 
practitioners in this area, but it must be recognised that these judgments, which 
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are albeit embedded in the psyche, have not been embedded into the construct of 
Union law – it must therefore be believed that the Court has both the power and 
the will to prioritise collective action over the fundamental freedoms where 
appropriate. 
However, it has been concluded that the proposed Monti II Regulation will 
not be the legislative instrument by which the Court can exemplify its potential 
for greater balancing of the competing interests as the proposal has been 
withdrawn. There was an overwhelming negative response to the proposal, from 
the ETUC616 and BusinessEurope,617 but perhaps most substantially from the 
national Parliaments. For the first time since its introduction by the Lisbon Treaty, 
Parliaments of some of the Member States activated the so-called “yellow card” in 
accordance with Article 6 Subsidiarity Protocol,618 which provides that any 
national Parliament may send a reasoned opinion stating why it considers a draft 
legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. In the case of the 
proposed Monti II Regulation, twelve national Parliaments issued such an opinion 
thereby necessitating that the draft be reviewed. As a result, the Commission 
withdrew the proposed Monti II Regulation and, “in a letter to national 
parliaments, the Commission stated that… the reason for the withdrawal was the 
possible lack of the necessary political support for the proposal in the European 
Parliament and the Council in the future.”619  
This thesis can recognise the proposal’s shortcomings, yet it also stands by 
the conviction that Union legislation is far better off taking the route it has done 
here by stating that fundamental freedoms are equal to fundamental rights, as 
opposed to setting out in the legislation that one has primacy over the other. 
Furthermore, the legislation should not fundamentally change the position of 
economic freedoms as they are so core to the Union’s operation. Finally, the 
notion of primacy is a very delicate subject in Union law, as evidenced by the fact 
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that the Treaty does not explicitly refer to the “primacy” of Union law – placing it 
in the body of the text would be a very bold move – closer to the objectives of the 
unsuccessful Constitutional Treaty than the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, the only mention 
of primacy can be found in Declaration 17, which is attached to the Treaties and is 
non-binding. It states that the primacy of Union law is conditional on the Court’s 
well-settled decisions and therefore is not an absolute principle.  
 
(vi) Interim Conclusion 
 
Solution Number Two has presented the proposed Enforcement Directive and 
Monti II Regulation. The latter has now been withdrawn, however, the proposed 
Enforcement Directive still has the potential to be adopted. 
The concept of an Enforcement Directive is welcomed, provided that it 
sufficiently enforces the Directive and does not enforce existing problems. The 
difficulty with revising the actual Directive itself is that there is no common 
European interest; as evidenced by the diverging interests of the European social 
partners.620 However, this thesis has the benefit of being free from the influence of 
political interests and therefore has not been swayed either by economic or social 
policy objectives; it is not beholden to stakeholders’ expectations and therefore 
experiences the luxury of autonomy. Accordingly, this thesis is able to generate a 
more balanced and holistic picture of the Directive and has consistently aimed to 
correctly identify the most pertinent issues, thereby presenting a clearer view of 
the most suitable and effective legislative solutions.  
The Enforcement Directive was published at a time when all of Europe 
was feeling the economic recession; bringing workers in from abroad will always 
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be a sensitive topic, not least when local unemployment is at its highest. This 
atmosphere was not in favour of welcoming a proposal that would potentially 
show fervent support for the freedom to provide services in the form of workers 
from outside and that these workers would be granted greater clout in terms of 
protecting their rights when the national labour markets and rights of the national 
workers were at their most vulnerable. Nevertheless, it was time for the 
Commission to act, bearing in mind the “long wait” that had been endured in the 
lead up to the Commission’s proposal. Yet, the Commission’s proposal was 
reflective of the uncertain environment in which it was published as it did not 
fully commit to solving the problems of the Directive; it is incomplete and 
therefore this thesis emphatically submits that it should not be adopted in its 
current state. Ideally, the Directive itself needs to be revised so as to make a real 
difference.  
Without wanting to over-simplify this technical and intricate area of law, 
the suggestions that have been proposed by all interested parties to date can 
bluntly be summarised as follows: the trade unions want to prioritise social rights 
and the legislator has maintained the priority of economic rights by leaving the 
legal basis untouched and in fact has reinforced it by emphasising the objectives 
of the Enforcement Directive solely in line with service provision. This thesis 
identifies these suggested solutions as a ‘pendulum approach’ in the way that 
these two forces are kept on opposing sides and one cannot succeed so long as 
favour has been granted to the other side. This same principle was eloquently 
expressed by Cherednychenko in the context of contract law and fundamental 
rights, but rather than relating to a pendulum the analogy of ‘walking in circles’ 
was adopted. Here, Cherednychenko suggests how to break free from walking in 
circles, “It is only when there is a dialogue between fundamental rights and 
contract law, rather than the subordination of contract law to fundamental rights, 
that major breakthroughs in our understanding of contractual justice may be 
achieved, and it is these breakthroughs, in providing new and better solutions, 
both in EU Member States’ national contract laws and in the nascent EU contract 
law, which will truly benefit weaker parties.”621 This dialogue is also needed in 
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the context of fundamental rights and freedoms; to break free from the pendulum 
approach this area needs a ‘shake-up’ to jolt the Court out of its previous 
interpretation. It is submitted that this will most effectively be achieved by 
changing the legal basis to provide balance and harmony as opposed to a 
legislative hierarchy. Accordingly, the Commission’s proposal will not effectively 
resolve the issue of walking in circles, therefore, the Enforcement Directive 
should not be adopted. 
 
IV. Solution Number Three: No Changes to the Directive 
 
Solution Number Three is the final solution to be considered in this Chapter and 
its premise is to rely solely on the legislative changes that have been made to the 
Union by the Lisbon Treaty, as opposed to making any amendments to the 
Directive. This section will initially analyse the impact of Article 6 TEU and 
whether the elevated status it has granted to social rights in the primary law is 
sufficient to rectify the issues of the Directive and finally, this section will review 
the posted worker cases since the Laval Triplet to decipher how far the Court has 
adjusted its interpretation in this area and accordingly, in light of these changes, 
whether an amendment to the Directive is still necessary.   
 
(i) Article 6(1) TEU 
 
The Lisbon Treaty came into force on 1 December 2009. It has made a number of 
changes to the Union’s constitutional and institutional frameworks, its external 
relations and EU policies.622 The Social Policy Title of the TFEU is Title X; 
Articles 151 – 161 TFEU (ex Articles 136 – 145 EC Treaty). Article 152 TFEU is 
the new provision that establishes the objectives of the Union to include the role 
of social partners, including social dialogue and respecting their autonomy, and it 
takes into account the diversity of national systems. It also institutionalises the 
Tripartite Social Summit, stating that it will contribute to social dialogue. The 
promotion of social dialogue and respect for the differing national systems in the 
Treaties is imperative, however, arguably, the greatest contribution of the changes 
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made by the Lisbon Treaty to EU social policy has been the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
Article 6(1) TEU states, “The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union… 
which shall have the same legal values as the Treaties.” This provision grants the 
Charter legally binding status, thereby incorporating it into EU constitutional law. 
The Charter intends to make rights more visible, but it does not extend the scope 
of application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union and therefore it does 
not create new fundamental rights under national law as it only applies to Member 
States when they are implementing Union law.623 However, it is suggested that the 
limit on the application of the Charter does not necessarily have to be too limiting, 
“the scope of EU law, and thus the applicability of the Charter to national 
measures, may, with a little lawyerly or judicial imagination, be rendered very 
broad indeed.”624 
Chapter IV Charter is the Solidarity Chapter, comprising Articles 27 – 38 
Charter. Of particular importance is the right of collective bargaining and action, 
including strike action, under Article 28 Charter. Importantly, the Charter codifies 
civil, political, social and economic rights into one catalogue but this does not 
denote that all rights therein are of equal value, “The right of free access to a 
placement service is worthwhile no doubt (article 29 of the Charter) but it can 
hardly be seen as on the same level as the prohibition on slavery (article 5 of the 
Charter). To be sure, it might be argued that inclusion in a single document does 
not mean that they are being equated”.625 The issue with indivisibility is that a 
similar method of interpretation may be applied to all of the rights. However, 
there is a further distinction to be made; between rights and principles, 
“According to its Preamble, the Charter contains ‘rights, freedoms and principles,’ 
without identifying which provisions belong to which category.”626 Article 51(1) 
Charter prescribes, “respect the rights, observe the principles”, this is expanded on 
by Article 52(5) Charter which provides that principles may be implemented by 
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Union institutions and Member States when implementing Union law and “They 
shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the 
ruling on their legality.” However, this condition does not extend to the 
application of rights. Therefore, the Charter does prescribe a difference in 
treatment but does not specify which provisions fall within the concept of either 
rights or principles, “In the absence of precise guidance, the distinction between 
rights and principles, though important, seems set to remain obscure and 
unpredictable.”627 Notably, Article 28 Charter refers to the right of collective 
bargaining and action and therefore, seemingly, gives rise to a direct claim for 
positive action by the Union’s institutions and Member States.  
A further element of legal uncertainty introduced by the Charter, in respect 
of Article 28, is embodied in Protocol No. 30,628 which reflects how solidarity 
within the Union is adopted differently between the Member States and therefore 
the legal effect of solidarity rights in practice is undecided. Finally, the Charter 
does not have direct horizontal effect as Article 51(1) Charter does not mention 
private parties among those being bound by the Charter. Even if it could be 
argued that due to the way Article 28 Charter has been drafted, by addressing 
workers and employers, and so is capable of garnering some horizontal effect, the 
Charter’s origins reveal that it was not intended to be invoked horizontally, “From 
the start, emphasis was laid on the fact that the Charter is primarily addressed to 
the EU institutions, and that it is not in principle aimed at the Member States as 
such.”629 Clearly, the Charter has evolved since then so that now it directly 
addresses Member States when they are implementing Union law, but there is still 
no direct address to private parties.630  
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The Charter has been granted legally binding status since the Laval Triplet 
and therefore it is hoped that this will introduce a more social influence in the 
Court’s future preliminary rulings. However, due to the aforementioned 
conditions which create prohibitions on the application of the Charter, the 
practical application of Article 28 Charter and the right of collective bargaining 
and action does not guarantee greater clout for the social partners in the European 
industrial relations context and cannot be relied upon alone; the Directive 
necessitates firm guarantees that there will be definite improvements. 
 
(ii) Article 6(2) TEU 
 
Article 6(2) TEU provides for EU accession to the ECHR, determining that the 
EU will have to be treated like any other Member and accordingly, the decisions 
of the ECtHR will have an even greater impact on the Union. Demir and 
Baykara631 was decided in the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR on 12 November 
2008; less than one year on from Viking and Laval. In the case, Mr Demir was a 
member of the Turkish trade union for civil servants ‘Tüm Bel Sen’ and Mrs 
Baykara was its President. Tüm Bel Sen had entered into a two year collective 
agreement with the Gaziantep Municipal Council concerning all aspects of the 
employees’ working conditions. The Council had failed to adhere to all of the 
conditions, therefore, Mrs Baykara brought proceedings against it in the 
Gaziantep District Court. The District Court ruled in favour of the trade union, 
however, on appeal the Court of Cassation quashed that judgment on the basis that 
there is a right to form a trade union but the trade union did not have the authority 
to enter into collective agreements as the law stood. The District Court stood by 
its original judgment that the trade union had the right to enter into collective 
agreements as that accorded with the conventions of the ILO that Turkey had 
ratified. The Court of Cassation again quashed this decision. Then the Audit Court 
ordered that members of the trade union had to reimburse the additional income 
they had received as a result of the “defunct” collective agreement. Finally, the 
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trade union made an application to the ECtHR alleging breach of the freedom of 
association under Article 11 ECHR and protection against discrimination under 
Article 14 ECHR. It was held that Article 11 ECHR had been breached but there 
was no need to examine Article 14 ECHR, so the Turkish Government requested 
that the matter be referred to the Grand Chamber. The Grand Chamber, consisting 
of seventeen judges, unanimously held that there had been an unjustified and 
disproportionate breach of Article 11 ECHR on account of the failure to recognise 
the right of the Applicants to form a trade union and on account of the annulment 
of the collective agreement. The effect of this decision is that it “succeeded in 
putting a smile back on the faces of labour lawyers everywhere… the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights consciously and deliberately 
overruled its earlier decisions on the matter to hold that the right to freedom of 
association in article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
now includes the right to collective bargaining.”632  
The significance of Demir and Baykara cannot be underestimated, “it is a 
decision in which human rights have established their superiority over economic 
irrationalism and ‘competitiveness’ in the battle for the soul of labour law”.633 
However, it must be asked how this can have a positive impact on resolving the 
Directive? The EU’s accession to the ECHR is intended but, equally, it has been 
anticipated since 2009. So the likelihood is that it will not be imminent. 
Nevertheless, there is a great deal of promise in paragraph 157 of Demir and 
Baykara which necessitates legislation to give effect to the provisions of 
international labour conventions, “The decision in Demir thus creates the alluring 
possibility of complaints being made in the Strasbourg Court against an EU 
Member State about the latter’s failure to comply with the ECHR because of 
obligations arising under EU law.”634 The case established that Article 11 ECHR 
is the yardstick by which the right of collective bargaining must be assessed. 
Every Member State of the Union is a Member of the ECHR and both the 
Charter’s Preamble and Article 6(3) TEU reaffirm that the ECHR constitutes a 
general principle of Union law, which has been granted expression by Article 12 
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Charter on the freedom of assembly and of association and Article 28 Charter on 
the right of collective bargaining and action. 
Five months later, seven ECtHR judges confirmed that Demir and 
Baykara was not an aberration by unanimously ruling in Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen635 
that Article 11 ECHR also protects the right to strike, “This link is obvious on 
examination of the realities of collective industrial relations. Without the right to 
strike, the right to collectively bargain is no more than a right to collective 
begging.”636 This case, also from Turkey, concerned a ban preventing public 
sector employees from taking part in a one day national strike in support of the 
right to a collective bargaining agreement. Some of the Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen trade 
union’s members took part in the strike and received disciplinary sanctions as a 
result. The trade union alleged that the Turkish authorities had violated Article 11 
ECHR and the ECtHR, in reference to its earlier judgment in Demir and Baykara, 
agreed with the trade union. The ECtHR acknowledged that the right to strike is 
not absolute637 and is subject to the limitations under Article 11(2) ECHR. 
 These cases have satisfactorily endorsed the right of collective bargaining 
and action which must be acknowledged by the ECJ in light of the future 
accession to the ECHR and the provision under Article 6(3) TEU.  
 
(iii) Article 6(3) TEU 
 
This provision states that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR and the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States shall constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law. As the Member States’ constitutional principles are 
part of the body of Union law, the Court must not diverge too far from those 
values. The right to strike has constitutional significance in some Member States 
and therefore should not be underplayed. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to 
alter the perspective by which these labour rights are viewed, and indeed, labelled, 
“One approach is to seek to persuade the Court to attach more weight to the 
employment protection issues involved, for example by arguing that the matters of 
employment protection listed in the Posted Workers Directive are matters of 
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human rights, rather than ‘merely’ workers’ interests.”638 Accordingly, what 
makes labour rights transcend the limits of ‘merely’ workers’ interests? A 
positivistic approach provides that, “If labour rights are incorporated in human 
rights documents, they are human rights.”639 Therefore, there is scope to support 
this premise in respect of the Charter, the ECHR and the fact that in 1998 the ILO 
adopted the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work which 
includes the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to 
collective bargaining, embodied under ILO Convention No. 87 and No. 98, as one 
of the four rights that are to be recognised as fundamental human rights by the 
ILO Member States, even if the State has not ratified the relevant Convention 
Numbers. However, the practical application of fundamental rights in private law 
will inevitably differ from that of labour rights, also, when there is a clash with an 
economic fundamental freedom, the Court will subject these rights to the principle 
of proportionality, as endorsed by Article 52(1) Charter. 
When trade union collective action comes up against the fundamental 
freedom to provide services in the context of posted workers, the services are 
likely to prevail as the Court’s hands are tied by the legal basis and the fact that it 
does not come within the EU’s competence all contribute to it being a ‘quieter’ 
right in the Court. Therefore, unless the legal basis changes, it is necessary to rely 
on something else, such as constitutional principles, which would be a stronger 
‘contender’ against service provision. If the social right is granted constitutional 
value, the Court would have to apply a stricter scrutiny in derogating from that 
right640 as constitutional law warrants a special scrutiny by the Court, whereas 
ordinary law simply requires ordinary principles of interpretation.  
In BECTU641 it was held that the right to paid annual leave is a social right 
conferred directly on all workers by Union law. The UK Working Time 
Regulations specified that the right to paid annual leave did not arise until the 
worker had completed a minimum of thirteen weeks uninterrupted employment 
with the same employer. However, BECTU is a trade union representing workers 
in the broadcasting, film, theatre, cinema and related sectors in which employment 
is usually based on short-term contracts, often less than thirteen weeks. The Court 
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referred to the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 
which cites that every worker in the Union must enjoy satisfactory health and 
safety conditions at work and every worker is entitled to paid annual leave, “It 
follows that the entitlement of every worker to paid annual leave must be regarded 
as a particularly important principle of Community social law from which there 
can be no derogations”.642 Importantly, Directive 93/104 concerning certain 
aspects of the organisation of working time gives expression to this general 
principle of Union law. The entitlement to paid annual leave as a fundamental 
right has since been confirmed by Article 31(2) Charter.  
The main lesson to be learnt from BECTU is that the social right at issue 
was embodied in Directive 93/104 which gave expression to the general principle, 
however, the right to strike is not provided for in the Posted Workers Directive. 
Article 28 Charter has given expression to the right of collective bargaining and 
action, however, Article 1(2) Protocol No. 30 provides the following, “nothing in 
Title IV [the Solidarity Title] of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to 
Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom 
has provided for such rights in its national law.” The UK does not legally 
recognise the right to strike,643 therefore, this would negate a justiciable right, in 
accordance with the abovementioned Protocol in the UK, and unless it can 
substantially improve conditions for the posting of workers in all Member States, 
this thesis will not consider the solution as a viable option. Also, BECTU was a 
public law case, whereas posted worker cases can come under both public644 or 
private645 law and the issue of the place of constitutional principles and 
fundamental rights in private law adds another layer of uncertainty. Finally, in 
BECTU it was very clear as to the right that was being protected: the entitlement 
to paid annual leave, however, in the case of posted workers, it is not only the 
right to strike that has been neglected, but also a respect for the differing national 
labour systems and methods of extending the host State’s laws to posted workers 
via different methods of applying collective agreements and so on; the issues are 
numerous and therefore it is difficult to pin-point the main issue that could be 
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granted more weight by the support of a constitutional principle or fundamental 
right. In short, the posting of workers has revealed itself to be so unique and 
steeped in its own very specific issues that Solution Number Three is not showing 
itself to be the most suitable or effective legislative solution. However, there is 
still one final avenue that needs to be considered and that is the role of the Court. 
 
(iv) The Court’s “Newer” Approach? 
 
Kilpatrick described the Court’s interpretation of the Directive in the Laval Triplet 
as taking a “new approach”.646 It is submitted that the Court needs to revise this 
new approach as it has proved itself to be overwhelmingly unsatisfactory; the 
Court only upheld the freedom to provide services and therefore revealed that in 
respect of fair competition and workers’ rights, the Directive adds very little.  
 The question that will be answered in this section is whether the Court 
alone can resolve the issues of the Directive. This will require a change in the 
Court’s interpretation in light of social issues, which will hopefully now be 
possible due to the legitimate expression that has been granted to social rights by 
the Lisbon Treaty. In order to examine this question, this section will initially 
analyse the case law on posted workers following the Laval Triplet; three cases 
from the ECJ and two cases from the EFTA Court, and will conclude with an 
assessment of the Court’s role as constitutional adjudicator. 
The case of Commission v Germany647 was decided on 21 January 2010, 
one year and a half after the final case in the Laval Triplet.648 This case, that 
concerned transitional measures and the posting of workers from Poland to 
Germany, showed that the Court’s interpretation in this area has evolved from the 
Laval Triplet as it exemplified that whilst it is imperative to maintain the 
importance of Article 56 TFEU, account must also be taken of the effects this has 
on the domestic labour market.  
The first point of complaint from the Commission was in respect of Article 
1(1) of the German-Polish Agreement which provides that work permits shall be 
issued to Polish posted workers in respect of a “works contract between a Polish 
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employer and an undertaking from the other side”. Germany had interpreted the 
expression “undertaking from the other side” as referring only to German 
undertakings. The effect of this interpretation was that only undertakings that 
were established in Germany and wished to carry out work there could conclude 
contracts with a Polish contractor and thereby benefit from the quota of Polish 
workers guaranteed under the Agreement. Therefore, undertakings from other 
Member States would have had to set up a subsidiary in Germany in order to 
comply with this interpretation. The Court held that this is a restriction of Article 
56 TFEU. 
 The second complaint from the Commission was that the labour market 
protection clause in Leaflet 16a infringed the ‘standstill’ clause under Chapter 2, 
paragraph 13, Annex XII to the Act of Accession. Leaflet 16a concerns 
employment of foreign workers from new Member States undertaking work 
contracts in Germany. It contains a labour market protection clause which states 
that where the average unemployment rate in districts of the Federal Employment 
Agency have been at least 30% higher for the previous six months than the 
average unemployment rate in Germany, work contracts involving foreign 
workers are generally prohibited. The standstill clause specifies that Germany and 
Austria may, after notifying the Commission, derogate from Article 56 TFEU in 
order to limit the number of posted workers established in Poland, whose right to 
take up work in the host State is subject to national measures. The objective of 
this derogation is stated as addressing “serious disturbances or the threat thereof in 
specific sensitive service sectors on their labour markets, which could arise in 
certain regions from the transnational provision of services, as defined in Article 1 
of Directive 96/71/EC”. Clearly this is directly discriminatory, however, as it is 
provided for in the Act of Accession, the standstill clause only applies for a 
limited time. The clause also provides that the conditions between the posted 
workers from Poland and Germany and Austria shall not be more restrictive than 
those applicable on the date of signature of the Treaty of Accession; acceding to 
the Union should ease movement in the internal market and this ‘transitionary 
stage’ provides a compromise for both sides until time has evened the balance. 
However, the issue from the Commission in this case was that since 16 April 
2003, the date of signature of the Treaty of Accession of Poland to the EU, ten 
new districts were added to the list of districts subject to the labour market 
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protection clause in Leaflet 16a, therefore, in essence, this made access to the 
German labour market harder for posted workers from Poland since 16 April 
2003, which effectively infringed the standstill clause. 
It is submitted that the growing rate of unemployment is an unfortunate yet 
very real sign of the times, for which of course the service providers in Poland 
should not be punished, yet the labour markets in the host States that are already 
suffering require increased protection. There will inevitably be an increased risk 
of an abuse of this law resulting in national protectionism. However, Germany 
maintained that there has been no negative change in the legal situation or 
administrative practice as regards Poland since 16 April 2003; the only change has 
been that of the German labour market. The Court considered that the labour 
market protection clause in Leaflet 16a cannot infringe the standstill clause as the 
very purpose of that clause “is designed to enable the Federal Republic of 
Germany to address serious disturbances, or the threat thereof, in specific 
sensitive service sectors on its labour market”649 which reflects the context of the 
current labour market. The factual situation has changed, but the terms and 
conditions applicable to posted workers have remained identical. Accordingly, the 
Court held that the second complaint must be rejected as unfounded.  
The judgment did not focus on the interpretation of the Directive per se, 
but the case does reveal a less stringent approach by the Court in the context of 
posted workers. The Court showed more willing to protect the national labour 
markets in times of economic crisis; even if this has the effect of restricting the 
freedom to provide services. 
Santos Palhota650 was decided on 7 October 2010 and one of its main 
features is that AG Cruz Villalón used the case as a platform in his Opinion651 to 
advocate the changes that have been made to EU constitutional law. It is clear that 
with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the consequent binding effect 
of the Charter, there was an atmosphere of expectation that the Union was 
embarking upon a determined evolution of the importance of EU social rights. 
The AG engaged with this changing atmosphere and, in what can only be seen as 
a warning to the Court, stressed this point, “As a result of the entry into force of 
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the Treaty of Lisbon, when working conditions constitute an overriding reason 
relating to the public interest justifying a derogation from the freedom to provide 
services, they must no longer be interpreted strictly.”652 Therefore, the social 
protection measures should not just be viewed as an “exception” or “derogation” 
from the primary goal of securing the fundamental freedoms, but the perspective 
needs to change in order to reflect that social rights also form an objective of 
Union law. 
The facts of the case are as follows: a Portuguese undertaking posted 
Portuguese welders and fitters to work on ships in Belgium. During an inspection 
of the shipyard, it was found that 53 Portuguese posted workers had not exercised 
the prior declaration of posting, as required under Belgian national law. However, 
the process for the prior declaration involved the Belgian authorities certifying 
receipt and approval of the declaration within five working days from the date on 
which it was received by sending a registration number for the declaration to the 
service provider. The posted workers could only start their employment in the 
host State following the date when the registration number had been notified, if 
this was not complied with, the service provider could not benefit from the 
simplified regime but was required, under Belgian law, to draw up Belgian social 
documents, such as the individual account and payslip. The Court held that the 
provision of a prior declaration subject to the issue of an administrative licence is 
precluded by Articles 56 and 57 TFEU. The Court provided alternative measures, 
such as a requirement on the service provider “to report beforehand to the local 
authorities on the presence of one or more deployed workers, the anticipated 
duration of their presence and the provision or provisions of services justifying the 
deployment.”653 This would still have the effect of the prior declaration but would 
not be as restrictive as the additional requirement of the work licensing 
mechanism, and would therefore be a more proportionate measure to ensure 
compliance with the social welfare and wages legislation of the host State. 
The second issue was the obligation under Belgian national law on service 
providers to keep copies of documents equivalent to the individual account and 
payslip available to the Belgian authorities during the posting and then, where a 
posting has lasted a minimum of six months, following that posting the service 
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provider must send those documents to the Belgian authorities and keep them 
available for five years. The justification for keeping documents at the relevant 
authorities ensures monitoring compliance with the terms and conditions of 
employment applicable to posted workers. The Court held that such measures are 
proportionate to the aim of protecting workers. This shows real progress on the 
part of the Court from the Laval Triplet; the obligation to keep documents during 
and after the posting with the relevant national authorities is clearly an additional 
administrative and economic burden on the service provider and therefore restricts 
the freedom to provide services, nevertheless, the Court held that it is justified and 
proportionate in the interests of protecting workers. In 1999 the Court held that 
the host State cannot impose an obligation on the service provider to retain certain 
documents for a period of 5 years following the period of posting,654 therefore, 
this shows a tangible shift in the Court’s interpretation of the Directive back to the 
legislator’s original intention. 
However, the issue with this case is that the Court did not explicitly 
address the social changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty that AG Cruz Villalón 
thoroughly explored and advocated in his Opinion. AG Cruz Villalón drew 
attention to the guarantee of adequate social protection under Article 9 TFEU, the 
social market economy aiming at full employment and social progress under 
Article 3(3) TEU and fair and just working conditions under Article 31 Charter. 
The AG specified that “since 1 December 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon 
entered into force, it has been necessary to take into account a number of 
provisions of primary social law which affect the framework of the fundamental 
freedoms. Specifically, the posting of workers, in so far as it may alter the 
amplitude of the freedom to provide services, must be interpreted in the light of 
the social provisions introduced by that Treaty.”655 Dagilyte656 proposed that the 
Court’s silence on the AG voicing the ‘new social era’ could be due to the fact 
that proposals for revising the Directive had been adopted prior to this case,657 or, 
perhaps the Court did not want to step onto the legislator’s territory. It is 
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submitted that both of these reasons are plausible, however, it is interesting to 
note that despite not advocating the new social era as avidly as the AG, the 
Court’s ruling in Santos Palhota was in fact more lenient than the AG’s Opinion. 
The AG specified that service providers may draw up copies of documents that 
are equivalent to those that must be drawn up in the host State, but it is not 
permitted to keep the documents after the period of posting has ceased, neither is 
it permitted to require the documents specifically whereby the period of posting 
lasts more than six months as it unjustifiably restricts Articles 56 and 57 TFEU, 
whereas the Court did not make such distinctions. 
In this next case, decided on 10 February 2011, the Court confirmed the 
precedent set by Commission v Germany, as seen above, and showed deference to 
the interests of protecting the host State’s labour market during the transitional 
period despite the apparent restriction to the freedom to provide services. In 
Vicoplus658 the Minister for Social Affairs and Employment imposed fines on the 
Polish companies Vicoplus, BAM Vermeer and Olbek for posting Polish workers 
to the Netherlands without first having obtained work permits. Dutch national law 
imposed an obligation to obtain work permits, the referring court opined this was 
a temporary restriction on the free movement of Polish workers provided for in 
Annex XII to the 2003 Act of Accession. At the time of the events in the main 
proceedings, the transitional provisions of the 2003 Act of Accession applied a 
derogation from the freedom of movement for workers but not, as regards the 
Netherlands, from the freedom to provide services in respect of posted workers. 
The issue is that the national law required a work permit specifically for hired out 
workers, as referred to under Article 1(3)(c) Directive. Accordingly, it needed to 
be determined whether such a restriction may be justified by the general interest 
objective of protecting the domestic labour market against, inter alia, 
circumvention of the restrictions on the free movement of workers. 
The referring court asked whether Articles 56 and 57 TFEU preclude the 
national legislation. In particular, the referring court raised the question in light of 
the concept of ‘making available of workers’ and accordingly the nature of the 
main activity of the service provider. There clearly is a distinction between the 
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making available of workers, in the form of hiring-out workers, and posted 
workers, “the hiring-out of manpower constitutes a provision of services of a 
special nature, because it is characterised by its objective which is to enable 
workers to gain access to the labour market of the host Member State. From that 
angle, the hiring-out of workers… cannot be totally isolated from the problems 
connected with freedom of movement for workers within the EU.”659 The hiring-
out of workers is particularly interesting because they are sent to a host State 
under the provision of service of their employer, in the same way as posted 
workers, however, unlike posted workers, once in the host State, workers that are 
hired out work under the control and direction of the user undertaking. 
Nevertheless, paragraph 35 of the Court’s judgment reinstated AG Bot’s Opinion, 
“I consider it artificial to draw a distinction according to whether a worker gains 
access to the employment market of the host Member State directly and 
independently or through an undertaking which hires out manpower. In both 
cases, in fact, there are potentially large movements of workers which, following 
new accessions, risk disturbing the employment market of the Member States.”660 
Therefore, both the Court and the AG concluded that to exclude the hiring-out of 
workers from the scope of the Act of Accession, just because their access to the 
labour market may differ from that of the stereotypical posted workers, would 
deprive the objective of the transitional provision of much of its effectiveness. 
The Court held that, during the transitional period, Articles 56 and 57 TFEU do 
not preclude the national law that imposes the hiring-out of workers who are 
Polish nationals subject to obtaining a work permit.  
This again is a very progressive ruling that has revealed access to the host 
State’s labour market upholds a more definite and impenetrable border for typical 
posted workers in comparison to hired out workers, that is why the Court’s ruling 
to uphold the transitional measures in this context in order to protect the domestic 
labour market was so crucial. 
The final two cases to be considered both come from the EFTA Court. 
ESA v Iceland661 was decided on 28 June 2011. The case concerned a potential 
failure of Iceland to fulfil its obligations under Article 36 EEA Agreement (on the 
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freedom to provide services) and Article 3 Directive. In particular, it was 
considered whether a right to payment for sick leave under Article 5 Icelandic 
Posting Act constitutes an element of the minimum rate of pay under Article 
3(1)(c) Directive. In view of the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA), the 
payment for sick leave does not constitute remuneration for work carried out; it 
only arises under the condition where a worker is sick. The ESA argued that this 
constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services as imposing 
requirements on matters outside of Article 3(1) Directive is liable to “make it less 
attractive or more difficult to carry out work in the host State”.662 Such a 
restriction may only be justified under the exception for public policy in 
accordance with Article 3(10) Directive which the ESA does not see as applicable 
in this case. Iceland argued that the payment for sick leave is included under the 
‘minimum rates of pay’ as the Directive provides that the concept of minimum 
rate of pay is defined by the law and/or practice of the State in which the posting 
takes place and therefore Iceland argued that it is their prerogative. The ESA also 
contested Article 7 Icelandic Posting Act which imposes an obligation on the 
employer to take out accident insurance for posted workers which again makes it 
less attractive or more difficult to undertake service provision. The EFTA Court 
held that these provisions are incompatible with the Directive and Iceland has 
failed to establish that the disputed provisions are necessary to counteract a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society and 
therefore a justification under public policy is not available. 
 The issue with this case is that the Directive does specify that the notion of 
the minimum rate is to be set by the host State, accordingly, it is submitted that 
what the EFTA Court really took exception to here was the fact that Article 5 
Icelandic Posting Act does not set the sickness pay at a minimum level, also, 
Iceland stated that “the requirements at issue are established in collective 
agreements which are legally protected… The objective of the legislation is to 
provide worker protection; a recognised objective under EEA law.”663 At worst, it 
can be deduced that as the provision was not set at the minimum level and it was 
provided for in collective agreements (as opposed to a statutory condition) for the 
purpose of protecting workers, the EFTA Court dismissed the contested Article on 
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the basis that it ultimately makes service provision less attractive; this shows a 
significant step back for the interpretation of the Directive. Or, at best and in the 
alternative, the EFTA Court genuinely concluded, following a detailed 
examination of the purpose of these requirements that entitlement to pay in the 
event of illness or accident comprises a social security benefit, not payment for 
work undertaken. Either option can logically be argued, however, the main 
conclusion to take from a case such as ESA v Iceland is that the Directive still 
presents uncertainties leading to dubious judgments that may well serve the sole 
purpose of maintaining the freedom to provide services above all else, reminiscent 
of the Laval Triplet. Therefore, the Directive itself still requires amendment.  
 The final case to be considered is STX Norway664 which was decided by 
the EFTA Court on 23 January 2012. STX Norway and eight other companies 
(shipyards) brought this action against the Norwegian State by claiming that the 
Tariff Board Regulation that grants universal application to various clauses of the 
Engineering Industry collective agreement in the maritime construction industry 
was in breach of Article 36 EEA Agreement and Article 3 Directive and the 
shipyards sought compensation in this respect. The clauses that were granted 
universal application concerned the minimum rate of pay, maximum working 
hours, remuneration for work assignments requiring overtime, shift-work and 
overnight stays away from home and compensation for expenses. The effect of 
making the collective agreement universally applicable was to ensure that posted 
workers and workers established in Norway are entitled to the same wage and 
working conditions. Unfortunately, the EFTA Court adopted the “new approach” 
of the ECJ, as seen in the Laval Triplet, and maintained that, in the interests of 
service provision, obliging the service provider to provide expenses for travel, 
board and lodging in connection to the period of posting is not provided for under 
Article 3(1) Directive and therefore it can only be justified by public policy 
grounds under Article 3(10) Directive. The EFTA Court also held that the 
compensation for overnight stays away from home is, in principle, a restriction of 
the freedom to provide service under Article 36 EEA Agreement, yet the national 
authorities or courts of the host EEA State may determine whether the provision 
fulfils a public interest objective. Finally, the EFTA Court held that in respect of 
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awarding posted workers improved protection on working time, this is not strictly 
precluded by Article 3(1) Directive. 
Is this the Laval of Norway? This decision was made two months prior to 
the publication of the proposed Enforcement Directive and during the same month 
when the Danish Presidency of the Council of the EU vowed to pay special 
attention to the forthcoming proposal to resolve the problems associated with the 
Directive.665 Consequently, this decision enforced an interpretation that the 
political will of the Union was working hard to avoid. 
 Fortunately for STX Norway, the decision was not corroborated by the 
national court, unlike in Laval whereby the Swedish Labour Court’s judgment 
was seemingly just as tough. The Norwegian Court of Appeal ruled in favour of 
the Norwegian State as it held that the decision to make the collective agreement 
universally applicable and therefore impose higher employment conditions on the 
service provider was not in breach of the EEA Agreement. Following this 
decision, STX Norway and the other shipyards took the case to the Supreme Court 
of Norway which also ruled in favour of the Norwegian State on all counts and 
held that any additional obligations do not exceed what is necessary to fulfil the 
objective of attaining social protection for posted workers.  
This case, which had been “lingering in the Norwegian court system since 
2009”666 finally arrived at a broad interpretation of the hardcore list of mandatory 
terms set out under Article 3(1) Directive in the interests of maintaining worker 
protection. However, it is clear that despite the progressive decisions of the ECJ 
set out above, and despite the plethora of criticism of the way in which the 
Directive was interpreted in the Laval Triplet, these two EFTA Court decisions 
prove that the issues with the Directive are ingrained; revealing a disconcerting 
sign of history repeating itself with one step forward and two steps back.667    
 
(v) The Court’s Role 
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This section set out to answer whether the Court alone can solve the issues of the 
Directive. The Court’s role in shaping the general principles of Union law is 
unbounded, “The social policy cases, with their direct impact on individuals, 
therefore presented the Court of Justice with the opportunity to develop important 
principles, such as the direct effect of directives668 and even general principles of 
law.669”670 The Court is the constitutional adjudicator of the Union and its 
inspiration in adhering to the general principles of Union law stems from the 
fundamental rights under the ECHR and the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, “In short, the general principles of law are children of national 
law but, as brought up by the Court, they become enfants terribles: they are 
extended, narrowed, restated, transformed by a creative and eclectic judicial 
process.”671 Thus, the elements adopted from the Member States’ laws are 
reshaped to fit into the mould of the Union’s interests.  
Social policy clearly forms part of the Union’s interests; the Court has 
recognised the protection of fundamental rights as a general principle of Union 
law that has constitutional status672 and the evolutionary developments that have 
been made to EU law since the Laval Triplet “should shape a new legal 
context”.673 Recently, the Grand Chamber of the Court determined674 the field of 
application of the Charter as binding on the Member States whenever they are 
acting within the scope of EU law. Accordingly, the Court’s jurisprudence cannot 
be underestimated and the voice of the Court will have an influence regarding the 
attitude towards social rights and the way in which the Treaties and the Directive 
are interpreted, for example, if the Court established a commitment to a more 
convincing social interpretation, that attitude can become embedded in the way 
the legislation is viewed.  
The Court’s policy-making role is therefore recognised by this thesis; 
which is also highlighted by the extensive impact the cases of the Laval Triplet 
                                                 
668
 Marshall; Foster v British Gas, op. cit.  
669
 Mangold; Kücükdeveci, op. cit. See Kilpatrick, ‘The ECJ and Labour Law: A 2008 
Retrospective’, op. cit.  
670
 Barnard, ‘EU ‘Social’ Policy: From Employment Law to Labour Market Reform’, op. cit., 662. 
671




 Report to the Commission, ‘A New Strategy for the Single Market: At the Service of Europe’s 
Economy and Society’, op. cit., Section 3.2. 
674
 Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson [2013] ECR ECR I-0000, judgment of 26 
February 2013, nyr. 
 260 
have had on Union law. However, the difficulty specific to this context is that if 
the Directive itself is not amended, the Court cannot be expected to reshape the 
law without the legislative impetus and go against its previous rulings.675 This is 
particularly true in regard to the legal basis; the Court is required to uphold the 
Treaties and interpret them accordingly676 and in light of the current Treaty 
provision forming the Directive’s legal basis the Court is restricted in departing 
too far from upholding the freedom to provide services.  
In conclusion, the improvement of the Directive should not be longed for 
by anticipating a future preliminary reference and, as seen by the EFTA Court 
judgments above, the scope of judicial interpretation will always leave a margin 
of uncertainty. Therefore, as this situation has reached its breaking point, it is 
submitted that for real change to be realised, a revision of the Directive is required 
which necessitates a voice from the legislator, not the Court.  
 
(vi) Interim Conclusion 
 
Since the Laval Triplet there have been substantial changes to the Union’s 
primary law, a Union bill of rights in the form of the Charter, a leap forward for 
the right of collective bargaining and action under Article 11 ECHR by the 
ECtHR and an axiomatic shift in the interpretation of the ECJ in the context of 
posted workers. Solution Number Three has therefore asked: are these changes 
alone enough to rectify the issues associated with the Directive so that the initial 
impetus to amend the Directive has been made obsolete? The answer is an 
unequivocal no. 
 It is true that Article 6(1) TEU grants legally binding status to the Charter, 
however, the practical application of Article 28 Charter is not a strong enough 
guarantee that this will truly bolster the interests of trade unions in the case of 
posted workers. Also, in light of the positive interpretation of Article 11 ECHR, to 
claim that an improvement to the right of collective bargaining and action will 
resolve all of the issues of the Directive presents a very one-dimensional view of 
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the legislation’s problems. This section also considered that even if labour rights 
can be argued to constitute fundamental human rights they will still be made 
subject to the principle of proportionality when up against a fundamental freedom 
in the Court and, in light of the legal basis, there is an automatic leaning in favour 
of the fundamental freedom. The difficulty with bolstering the significance of 
labour rights with a constitutional right of a Member State is that the 
constitutional principles of the Member States are unique and therefore, “the 
Court… prefers to avoid citing national constitutions for reason of the 
considerable differences between them.”677 
 The ECJ showed willing to move on from its previous interpretation of the 
Directive to reveal a newer approach. In both Commission v Germany and 
Vicoplus the Court upheld the transitional measures, thereby showing deference to 
the interests of protecting the host State’s labour market, despite the apparent 
restriction to the freedom to provide services. In Santos Palhota the Court held 
that a prior declaration is proportionate but the specific requirement of the work 
licensing mechanism under Belgian national law is not, however, in Commission v 
Germany678 the Court held that the obligation to make a prior declaration was an 
unjustified restriction on the freedom to provide services, thus, the Court has 
developed its jurisprudence in this area. Also, the Court upheld the second 
requirement on service providers to keep copies of documents available in the 
host State during the posting and then to send copies of those documents on 
completion of the posting, in the interests of worker protection, which also goes 
against its previous jurisprudence.679 Despite these developments, ultimately, real 
change cannot be achieved at the level of the Court as revealed by the EFTA 
Court’s interpretation in both ESA v Iceland and STX Norway that highlighted the 
issues with the Directive are intrinsic. These findings prove that in order to rectify 
the issues identified in Chapter 2, changes to the primary law of the Union and 
potential for a differing interpretation from the Court is not enough of a solid 
guarantee that this alone will improve the Directive. 
 
V. Conclusion 
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This Chapter has reviewed three separate solutions to rectify the issues of the 
Directive: (i) amend the Directive; or (ii) adopt the Enforcement Directive; or (iii) 
no changes to the Directive. Potentially, there could be a Solution Number Four 
which would remove the Directive altogether so that posted workers would be 
governed by something else pre-existing.  
Before 1996 there was no Posted Workers Directive and the choice of 
applicable law was influenced by private international law under the 1980 Rome 
Convention, “the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations already permitted host states to apply parts of their national labour law 
systems (under the guise of ‘mandatory requirements’) to posted workers whose 
contracts were governed by home state law.”680 However, the option of extending 
the host State’s laws via the mandatory requirements is not a guarantee, as 
opposed to the Directive which obliges the host State to extend the core 
provisions of their labour laws to posted workers, accordingly, “The benefit to 
out-of-state service providers of the Directive was that it harmonised the list of 
mandatory requirements (though not their content) across the Member States.”681 
Also, as a posted worker is only temporary, in accordance with the Rome I 
Regulation the ‘habitual place of work’ does not change and therefore neither 
does the applicable law, “if the posted worker does not have a habitual place of 
work, and moves from one country to another, the law of the country where his 
employer is established is applicable (which in cases of posting is the country of 
origin).”682 This indicates that the situation might be even worse without the 
Directive in terms of respecting and applying the host State’s laws.  
Another option would be to rely on a default arrangement such as the 
European Works Council Directive,683 “The default arrangement in this case must 
provide incentives for host-state workers/unions and home-state employers/unions 
to make agreements on the labour standards to apply to posted workers in the host 
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state.”684 This idea has potential, in part, because the European Works Council 
Directive “is frequently cited as an example of a very successful attempt to 
Europeanise national labour law systems.”685 However, these Works Councils are 
limited to improving the right to information and consultation of employees in 
undertakings with at least 1,000 employees spread over at least two Member 
States, which would effectively invalidate all SMEs from participating in the 
opportunity of posting or receiving posted workers. 
An alternative secondary legislation would be reliance on the Temporary 
Agency Work Directive,686 however, this would only, potentially,687 cover the 
scope of Article 1(3)(c) Directive on hiring out workers, thus, postings made 
under Article 1(3)(a) and (b) Directive that concern sending workers from the 
service provider to recipient or inter-company transfers would effectively be made 
redundant. 
 The final option considered here is the application of soft law mechanisms 
for harmonisation which can be used in areas where there are no competences to 
regulate, such as the open method of coordination (OMC). This could be coupled 
harmoniously with the concept that this area requires a greater flexibility in terms 
of the diverse national labour systems, “the bargaining system established in 
Sweden and other Nordic countries is often described as the model for 
‘flexicurity’ currently being promoted by the European Commission. By requiring 
‘universally applicable’ legislation the ECJ’s judicial activism may be seen as 
threatening not only autonomous collective bargaining structures in the Member 
States, but also the flexibility inherent in the European Social Model and, in 
particular, the Open Method of Coordination.”688 The OMC has sparked diverging 
opinions; whether arguments have been made in favour of the opportunities that it 
presents689 or have highlighted its shortfalls,690 this thesis submits that reliance on 
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the OMC alone would not be a suitable solution as, politically, it would be 
unfeasible, “It would not satisfy major stakeholders and certain parties in the 
European Parliament.”691 Also, a legislative intervention would provide for more 
legal certainty than a soft law approach and it would show a more committed 
response from the Commission. 
In conclusion, the potential for ‘Solution Number Four: Remove the 
Directive Altogether’ does not carry enough weight as there is no suitable pre-
existing alternative. The fact is that posted workers are a unique category of 
worker that require their own unique legislation. The purpose of this PhD has 
always been to find solutions that directly fix the identified issues of the Directive, 
therefore, unless the Directive itself is adequately amended to directly address 
those issues, any other proposed solution would ultimately be inadequate. In the 
same vein, Solution Number Two would be ineffectual as the proposed 
Enforcement Directive is incomplete and has succeeded in enforcing some of the 
issues and Solution Number Three is too conditional, uncertain and unknown. 
This thesis therefore submits that Solution Number One should be adopted in its 
entirety and added to this should be ‘Chapter VI: Cross-border Enforcement of 
Administrative Fines and Penalties’ from the proposed Enforcement Directive, 
under Solution Number Two, which would guarantee that workers receive the 
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I. The Answer to the Research Question 
 
The research question set out in the Introduction asks: how can the issues 
associated with the Posted Workers Directive692 best be resolved? The answer to 
that question is to adopt the proposals set out under Solution Number One and 
added to that Chapter VI of the proposed Enforcement Directive, as prescribed by 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
The law is a dynamic and constantly evolving subject, as such, my 
research question had to be flexible in order to reflect its movements. When I 
began this PhD my research question was “Should the Directive be Amended?” 
then, in my third year, the Commission published its proposal, confirming that 
there will be an amendment, in some form, regarding this legislation, 
consequently, my research question had to reflect this development and shifted to 
ask what that change should be. The contribution to knowledge presented in this 
PhD is my input to that current debate, and specifically, my contribution can be 
seen in the analysis of the issues, the original critique of the Court in Laval693 
embodied in its failure to recognise that the elimination of Article 4(3) of the 
amended Proposal694 from the Directive affirms that the requirement to declare the 
applicability of collective agreements in the transposing national legislation is 
obsolete and finally, the presentation of my proposed solution to the identified 
issues.  
This has been a very honest presentation of my ideas; every element is 
something that I truly believe in, even when it goes against the grain or what is 
presumed to be the right thing to do. For example, including a Monti Clause into 
the legislation, whether it be the primary or secondary legislation, would only 
change the direction of the problem; we need to break free from the pendulum and 
move forward. Including a provision for the going rate as opposed to the 
minimum rate would have the effect of eroding the commercial opportunities of 
posting workers abroad and is therefore not a realistic or thoroughly-considered 
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proposal, in essence, it represents an immediate reaction to a one-dimensional 
representation of the problem. Yes, of course there are differing wage and labour 
standards across the Union but this thesis endorses that those differences should 
be embraced so that the real value of the EU can be realised. The commercial 
opportunities of employing cheaper temporary labour should not be discouraged, 
provided, that the social opportunities are equally embraced by providing greater 
flexibility and awareness of the diverging national labour systems including an 
acceptance of the different ways in which the terms and conditions of employment 
may be extended to posted workers and the ability of social partners to negotiate 
and fight for more favourable conditions. It is intended that these amendments 
will contribute to the Union’s aim of establishing a genuine “social market 
economy”695 and thereby assist in finding balance between the competing interests 
of national and EU law and economic and social policies through the Directive. 
 
II. Wider Issues 
 
This PhD has focused on a case study, in the form of the Directive, in order to 
elicit the broader issues of the EU. The Directive is emblematic of the most 
pertinent and timeless issues of the Union: national versus Union law; economic 
versus social policies; and the threat of social dumping in an enlarging Union, 
exacerbated by the economic crisis, “Once perceived as a key instrument to 
prevent unfair competition on wages and working conditions in situations of 
temporary cross border provision of services, [the Directive] has now become the 
battle ground on which the fight about the social dimension of the internal market 
is fought.”696 
 The Directive’s issues bring to light the clash between economic and 
social rights of the Union and this thesis has proposed that rather than pitting these 
interests against one another, which pertains to a pendulum approach whereby the 
issues would repeat themselves back and forth, what is needed is an entirely new 
perspective of the normative value of these two concepts. The presumption to 
favour economic rights is rooted in the economic origins of the Union and 
therefore is rooted in the past. This thesis has been set out chronologically so as to 
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document the fundamental changes and developments that have occurred in the 
EU over the last few years. The primary law has been amended and in the process 
has truly bolstered the significance of social rights. The evolution of EU law must 
be reflected in the way the law is discussed, analysed and interpreted. This thesis 
has intended to demonstrate that the key to attaining a social market economy is to 
rethink the role of social rights which should not be as a derogation or an 
exception, but a partner to economic trade. This may be viewed as an idealistic as 
opposed to a realistic approach in practice, as ultimately, the Court cannot merely 
say that both sides are of equal value; it must make a judgment. Therefore, the 
proportionality test is necessary in assisting the Court with this balancing process. 
In light of this new thinking, the results of the proportionality test should not 
automatically be assumed to fall in line with economic policies but there must be 
a genuine scope to balance the fundamental freedoms in the same way as 
fundamental rights. The primary intention is that this suggestion should influence 
a change in perspective to move on from the notion that the economic and social 
principles are inherently incompatible. 
 Subsequently, it is hoped that this ‘reboot’ of the Union’s “economic 
programming”697 will resonate in the context of Union versus national law. 
Ascertaining the place of national law in a Union context was explored through 
the discussion of public policy arguments implemented to protect the domestic 
labour market from social dumping, which has been worsened in this context by 
the minimum conditions maintained in the Directive. The arguments in this area 
are more complicated than the economic versus social paradigm as those elements 
both comprise the Union’s objectives, whereas protection of the national labour 
market could so easily be linked to national protectionism which is 
understandably precluded from the Union’s goals. Therefore, this clash of 
competing interests requires a more careful and deliberate phrasing in finding its 
solution. It is submitted that through emphasising the need to avoid social tensions 
resulting from disturbances on the labour market in order to protect both public 
and social policy this will enhance the overall competitiveness of the internal 
market and contribute to the Union’s aspirations for full employment and social 
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progress.698 Therefore, by incorporating the Union’s objectives, the argument for 
protecting the Member States’ interests will be strengthened.  
 
III. Final Comments 
 
The Directive has been an incredibly useful tool to examine all of the major issues 
that I was most interested in researching. The Directive is also very compelling in 
and of itself as the specific problems continue to be raised across the Member 
States,699 revealing that the issues remain and the solution continues to be sought-
after. Subsequently, my final question in respect of attaining the proposed solution 
to the Directive has to be: is there currently the political will for change? 
 
“If we examine the history of the [posting] debate, it becomes very clear that 
national positions only shifted in favour of the Directive if there was an 
urgent ‘political’ need at home. When the European Community was 
enlarged with Portugal and Spain in 1986, public debates about the influx of 
Iberian workers created a climate for legislation… Later on, the fall of the 
wall in Berlin and the opening to the East created again an atmosphere 
where initially ignorant politicians realised that ‘something had to be 
done’.”700 
 
The political will for change must be present in order for anything to happen, 
however the Commission has determined that the current political feasibility of 
undertaking a wide-ranging review of the Directive is low as the “political debate 
remains polarised.”701 The only development provided by the Commission has 
been the proposed Enforcement Directive which clearly shows a lack of political 
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will for change as it fails to address the substantive issues at the heart of the 
problem. In the national context, with the UK as an example, there is a “current 
lack of interest expressed in this issue by any of the major UK political parties.”702 
 In conclusion to my final question, the answer is that currently there is not 
the political will for change. Nevertheless, it is determined that we need proposals 
in place in order to be able to inform the political process of thoroughly 
considered suggestions that take the interests of all major stakeholders into 
account, so that when the time is more opportune, an effective legislative solution 
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